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1 Introduction 
 
Key figures of education in Sub-Saharan Africa have improved substantially in recent 
years. From 2002 to 2012, the rate of out-of-school children of primary school age has 
decreased from about 36 percent to about 22 percent, the gross intake ratio to the last grade of 
primary education has increased from roughly 57 percent to almost 70 percent and the adult 
literacy rate of the population aged 15 and above has increased from about 57 percent to 
almost 60 percent (UNESCO, 2014a).1 
Nevertheless, the level of educational attainment is still low and has considerable 
scope for improvement. One of the important limitations to quantitative and qualitative 
improvements in education systems of developing countries is the severe budget constraint 
they face. The construction of schools, teacher salaries and the provision of teachers’ 
professional education are some of the main expenditures of governments for their school 
systems. 
 In low income countries, there are also often severe financial constraints on the micro-
level. Households may need their children to help generating household income (see, for 
example, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1997, p. 398). The latter can help in agricultural or in 
commercial activities and may therefore be partially absent from school. Schooling may 
consequently be subject to opportunity cost considerations: The benefit or return of an 
additional year at school may therefore be weighed against the immediate gains from working 
(see, for example, Bedi and Marshall, 2002). 
                         
1
 These figures by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) are partially estimated. 
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The financial constraints of governments on the macro-level and those of households 
on the micro-level play an important role in motivating the research question in chapter 2: 
There, I analyze grade repetition of students – a phenomenon that is particularly strong in 
Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. Around the year 2000, repetition rates in primary education 
in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa marked 20 percent and were substantially higher than in 
Anglophone Africa (MINEDAF, 2002, p.37). These exceedingly high rates pose a heavy 
financial burden on education systems struggling to achieve higher enrolment rates and better 
quality in primary education. 
Repeaters use up resources (such as textbooks) twice for each grade they repeat and 
may overcrowd schools leading to insufficient space for new entries, which leads to additional 
costs for schools (see Bourdon, 2006, p.130). Moreover, parents who do not see their children 
progressing in school may consider the return to an additional year of schooling to be small 
and prefer to take them out of school and let them help in generating the household income 
(see PASEC, 2004, p.19 in combination with Bedi and Marshall, 2002, p.134). 
 A justification for grade retention in spite of these costs may be that students increase 
their achievement in response to their retention. However, very little is known about the 
impact of grade retention on student achievement in the context of a school system with very 
high repetition rates. To analyze this relationship, I use a unique panel data set from 
Senegalese primary schools with comparable test scores across grades. I estimate the impact 
of repetition on subsequent student achievement using a multi-level propensity score 
matching model that incorporates the development path of students with respect to their 
achievement and many other relevant student, teacher and school characteristics. 
I find that, in general, repetition has a negative or insignificant effect on a student’s 
subsequent achievement. The results suggest that high repetition rates are difficult to justify 
Introduction 
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considering not only the costs for the education system as a whole but also the effect 
repetition has on the individual student. 
To further understand the potential benefits of education, I consider the importance of 
human capital for labor market decisions in chapter 3. In a setting where wage employment 
opportunities are scarce, the ability to become self-employed, for example by setting up a 
small business, can be very valuable. However, it seems that mainly two things could go 
wrong: First, individuals may not have enough knowledge and skills to become self-employed 
and may therefore face educational constraints. Second, they may not have the financial 
means to start a self-employment endeavor. In this context it is useful to analyze households 
who receive distinct amounts of remittances as the latter can alleviate liquidity constraints. 
Since both educational and financial constraints need to be considered simultaneously, I 
develop a theoretical model that incorporates both constraints and shows that individuals will 
only opt for self-employment if they have a minimum level of knowledge as well as sufficient 
financial means. I test the predictions of this model in an empirical analysis and find evidence 
that indeed remittances increase self-employment only for higher levels of schooling. 
 Remittances, as a means of alleviating liquidity constraints, may not only be useful for 
occupational choice considerations for working age individuals depending on their human 
capital but they can also be directly used to increase schooling of children. However, for a 
household to receive remittances, usually an adult household member migrates which can 
have counteracting effects on the schooling decisions of the household’s children. In chapter 
4, I disentangle the potential theoretical effects of remittances and migration on educational 
attainment of children. The empirical analysis finds no evidence of a positive effect of 
remittances on educational outcomes of children and therefore casts doubt on the importance 
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of financial constraints for the schooling decisions. In contrast, the schooling level of adult 
household members appears to be highly relevant in explaining child education. 
 Chapters 2-4 are self-contained such that they introduce, discuss and conclude the 
relevant research questions and the theoretical and empirical results within the respective 
chapter. Finally, in chapter 5, I offer concluding remarks that highlight the contributions of 
this dissertation and show the scope for future research in the field of human capital, labor 
markets and remittances that results from this work. 
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2 Grade Retention and Student Achievement in Senegalese Primary Schools 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In developing countries high repetition rates are widespread. Repetition in this context 
refers to students re-attending the same grade, and is often perceived as a measure to maintain 
or achieve educational quality. Several reasons can be found why students are not promoted to 
the next grade. One may be that some students are not as emotionally mature as their peers 
and are retained in order to have additional time to develop individually (see Shepard and 
Smith, 1989). Also, students may be required to obtain a certain level of knowledge to be 
promoted (see Jacob and Lefgren, 2004, p.227). If this level is not achieved, the student has to 
repeat her grade. Furthermore, the practice of grade retention2 may also act as an incentive or 
deterrent for students in order to encourage them to perform well and to put more effort into 
their studies (see Gary-Bobo and Robin, 2014, p.9). 
In the broader context there are two initiatives formulating educational goals to which 
the issue of grade retention may be linked: The Education for All (EFA; see UNESCO, 2000) 
movement and Goal 2 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs; see United Nations, 
2014) that seeks to achieve universal primary education of high quality. If repetition rates are 
very high, the educational system may quickly suffer from overcrowding (see Bourdon, 2006, 
p.130) if additional educational inputs and infrastructure are not provided. When enrolment 
rates stay constant there will be more students per class the higher the number of repeaters. 
                         
2
 The terms “grade retention” and “grade repetition” are used synonymously throughout this chapter. 
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With growing class sizes, pupil–teacher ratios increase and the schools may not be able to 
manage high levels of school enrolment (see Bernard, Simon and Vianou, 2005). An 
education system that is overloaded as a result of high repetition rates therefore endangers the 
aims of the two initiatives. 
While there is a heated debate about the efficiency of grade retention in developed 
countries (see, for example, Gary-Bobo and Robin, 2014), little research has been done with 
respect to developing countries so far. It is necessary to analyze developing countries 
separately as the educational framework there differs considerably. Repetition rates are much 
higher in developing countries. Around 2000, average repetition rates in primary education 
marked roughly 20 percent in Francophone Africa and more than 10 percent in Anglophone 
Africa (MINEDAF, 2002, p.37). In Senegal, repetition averaged roughly 10 percent per grade 
in 2000 and decreased to about 5 percent in 2010 (UNESCO, 2011). Often these countries 
face problems that are virtually unknown in the developed world (e.g. low school attendance 
during harvesting season or a large distance to the nearest school). Other problems, like the 
costs of retention, are similar but their impact is different (developing countries face different 
financial constraints). When repetition rates are extremely high it is difficult to simply argue 
that all the repeating students are not mature enough or did not acquire the necessary 
knowledge to proceed to the next grade. Instead, the question arises as to how effective these 
high repetition rates are and how much they actually benefit the individual student. Given the 
high costs of overcrowded education systems for developing countries, repetition may only be 
justified if it has a clear positive effect on subsequent achievement of students. 
Grade Retention and Student Achievement in Senegalese Primary Schools 
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Recent empirical evidence on the effects of grade retention in developed countries is 
ambiguous.3 Jacob and Lefgren (2004) use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to study 
the test-based promotion policy in Chicago schools and show that repetition has a positive 
impact on the test scores of grade 3 students that is decreasing over time, but no impact on the 
achievement of sixth graders. Similarly, the pattern of short-term positive effects and the lack 
of an impact in the medium term are reported by Alet (2010) for French students. The author 
uses an instrumental variables (IV) approach and reports that grade retention in grades 1 and 2 
improves student achievement in the short run (grade 3) but loses its impact on test scores 
after several years, when students are in grade 6. Another study in France by Mahjoub (2008), 
using an IV approach as well as a matching approach, finds a positive impact of grade 
repetition on student achievement and on the probability of graduation. Fertig (2004) also 
finds a positive effect of grade retention on educational outcomes (increased probability of 
obtaining a high schooling degree) in Germany, when tackling unobserved heterogeneity by 
instrumenting for grade retention. 
Research on grade retention in developing countries is generally quite scarce and no 
less ambiguous than the literature in the developed world. The main problem is that adequate 
data from developing countries are hardly available and their quality is often inferior. 
Manacorda (2012) uses regression discontinuity to analyze Uruguayan public schools. He 
shows that automatic grade failure (when students miss more than 25 days of school) has a 
negative impact on educational outcomes four to five years after failure. In contrast, Gomes-
Neto and Hanushek’s (1994) analysis of primary schools in Brazil’s rural northeast finds that 
repetition has a positive impact on achievement scores in later grades. 
                         
3
 For a broader review of recent work on grade retention, see Gary-Bobo and Robin (2014). 
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In-depth studies on the impact of grade retention in Sub-Saharan Africa are very 
scarce and the existing literature has not been able to clearly infer causality for at least two 
reasons. First, the analyses rely on simple ordinary least squares (OLS) or multi-level 
techniques that are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias as unobserved student ability is 
not accounted for. Second, the studies generally confine their analyses to common items of 
the tests of subsequent grades, thereby discarding a substantial amount of information. 
Bernard et al. (2005) analyze the five-year PASEC4 panels for Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal and 
find a strong negative relationship between previous grade retention and test scores in grades 
4 and 5. In PASEC (2004), the panel for Senegal is used to examine the impact of repetition 
on subsequent achievement separately for different grades. In this analysis, the test scores of 
repeaters are compared to those of promoted students but only for those test items that were 
common in both tests. The results suggest that throughout different grades repeaters perform 
worse on these tests than promoted students, even if initial achievement and other variables 
are controlled for. Labé (2011) also uses the common items of the tests in these panel data and 
finds a negative effect of retention on subsequent achievement. While PASEC (2004) relies 
on simple OLS methods, Labé (2011) applies a multi-level model to cope with the structure of 
the data. Both are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias as unobserved student ability has 
not been accounted for. The analyses in this chapter build on the work of these studies but use 
a much larger set of information as detailed below. Furthermore, recent PASEC reports on 
other Francophone Sub-Saharan African countries also use simple regression techniques for 
their cross-sectional data and find negative effects of retention on achievement (see e.g. 
PASEC, 2009; 2010a; 2010b). 
                         
4
 Programme d’Analyse des Systèmes Éducatifs de la CONFEMEN (PASEC), where CONFEMEN stands for 
Conférence des Ministres de l’Éducation des pays ayant le français en partage. 
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This chapter contributes threefold to the literature. First, this analysis tackles the issues 
regarding the content as it considers the development of students in terms of achievement 
several years after their retention (not just the first subsequent year) and does not confine 
itself to specific items in student test scores. Second, it targets the problem of causal inference 
by including the development paths of students before retention, which are likely to account 
for relevant (unobserved) covariates that have not been surveyed. By employing this 
methodology I strengthen the credibility of the statistical assumptions, in particular the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA). Student fixed effects models that also target the 
issues related to possible endogeneity due to innate ability of students or other unobservables 
are employed as robustness checks. Finally, I am not aware of any other study on this topic in 
the context of Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa that uses a panel data set where test scores of 
the same students in different years are available and comparable. 
The results of the matching and panel matching estimations suggest that there is a 
negative or in some cases an insignificant effect of repetition on subsequent student 
achievement. These results are corroborated in robustness checks using fixed effects and 
random effects models. Moreover, there is no evidence that the effects differ for students with 
higher or lower test scores prior to repetition. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 elaborates on 
possible links between retention and subsequent student achievement. Section 2.3 gives 
details on the data used and data management. Section 2.4 explains the methodology used and 
section 2.5 reports the results of the analysis. Finally, section 2.6 concludes. 
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2.2 The link between retention and achievement 
 
Repetition is likely to have an effect on student performance via a number of channels. 
One greatly debated feature of retention in the literature on developed countries is the fact that 
retained students may suffer emotionally (see, for example, Smith and Shepard, 1989, p.216) 
which may be perceived as detrimental to the motivation of the student. The student will see 
her peers promoted to the next grade and therefore may perceive her academic failure as a 
personal one. The more often the student repeats, the more strongly the personal failure may 
be perceived. Moreover, it may well be that the student is mocked by her old and new peers 
who have been constantly promoted so far, and thus she could feel ashamed (see Byrnes, 
1989, p.124). In addition, the student will have to settle in her new class, starting anew with 
making friends and striving to get socially accepted by her peers. As the student will be older 
than her new classmates, she will have to struggle harder to achieve acceptance from her 
peers and therefore suffer from motivational drawbacks (cf. Roderick 1994, 1995). However, 
these linkages are more likely to hold for developed countries than for the developing world, 
where repetition rates per grade are so high that the individual repeater is less likely to be 
isolated or ashamed. Another reason for demotivation that is more specific to developing 
countries may lie in the awareness of the student of the additional costs she is causing by her 
grade repetition. If we perceive schooling as a cost–benefit consideration (as in Bedi and 
Marshall, 2002 or Glick and Sahn, 2010), even if there are no fees, the (opportunity) cost of 
schooling may be high since the student could work in the family business or labor market 
instead of attending school. The benefits for the student are human capital accumulation and 
thereby increased job market opportunities later in life (see also PASEC, 2004, p.19). If a 
student is aware of the cost an additional year of schooling is causing for her family she may 
Grade Retention and Student Achievement in Senegalese Primary Schools 
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well be demotivated, resulting in lower achievement or even dropout. As students are able to 
work more and gain higher wages the older and stronger they become, these opportunity costs 
tend to rise with increasing age. This argument is already relevant for early primary grades, 
specifically in the case of late school enrolment or multiple repetitions. 
When students repeat, there will be additional learning in this year (see Gomes-Neto 
and Hanushek, 1994) – possibly to fill knowledge gaps or to acquire further knowledge – and 
they should perform better, relative to their new peers, than they did, relative to their old 
peers, in the previous year (see also Bernard et al., 2005, p.55). The differentiation between 
old and new peers is important when comparing the students. On the one hand, we may 
analyze how the student develops compared to her new classmates (she will, however, have 
had one more year of schooling) or compared to her old classmates who have been promoted 
to the next grade (but have as many years of schooling as the repeating student, see Holmes, 
1989, p.21). These two concepts will be detailed in subsection 2.5.1. Using the rationale that 
retention will give the student an additional year of schooling, I posit the baseline hypothesis 
that, relative to their new peers, repeaters will do better than they did relative to their old peers 
in the previous year. 
It is not easy to judge whether filling knowledge gaps on the positive side or 
demotivational aspects on the negative side have a stronger impact on subsequent 
achievement after retention. The latter, however, is likely to have a greater influence for two 
reasons. Theoretically, retention is rather difficult to explain by knowledge gaps for high and 
medium achieving students, of which there are apparently a considerable number (PASEC, 
2004, p.12; Bernard et al. 2005, p.42). Their demotivation may be expected to be even 
stronger as they may regard the repetition decision to be unjust. Moreover, empirically, the 
results of recent PASEC reports from other Francophone Sub-Saharan African countries 
Grade Retention and Student Achievement in Senegalese Primary Schools 
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suggest that retention impacts rather negatively on subsequent achievement (e.g. PASEC, 
2009; 2010a; 2010b). 
If the consideration that demotivation is the stronger argument is true, we could expect 
that a retained student will in fact perform worse in subsequent grades than if she had been 
promoted. Furthermore, when the student enters higher grades of primary school she will 
approach early adolescence and the difference between older and younger students may 
become more obvious. These may arise in physical or emotional form and emphasize the 
differences between older students (who have repeated in the past) and students of average 
age (see Roderick, 1994, p.742). As I am analyzing primary grades the problem of being over-
age may be the more pronounced the higher the grade. As the ability to work and the strength 
of the student increase the older the student gets, the opportunity costs increase as well. This 
may also lead to demotivation if the student feels she could work in the family business or the 
labor market instead of attending school. In this case, grade repetition in early primary grades 
could have more negative effects after more years following the repetition than in the direct 
aftermath. On the other hand, a one year age difference is relatively greater for younger 
students than for older ones which may result in more negative effects in the first year after 
retention. Therefore, it is ultimately an empirical question if, for early primary grades, 
repeaters will perform worse the longer retention dates back compared to a matched control 
group of promoted students or if the impact of retention on achievement in the subsequent 
year is nullified or reversed after more years. 
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2.3 Data and data management 
 
2.3.1 Variable selection 
 
The analysis of this chapter uses exceptionally rich panel data from Senegalese 
primary schools surveyed during the period 1995–2000 (see PASEC, 2004)5. The survey was 
conducted as part of PASEC in a cooperation between the Senegalese Ministry of Education 
and CONFEMEN6 starting with a stratified random sample of roughly 2,000 students at the 
beginning of their second grade in 1995 and following this cohort for five consecutive years 
or until the respective students dropped out of school. The students were tested each year in 
both Math and French.. This survey was specifically designed to allow for a thorough analysis 
of repetition practices and their consequences in Senegalese primary schools. The data include 
a wide range of variables detailing the characteristics of the students and of their environment. 
These data come from questionnaires for students, teachers and directors giving insight into 
the socio-economic background of students, the schooling conditions and the characteristics 
of their teachers (see Bernard and Michaelowa, 2006 and PASEC, 2004). Twenty students 
were selected at random in each of just under 100 schools to answer the questionnaire and 
participate in the tests leading to 1,977 observations, of which 1,746 have a non-missing test 
score value. Since the number of dropouts is considerable the number of observations 
decreases from one survey wave to the next. In addition, some students were not at school on 
test days and account for some of the missing data in the test score variable. For these 
reasons, there are only 1,009 observations with a non-missing test score value left in the last 
                         
5
 The raw data of the PASEC panel for Senegal is available from CONFEMEN (www.confemen.org) upon 
request. 
6
 CONFEMEN stands for Conférence des Ministres de l’Education Ayant le Français en Partage. 
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year of the survey. For the matching analysis, the data are split by grade in order to enable an 
analysis for each grade level (see a detailed explanation in section 2.4). 
The explanatory variables are classified into three major categories, as shown in Table 
2.1:7 Student-specific characteristics that include mainly the respective socio-economic status 
(see, for example, Dumas and Lambert, 2011, on the relationship between socio-economic 
background and schooling in Senegal), class variables, and teacher characteristics. Six 
variables are used to identify the socio-economic status, namely the student’s gender (boy)8 
and age (student age), the work obligations outside school, the intake of meals, an index for 
property at home and an index for media availability at home.9 The latter three variables are 
additive indexes each of which consists of the sum of their components. Work obligations 
outside school (work at home) is a categorical variable comprising eight possible work fields: 
Cooking, cleaning, washing, agriculture, animal husbandry, dishwashing, childcare and 
commercial activities. This index shall account for the distraction from school activities and 
the reduced time available for homework and home study. The index for property at home 
(property at home) details the wealth situation of the student’s family, comprising the 
possession of a car, a fridge, a flush toilet, electricity and/or a water tap. The index of media 
availability (media availability) contains information on the possession of a TV, radio and/or 
video device at home. The latter variable can be perceived as an additional wealth index. By 
the nature of its components, it can also be linked to education since consuming videos, radio 
and TV shows may improve a child’s understanding in the spoken languages, drive curiosity 
or even be directly useful as educational transmitters when transferring useful knowledge (see 
Michaelowa, 2001, p.1705). For this reason, it is separated from the previous property index. 
                         
7
 Appendix D comprehensively details editing and imputations from the raw data to the final data set. 
8
 The variable names are indicated in parenthesis as used in the tables. 
9
 For variable descriptions, see Table A1 in Appendix A. 
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Finally, intake of meals (meals) measures if the student has regular breakfast, lunch and 
dinner. I consider this important as the link between nutrition and educational outcomes has 
been established in the literature (see Michaelowa, 2001; Vermeersch and Kremer, 2004; 
Glewwe, 2005). Besides these student characteristics information is included on the 
individual schooling conditions and knowledge of the respective child. In particular, the 
analysis includes the number of grades repeated up to the current grade (prior repetition). I 
regard this to be important information since I want to measure the effect of a specific 
repetition decision (repetition) that could in turn be influenced by prior repetition. What is 
more, with respect to personal schooling conditions I include current Math test scores (test 
scores), which should be important in determining repetition. Moreover, I include two 
variables indicating if the student speaks French at home (student speaks French at home) and 
the number of languages spoken (languages student). Finally, I include a variable that 
measures if the student studies at home and gets help there with her studies (study at home). 
A number of variables are used containing information on class or school 
characteristics10. One is the size of the class (class size) (see, for example, Angrist and Lavy, 
1999; Case and Deaton, 1999; Hanushek, 1998, on the impact of pupil–teacher ratios/class 
size on student achievement) and another two are the shares of available Math books (share 
math books; see, for example, Frölich and Michaelowa, 2011 or Fehrler, Michaelowa, and 
Wechtler, 2009, for studies in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa) in the class of the student 
and a variable indicating if the class is organized in a double-shift manner (double shift), 
where different classes use the same room at different times of the day. Furthermore, the 
estimations include a measure of urbanization of the school location, differentiating between 
small village, big village, suburban area and town (city size). 
                         
10
 As only one class per school has been sampled I use the terms class and school characteristics as convenient. 
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In addition, variables on class characteristics are included that reflect class and school 
management. This includes the number of students in the first six grades and therefore a 
measure of school size that may influence the organization of the school (number of students). 
Smaller schools may exhibit a more familial relationship between students, teachers and the 
director. This may have an impact on individual repetition decisions and on test scores. 
Another variable (teacher meetings) measures how often the director meets with all the 
teachers in school. This variable may reflect how much discussions and exchange of opinions 
are valued among the teachers and with the director. In addition, a variable that indicates the 
number of partnerships (partnerships) a school has with foreign schools, non-governmental 
organizations or other aid organizations or bilateral co-operations. These partnerships may 
influence the general perceptions of a school with regard to grade retention or other policies. 
Additional variables are the share of repeaters per class (share repeaters in class) and 
the mean score of a class (mean score of class). The reasons for the inclusion of the latter two 
variables and their importance are detailed in subsection 2.5.1. 
Finally, teacher characteristics are considered by variables for the gender of the 
teacher (male teacher), the training he or she received (teacher training) and the work 
experience he or she obtained (teacher job experience). The teacher training variable is a 
categorical one starting with a value of zero for no training up to a value of five for a training 
period of more than twelve months. Job experience contains teaching experience in number of 
years. Furthermore, I include variables indicating if the teacher speaks French at home 
(teacher speaks French at home) and if he or she speaks the local language (teacher speaks 
local language). 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
Variable1) N2) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Student characteristics   
repetition 5588 0.16 0.37 0 1 
prior repetition 7468 0.49 0.66 0 4 
test scores 6488 0.28 1.95 -6.2 6 
test scores grade 2 1742 -1.33 1.52 -6.21 3.98 
test scores grade 3 1641 -0.18 1.42 -5.21 4.57 
test scores grade 4 1330 0.98 1.36 -3.15 5.69 
test scores grade 5 1140 1.82 1.26 -4.4 5.77 
dropout after grade 2 2070 0.14 0.34 0 1 
dropout after grade 3 1844 0.12 0.32 0 1 
dropout after grade 4 1475 0.07 0.25 0 1 
boy 7349 0.55 0.5 0 1 
property at home 7349 3.25 2.35 0 7 
media availability 7349 1.57 0.92 0 3 
work at home 7434 3.14 2.07 0 8 
meals 6414 2.56 0.57 0 3 
student age 7452 10.07 1.7 6 17 
student speaks French at 
home 
7349 0.1 0.30 0 1 
languages-student 7349 1.17 0.61 0 7 
study at home 7238 1.72 0.59 0 2 
 Teacher characteristics   
teacher training 5244 3.47 1.36 0 5 
male teacher 5283 0.65 0.48 0 1 
teacher job experience 4413 13.94 8.46 1 37 
teacher speaks local 
language 
4008 0.72 0.45 0 1 
teacher speaks French at 
home 
3996 2.56 0.84 1 4 
Class characteristics (including class management) 
mean score of class 7249 0.38 1.54 -5.2 6 
share repeaters in class 7272 0.14 0.11 0 1 
double shift 4828 0.28 0.45 0 1 
class size 4172 51.53 15.05 12 148 
share math books 6254 0.41 0.35 0 1 
city size 6726 3.06 1.17 1 4 
number of students 7145 702.45 363.53 14 1965 
partnerships 7384 0.48 0.65 0 3 
teacher meetings 7384 2.58 0.95 0 4 
1) Descriptive statistics of complete data set after partial imputation without dropouts (except in the case of the variable dropout). 
2)
 The number of observations differs across variables as some of them refer to a single grade (for example test scores grade 2), to all years of 
the data for each student (for example repetition) and due to missing values. 
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2.3.2 Item response theory (IRT) 
 
An excellent feature of the data used here is the availability of observations across 
time for the same students, specifically their achievement measured by test scores. 
Educational data with this property are almost non-existent in developing countries. In most 
studies where panel data are available – even for developed countries – comparability is 
severely restricted as the difficulty of the tests varies with the different grades in which the 
students are tested. For this reason, most studies referred to above confine their analyses to 
common items (of two consecutive years), i.e. questions that are identical in the tests of the 
grades that the researcher intends to compare. When using this methodology the problem 
arises that only a small part of the actual test is analyzed, therefore leaving out potentially 
important information from other test questions. Furthermore, the more distant the analyzed 
grades are, the more difficult it will be to find a sufficient number of common items. If they 
exist at all, they may not reflect very well what the students learn, as it is unlikely that there 
will be much additional progress on simple items of grade 2 when the student attends the last 
grade of primary school. I believe this additional aspect to be of significant importance as it 
could bias the analysis of prior studies that rely only on items that are common throughout the 
grades compared. The IRT calculation overcomes this problem due to the use of anchor items, 
i.e. common items across tests, that also change over the years, thereby linking only one or 
two years. 
For this reason, the opportunities of IRT were used where questions that are not 
identical in different tests are made comparable (see Hambleton, Swaminathan, and Rogers, 
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1991).11 This methodology aims at assessing item difficulties instead of test difficulties. Using 
anchor items, the remaining items that vary in the tests of the different grades are calibrated in 
order to achieve a common scale for the different tests. The assumption is that item difficulty 
and student’s ability are invariant. The test difficulty estimates do not change depending on 
the particular set of students (and therefore the particular set of abilities) and vice versa. As 
item difficulty and ability are unknown a priori, they are jointly estimated by weighted 
(maximum) likelihood estimation (WLE; see also Warm, 1989). Data calibration was 
complex due to the length of the panel. In particular, in the case of French this meant that the 
concepts covered by the different items could not be considered to reflect one and the same 
dimension of learning. WLE scores for Math, however, could be calculated, thus allowing for 
a comparison of test scores across all tests and therefore across all the years of the panel. 
 
2.4 Methodology 
 
2.4.1 Empirical approach 
 
This analysis benefits from three major advantages over the existing studies of grade 
retention in Sub-Saharan Africa. First, as discussed above, I do not confine the comparison 
between repeaters and non-repeaters to the common items of tests of consecutive years but 
use the more complete information extracted by the application of IRT methodology. Second, 
I also analyze the effect of grade retention on student achievement more than one year after 
the repetition decision. This is important to infer not just the immediate effect of repetition but 
the effect on achievement after several years. Third, by using a multi-level matching 
methodology that includes the development path of the student with respect to relevant 
                         
11
 I would like to thank Christian Monseur for the calculation of these comparable test scores. 
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covariates I overcome statistical shortcomings of earlier work in this field (for example 
PASEC, 2004; Labé, 2011) that could not establish the causal effect between repetition and 
student achievement. 
While PASEC (2004) largely relied on OLS methods and Labé (2011) implemented a 
multi-level model, this analysis makes use of propensity score matching to infer the impact of 
grade retention on student achievement. This method is chosen for a number of reasons. One 
advantage over the other methods is the lack of assumptions regarding the functional form, 
i.e. I do not assume linearity. More importantly, comparisons should only use existing 
observations. While OLS extrapolates into regions where there are possibly no observations, 
the matching algorithm ensures that results are based on actual observations. 
The aim of this study is to infer how students would have performed if they had not 
repeated. For this counterfactual analysis, it is necessary to find students with similar 
characteristics in order to compare them. The students are matched based on observable 
characteristics such as their background inter alia as discussed above. The method is based on 
the conditional independence assumption (see Dawid, 1979): 
 
	 ⫫ |	      (2.1) 
 
where D takes the value 1 if student i belongs to the treatment group (here: repeaters) and 0 if 
the student belongs to the control group and Y is the potential outcome (here: student 
achievement). If this assumption is satisfied there is no selection problem once observable 
characteristics are controlled for. In other words, adjusting for student, school and teacher 
characteristics, the potential outcome Y does not depend on participation status D. 
Accordingly, all relevant variables would need to be included separately. As Rosenbaum and 
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Rubin (1983) have shown we may use the probability of treatment instead, where matching is 
based on a single number, i.e. the propensity score: 
 
	 ⫫ |		( = 1 ∣ )    (2.2) 
 
Consequently, the probability of being treated may be compared instead of comparing 
all relevant characteristics X. The probability of treatment for each student is generally 
calculated by a logit or probit estimation. The panel data used in this chapter have a multi-
level structure of two levels. Students are nested within classes. As students within the same 
class tend to be more alike we cannot guarantee independence between observations within 
classes. Therefore, I opted for a multi-level logit function to estimate the treatment 
probabilities of each student. This estimation specifically takes into account the different 
levels and the correlation of student characteristics within a class. The model is essentially a 
random effects model and may be written as follows (see Gelman and Hill, 2007): 
 
ijijjij XD εββ ++= 10    (2.3) Micro model (student level) 
   jjj uW ++= 100 γγβ     (2.4) Macro model (class/school level) 
   jijijjij uXWD ++++= εβγγ 110   (2.5) Reduced form 
 
where D is the treatment variable (grade retention) that takes values one or zero, X indicates 
variables on the level of the student (i) and W on the level of the class/school (j). ε  and u  are 
individual and class/school level residuals respectively. 
Furthermore, the time dimension of the panel data needs to be taken into account. 
However, the assumption of independence between matched observations and the stable unit 
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treatment value assumption (SUTVA) should not be violated. SUTVA states that the potential 
outcomes for one observation are independent of assignment to treatment of other 
observations. Therefore, I do not match a student in grade 2 to herself in grade 3 or to herself 
in any other grade. Nielsen and Sheffield (2009) argue that matching should be based on 
panels, paying attention to ensuring that control samples do not overlap. In their example they 
match “Mali 1989–1998” with “Malawi 1991–2000” and “Mali 1979–1988” with “Niger 
1981–1990” (Nielsen and Sheffield, 2009, p.18). Therefore, they overcome the problem of 
possible dependence among country–year dyads. 
In the case of repetition, however, it is not advisable to adopt this procedure in exactly 
the same manner as I am specifically interested in the impact of repetition in a certain grade, 
i.e. I distinguish between students repeating grade 2, grade 3 and so on. Consequently, the 
analysis will draw from the matching methodology used by Findley and Young (2011), who 
split panel data by year, match observations within these subsamples and reconstruct these 
partial data sets into a new panel data set. This procedure guarantees that the same student is 
not matched based on different years. For the purposes of this chapter it is not necessary to 
reconstruct the partial data sets. I will report on the results for each available primary school 
grade separately. For a specific example, consider the grade 3 students. A student who repeats 
in this grade will be matched based on her characteristics in this grade to a student who is 
promoted to grade 4, based on that student’s characteristics in grade 3. Then, the difference in 
test scores between these two students one, two, etc. years after the repetition of one of the 
students will be compared. In this way, the effect of repetition can be assessed over time. This 
cross-sectional analysis will be specification 1 in the empirical analysis below. Since 
specification 1 does not make use of time trends before retention, the method is further 
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adjusted by including the development of the students' achievement (and other covariates) 
before the decision about repetition. 
When there is more than one time-observation before the repetition of a student, it is 
useful to match panels with two or more years. For this purpose, I adapt the methodology of 
Nielsen and Sheffield (2009) by restricting the matching algorithm to matches based on 
corresponding years, for example matching student i based on i’s observable characteristics in 
grades 2 and 3 to student j based on j’s characteristics in grades 2 and 3 in order to receive 
results for retention in grade 3. 
There are two issues to consider here. First, how many time periods before the grade 
of treatment should be included in the matching? Second, based on how many explanatory 
variables with information referring to pre-treatment years can be matched? The first question 
is easy to answer with respect to the data used. As there is only a short panel of five years, all 
pre-treatment years are included for this part of the analysis. That is, students repeating grade 
5, for example, are matched based on four previous years (i.e. grades 2 to 5). Students 
repeating grade 3 for another example are matched based on two previous years (grades 2 and 
3). The second question is more difficult to answer. For the same example of a grade 5 
repeater, the estimations would need to include the explanatory variables for four pre-
treatment years, resulting in a large number of explanatory variables. We may therefore 
expect difficulties in achieving balance among all covariates, which is crucial for the 
matching procedure to work. These problems can, however, be tackled using the appropriate 
matching algorithm that are detailed below. Furthermore, not all variables that have 
immediate effects need to be directly relevant for later years (e.g. how much the class size of a 
student four years earlier would influence current retention of a student). If a variable has an 
impact, it is likely to be indirectly channeled through student achievement in these pre-
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treatment periods. Therefore, I choose to take into account the time dimension for the variable 
I judge most important for the retention decision and that should also reflect these other 
variables in an indirect way, namely the test score. This is specification 2 in the analysis 
below. The test score is indeed the most significant variable in explaining retention, which is 
evident from the propensity score estimation (as discussed in subsection 2.5.2 and shown in 
Appendix B). Nevertheless, I also report on the results with time trends for all explanatory 
variables (specification 3). As I expect that the change in test scores from one grade to the 
next is more relevant than the level of test scores in each year, only the first year test score is 
included besides the changes from that grade to the next, the change from that new grade test 
score to the next, etc. The same procedure to compute time trends was used for all other 
covariates in the alternative specification 3, which includes time trends for all variables.12 
One of the most important tasks in this kind of matching estimation is to make sure 
that there is balance between the treatment and control groups with respect to all of the 
covariates used in the estimation. That is, observations need to be found that are indeed 
comparable and that do not differ significantly in their characteristics. For the data of this 
chapter, radius matching, which makes use of a caliper, leads to very good matches in most of 
the specifications (see Appendix C). Caliper matching defines the maximum difference in 
propensity score between two observations that may be used for comparison. In contrast to 
nearest neighbor matching, caliper matching avoids bad matches when the best comparison 
observation is very different. I have defined this distance to be no more than 0.05.13 One 
possible drawback compared to nearest neighbor matching – specifically in the case of few 
observations – is that using caliper matching may lead to fewer matches and may therefore 
                         
12
 See Figure A6 in Appendix A for an illustration of the allocation of matches. 
13
 The propensity score is the probability of being treated and therefore lies between 0 and 1. The value 0.05 
signifies that the propensity score of matches may be a maximum of five percentage points above or below the 
propensity score of the treated observation. 
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result in a higher variance of the estimation. I therefore follow the suggestion of Dehejia and 
Wahba (2002), who propose radius matching, that is to use all comparison observations 
within the caliper not just the nearest one, in order to overcome this problem (see also 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
 
2.4.2 Potential limitations of methodological approach 
 
The (panel) matching approach detailed above is a selection on observables 
methodology that relies upon the assumption that all relevant characteristics of students are 
included.14 Subsection 2.3.1 on variable selection showed that a large number of student, 
teacher and school characteristics were included that may be relevant for grade retention and 
future test scores of students. However, there may still be unobserved variables that may 
affect grade repetition conditional on included observable covariates, which may potentially 
confound the results of the estimations. In general, there may be two types of unobserved 
variables: Those that can be perceived as constant over time, such as student ability or – to 
some extent – motivation and those that should be regarded as sudden and/or unexpected, 
such as economic shocks to the household of the student. 
Student ability is a typical unobserved factor in educational studies, which cannot be 
inferred from survey data. However, ability is likely to mainly affect grade retention through 
prior student test scores or the change in test scores over time, both of which the study 
controls for. Including prior test scores would be equivalent to a standard value-added 
approach. This study goes beyond that with the additional inclusion of the change in test 
scores over time. Similarly, if motivation is regarded as a constant characteristic of a student, 
                         
14
 I would like to thank two anonymous referees for pointing me towards identification problems with respect to 
selection issues and student motivation. 
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then it is likely to have an effect on current grade retention through past retention, which is a 
control variable in this study. However, to the extent that motivation is not a constant 
characteristic of a student but of sudden nature its exclusion may be problematic for the 
estimation and may bias the matching estimates. In this case it is decisive where the lack of 
motivation stems from. If it is caused by observed teacher characteristics or by low learning 
progress during the school year this would also not be a problem for the estimations of this 
study as teacher characteristics and test scores are controlled for. If it is caused by other 
unobserved issues such as personal problems because of family issues or the like it might 
influence the estimations. Motivation can be expected to be positively correlated to future test 
scores. If grade repetition and motivation are negatively correlated then omitting a measure 
for motivation will underestimate the effect of grade retention on subsequent test scores. This 
gives some confidence in the estimates reported below. The size of the bias may then depend 
on the frequency that such lack of motivation based on unobserved factors appears in the 
sample, the strength of this motivational effect and its change over time. We may conjecture 
that the bias will be reasonably small because much of the correlation between grade retention 
and motivation may be expected to be captured by current test scores, the mean score of the 
class and to a lesser extent the large number of covariates included. Moreover, the 
specifications including the development path may decrease concern of bias to the extent that 
unobserved variables such as motivation should be captured by the development of test scores 
and other covariates of a student from one grade to the next if they do indeed have an impact 
on future test scores. 
Analogously, sudden shocks to the household of students may have an influence on 
grade retention conditional on test scores. This may be the case if parents fall ill or if there are 
unexpected economic shocks (e.g. due to a lack of agricultural output). Students may then 
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have to help at home or contribute to the household income. These shocks are likely to 
increase their risk of grade repetition and may also be negatively correlated with future test 
scores. This would also mean that the coefficients of the matching estimations would be 
underestimated. Moreover, these shocks may partly impact on grade retention and test scores 
through variables that are included in the estimations, such as students’ work obligations and 
their possessions at home that are time varying and that proxy the economic conditions at 
home. 
To the extent that time-invariant variables are not sufficiently captured in the 
specifications including time trends in covariates, subsection 2.5.4.1 estimates fixed-effects 
models as robustness checks that alleviate concerns in this regard. Nonetheless, they also 
cannot prevent bias to occur due to time-varying factors. 
A second potential limitation is selectivity since a noteworthy share of students drops 
out (see summary statistics in Table 2.1). The main analysis discards these dropouts since we 
do not have measures of their future achievements as they did not take tests after their 
dropout. The selectivity of remaining students may produce bias as grade retention and 
student dropout are likely to be positively associated (see, for example, André, 2012; 
Mancorda, 2012; Glick and Sahn, 2010). If grade retention indeed increases the likelihood of 
dropout, then a negative effect found in the existing sample will be a conservative estimate 
and the actual effect will be more strongly negative. Subsection 2.5.4.3 provides a detailed 
discussion on the selection problem and presents results from simulations that give insights 
about the strength of the main results of this study. 
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2.5 Results 
 
2.5.1 Tracking issues and descriptive graphical findings 
 
Before starting with the analysis of the relationship between retention and student 
achievement let us briefly discuss the issue of tracking (see, for example, Rothstein, 2010) 
that has been detailed in recent education literature and that may possibly bias the results if it 
is not accounted for. The idea is that teacher value added models may produce biased 
estimates when students are not randomly assigned to teachers but are assigned based on 
observed or unobserved characteristics. As an example, a class of students who obtain higher 
test scores on average may be assigned to a different teacher than a class with low average 
scores. As the skills of these teachers may differ they may affect the future outcomes of 
students, which are the object of this analysis. Even more so, regarding this analysis, repeaters 
may be sorted into different classes (for example, lower-achieving ones to reduce the within-
class variation). The latter could be the reason for differences in future outcomes between 
promoted students and repeating ones in lieu of the treatment variable grade retention. The 
data used do not allow for experimental analysis of this issue such as was conducted by Kane 
and Staiger (2008) who show that the value added model they implement does not suffer from 
biased estimates. I can, however, show that selection of repeating and promoted students into 
classes of different average scores does not seem to occur in the data used. 
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the share of repeaters and the mean score of 
students per class for second graders.15 The fitted line has a slight and insignificant positive 
                         
15
 This figure and the corresponding ones (Figures A1, A2 and A3) in Appendix A are based on grade 2 as the 
data structure does not allow for similar analyses in other grades. As there is no reason to believe that this pattern 
changes over time, I conjecture that it remains the same across the panel. 
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slope. This suggests that repeating students are not assigned into low-achieving classes to 
separate them from high-achieving students. Several similar exercises can be found in 
Appendix A. Based on these results I do not believe that there is a particular rule for assigning 
repeaters to different classes than promoted students.16 Furthermore, possible sources of bias 
are alleviated from assignment of classes to teachers based on mean scores and share of 
repeaters on the class level by including these variables as additional covariates in the 
estimation of the propensity score, as indicated in the variable description of subsection 2.3.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Relationship between share of repeaters and mean score per class 
 
It is important to note that there are two differing concepts in comparing the treatment 
and control observations in the post-treatment period (see Holmes, 1989, p.21). They reflect 
the varying views on the purpose that is attributed to grade retention. The first one (concept 
(a)) analyzes how much a student should learn during one year of schooling. Therefore, if a 
                         
16
 Since the figures show that classes with a higher or lower percentage of repeaters do not differ systematically 
in their mean test scores, they also deliver suggestive evidence that there are no peer effects stemming from 
repetition. 
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student repeats grade 3, her achievement one year later (she is still in grade 3) is compared to 
a non-repeating student who is in grade 4 by then. The idea is to analyze the changes in 
student achievement from one year to the next given repetition and non-repetition. 
 The second concept (concept (b)) reflects the idea that a student should have a certain 
level of knowledge by a specific grade. Therefore, if a student repeats grade 3, her 
achievement two years later (i.e. in grade 4) is compared to a non-repeating student one year 
later who at that time is in grade 4. This kind of comparison aims at finding out if repeating 
enabled the student to reach the same level of knowledge in grade 4 as the non-repeating 
student. Note that in this case the repeating student had one more year of schooling to reach 
this level. The different possibilities of comparison are illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
It shows a grade 2 retention decision and follows the students till the end of the panel. 
Only those students have been selected who have not dropped out during the panel. The 
squares indicate students who repeated grade 2 and therefore lag one grade behind the grade 2 
non-repeating students, which are shown by triangles. Concept (a) translates to a vertical 
comparison (solid circles) where the students had the same amount of schooling since the 
retention decision. Concept (b) can be applied by horizontal comparison (dashed circles), 
where a repeater when in grade 3 is compared to a non-repeater when in grade 3 and so on. As 
the mean test scores of non-repeaters are generally considerably higher (circular dots), I have 
selected those non-repeaters who roughly start at the mean of the promoted students in the 
first wave of the panel, i.e. approximately have the same starting point in terms of test scores. 
Referring to the vertical comparison we can clearly see that the repeating students build up a 
substantial negative gap in the post-retention years towards their old peers. As a consequence, 
for the same amount of schooling the promoted students will achieve higher scores than the 
retained students even though they started at the same initial level. 
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Figure 2.2: Comparing retained and promoted students (I) 
 
The circles encompass the observations to be compared. The solid circles represent concept (a): The students compared have the same 
amount of schooling since the point of the repetition decision. The dashed circles represent concept (b): A grade 2 repeater when in grade 3 is 
compared to a promoted student when in grade 3, etc. N=22 for repeaters and N=58 for non-repeaters starting at mean score of repeaters. 
 
Following the rationale of concept (b), we may now look at the horizontal 
comparisons. The retained students when in grade 3 have slightly higher test scores than the 
promoted ones had when in grade 3. So far, if the policy is meant to guarantee a certain level 
of knowledge by a certain grade, retention could be seen as a successful means to achieve this 
aim. Even in this context, it is important to note that the retained student had one more year of 
schooling to obtain this level. Moreover, looking at grades 4 and 5 the score of the retained 
students falls below that of the promoted student despite the additional year of schooling. 
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Therefore, we have to be more cautious about supporting retention even in the case of a same-
grade comparison in line with concept (b).17 
Even though other variables are not controlled for so far, we can make an attempt to 
answer the first hypothesis based on Figure 2.2. The figure shows the pathway in terms of the 
test scores of students repeating grade 2. Let us assume that the mean score in grade 2 
remained constant over time, i.e. the mean score of second graders in the first year of the 
panel (which is known from the data) is the same as the mean score of second graders in the 
following year. Using this assumption we can simply compare the mean score of repeaters 
when they attend grade 2 the second time to their mean score when they attended grade 2 in 
the first year of the panel. As the mean score of the repeaters has increased, we can state that 
the repeater will be better in relative terms when compared to her new grade 2 peers than 
when compared to her old grade 2 peers. This does not come as a surprise as the repeaters had 
an additional year of schooling and there was some improvement of scores during that year. 
The result of this simple and straightforward analysis corroborates the perception that teachers 
may believe retention to be useful as they can see the relative improvements of repeaters in 
their new class (see Bernard et al., 2005, p.64). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
17
 For variations of this figure with different starting points for promoted and retained students, see Figures A4 
and A5 in Appendix A. The pattern of all figures regardless of the starting values is roughly the same. 
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2.5.2 Determinants of repetition – propensity score estimation 
 
Before turning to the results of the matching estimations, let us first consider the first 
stage of the matching procedure, the propensity score estimations. These provide some 
insights about the determinants of grade retention. Appendix B shows the results of these first 
stage estimations for all specifications, grades and outcomes. While many variables are 
significant in one or the other case there are two consistent results across (almost) all 
estimations. First, the mean score of the class increases the likelihood of repetition and an 
increasing individual test score decreases its risk. Both variables are generally highly 
significant and seem to be the most important determinants of repetition. This is very 
reasonable since these variables taken together are a relative measure of the achievement of 
an individual student relative to her peers: If the mean score of the class is high, the individual 
score is relatively lower and the risk of grade repetition increases. In contrast, the higher the 
individual score the better is the student relative to her peers and the higher the chances of 
promotion. The detailed results of these and all additional variables are shown in Appendix B. 
 
2.5.3 Matching results 
 
As the main interests lie in the effects of retention on educational outcomes given the 
same number of schooling years since retention, I follow concept (a) for the matching 
analysis described above. Concept (b) has the limitation that it rather shows the effect of an 
additional year of schooling than the actual impact of repetition. If we were to find out that 
repetition according to concept (b) would lead repeaters to achievements comparable to those 
of non-repeaters by a certain future grade we could still not infer how beneficial repetition has 
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been indeed as the counterfactual scenario of an additional school year for non-repeaters is 
missing.  
The analysis is started by discarding the time dimension in the panel and by splitting 
the data into four cross-sections covering the retention decision in grades 2, 3, 4 and 5 
respectively (specification 1). This will serve as the baseline specification. Then I report on 
the results of the specification, including the time trends of the variable test scores 
(specification 2), and after this I discuss the results of the full specification, including time 
trends for all covariates (specification 3). In all these specifications I follow the logic of 
concept (a) and report on the outcome variable – the post-treatment test scores – one, two, 
three and four years after the retention decision where possible. 
Table 2.2, partitioned into parts A to D, contains all results for concept (a) – sorted by 
time of outcome, specification and grade. For the first specification, that is for the cross-
sections, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is negative and significant (at the 
1% or 5% level) for all grades if the test scores of the following year is used as the outcome. 
The ATT ranges from -0.37 in grade 2 to -0.87 in grade 4. Looking at the distribution of test 
scores in the respective grades, the magnitude of most of the significant estimates corresponds 
to between 20 and 65 percent of a standard deviation of test scores (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). 
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Table 2.2: Estimation of the impact of retention on achievement (ATT) 
Outcome after  A: One year B: Two years C: Three years D: Four years 
  ATT1 N2 ATT N ATT N ATT N 
Specification 1 Grade 2 -0.37** 109 -0.47** 71  -0.54*** 66  -0.64*** 56 
  (0.17) (106) (0.21) (69) (0.19) (61) (0.17) (53) 
 Grade 3 -0.68*** 113 -0.33* 79  -0.41** 59  - - 
  (0.17) (112) (0.18) (77) (0.21) (58)   
 Grade 4 -0.87*** 50 -0.75*** 30  - - - - 
  (0.23) (47) (0.24) (26)     
 Grade 5 -0.71*** 50 - - - - - - 
  (0.25) (44)       
Specification 2 Grade 2 - - - - - - - - 
          
 Grade 3 -0.64*** 104 -0.32* 74  -0.38* 57  - - 
  (0.17) (101) (0.19) (71) (0.21) (56)   
 Grade 4 -0.71*** 38 -0.30 23  - - - - 
  (0.26) (34) (0.30) (19)     
 Grade 5 -0.57** 47 - - - - - - 
  (0.26) (42)       
Specification 3 Grade 2 - - - - - - - - 
          
 Grade 3 -0.70*** 89 -0.40* 60  -0.64** 45  - - 
  (0.19) (83) (0.21) (58) (0.26) (43)   
 Grade 4 -0.74** 31 -3) - - - - - 
  (0.33) (24)       
 Grade 5 -0.74* 34 - - - - - - 
  (0.43) (14)       
Note: Specification 1 is a cross-sectional analysis that does not include the development path of the control variables. Specification 2 
includes the past trend of test scores of the respective student, that is the test score of grade 2 and all subsequent changes of the test score 
from one grade to the next up to the grade of interest. Specification 3 incorporates the trend of all control variables in the same way as for 
test scores (see also the propensity score estimations in Appendix B for a complete list of control variables (including trends).  
1)
 ATT computed using Stata’s PSmatch 2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) reprogrammed in order to estimate the propensity score using a 
random intercepts model. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
2) Number of observations on support in parentheses.  
3) Estimation did not converge. 
 
In this specification, students are compared with respect to their socio-economic 
background, their achievement and the characteristics of teachers and the school in the year at 
the end of which the repetition decision is taken. According to the results, students who are 
equal or very similar with respect to these characteristics perform worse in the following year 
if they are retained than if they are promoted. In other words, even though retained students 
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are equal to promoted ones regarding a large set of characteristics they will underperform as a 
result of retention. The size of this impact varies at the grade level with generally more 
negative effects for higher grades. Moreover, note that in general the number of (on support) 
observations decreases in each grade due to attrition, that is dropout from school. Further note 
that in grade 5 I could not include the variables class size, teacher job experience, teacher 
speaks French at home and teacher speaks local language in the estimation of the propensity 
score as there are no data for these four variables for grade 5. The disadvantage therefore is 
that there are less reliable ATT estimates for grade 5 as these four variables are likely 
important covariates that need to be controlled for.18 
Specifications 2 and 3 should be seen as the most meaningful ones since earlier time 
periods are considered. Technically speaking, this is equivalent to the inclusion of further 
covariates that strengthen comparability. We may, however, attribute at least two more 
advantages to the inclusion of time trends. First, as I include the time trends, that is the 
difference of test scores from one grade to the next in specification 2 and of all covariates in 
specification 3, I thereby also include a development path for each student rather than merely 
a snapshot in time. Second, if it is perceived that there are possibly additional (unobserved) 
covariates that need to be included for better comparability across students, then these 
covariates are likely to influence the pre-treatment covariates that I include and therefore be 
part of the set of covariates I control for. This idea is corroborated by the fact that matching is 
inter alia based on pre-treatment test scores in order to get an estimate for post-treatment test 
scores. That is, if an additional variable influences post-treatment test scores then it is also 
likely to influence pre-treatment test scores and possibly also the development of pre-
treatment test scores. Also, note that there is no estimation for grade 2 in specifications 2 and 
                         
18
 See Table A2 in Appendix A for a list of variables included by grade. 
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3 as there are no earlier time periods to be included. These two specifications do not differ 
much from the first specification for test score outcomes after one year. All the estimates of 
the ATTs are negative, but of smaller size in specification 2 for grades 3 to 5. In grades 3 and 
5 of specification 3 they are even larger. The estimate of the grade 5 ATT of specification 3 
remains significant only at the 10% level though. The first impression of a negative effect of 
retention is thus corroborated in the more encompassing specifications 2 and 3. In other 
words, given that students are equal or very similar based on the characteristics stated above 
in the first year of the panel as well as based on the development of these characteristics over 
time until the point of the repetition decision, then those students who repeat perform worse in 
the following year than those who do not repeat. 
These results give insight into the dynamics of achievement in the year immediately 
following the repetition decision. This could be a special year as the repeating student is now 
for the first time in her new class with her new peers. Therefore, it is of special interest what 
the effect of retention will be after two and more years when the student has had time to get 
accustomed to her new peers and her new environment. 
Parts B through D of Table 2.2 contain the ATT estimates for student achievement 
more than a year after the retention decision. Almost all estimates remain negative and 
significant albeit only at the 10% level in four cases. Looking at these results for the outcome 
after more than a year we may infer that repetition has either a clear negative effect at the 5% 
level or, in some cases, that there is a somewhat weaker evidence of a negative effect at the 
10% level or an insignificant effect (in one estimation). It seems clear, however, that 
following this particular type of comparison based on concept (a), there is no positive effect 
of repetition visible in the data set. 
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Let us next investigate changes in the effects over time. For grade 2 the absolute size 
of the effect continually increases after two (-0.47), three (-0.54) and four years (-0.64), 
remaining highly significant (at the 1% level for the outcome after three and four years). 
Starting with a repetition in grade 3, however, the absolute value of the ATT always decreases 
after two years and remains on a similar level or re-increases after three years. In the case of 
specifications 2 and 3, it amounts to -0.38 and -0.64 after three years. Grades 4 and 5 reveal 
considerable sizes for the ATT in all three specifications for the outcome after one year with 
somewhat smaller coefficient for more distant years. All three specifications show 
consistency in their prediction whether coefficients will be greater or smaller for a given 
grade and different time horizons. 
In general, it seems that the worsening impact of repetition is not systematically higher 
or lower based on grade or on the time between repetition and the measurement of 
achievement. Therefore, the results suggest that, unlike in the studies of Alet (2010) and 
Jacob and Lefgren (2004, p.235), achievement scores further away are not systematically 
worse than in the direct aftermath. 
How may these varying patterns be explained? It is straightforward to imagine that the 
grade of repetition is the most difficult one for the student as she will enter a new social group 
and will have to handle the demotivation stemming from retention and the fact of studying the 
same subjects again. What happens thereafter is less clear. Possibly, the student has managed 
to accept the new environment and has made friends. Indeed, the worsening effect after more 
years for grade 2 in specification 1 may be explained by the reasons stated in the theoretical 
part of this analysis. Approaching early adolescence age differences may become more 
evident in physical and emotional form, thus widening the gap between retained and 
promoted students. These differences could lead to mockery by other students or de-motivate 
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the over-age student if she believes that she should be in a class of even-aged students. This is 
also corroborated by the results for higher grades of specification 1. The higher the grade and 
hence the nearer a student is to adolescence, the worse the negative impact on achievement 
already after one year (although in grade 5 the coefficient decreases somewhat again). 
However, specifications 2 and 3 do not support this as in some cases the coefficients decrease 
with higher grade or for achievements after more years. This may be some evidence for the 
alternative explanation that for younger students age differences are relatively more 
pronounced than for older ones and therefore play a particularly negative role. In general, we 
must be cautious in the interpretation of the effects for more distant years since student 
dropouts lead to smaller sample sizes, which may be partly relevant for the sizes of the 
effects. 
Based on these estimations we may now attempt to answer if the considerations in the 
theoretical part of this chapter are reflected in the results. First, does a student perform worse 
than if she had been promoted or at least just as well? Second, what is the impact of repetition 
on student achievement over time? For the first question, we can state that grade retention 
does have a negative impact on achievement as all but one estimation reveal significant 
negative effects. Referring to the time dimension a clear statement cannot be offered. There is 
some evidence that the initially very negative effect of repetition in the direct aftermath of the 
retention decision is mitigated when retention dates back two years just to be reinforced after 
three years for grade 3. This may suggest that there is a non-linear effect of repetition in time. 
However, given the negative signs for all coefficients, a positive effect cannot be attributed to 
retention in any of the specifications and grades. 
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2.5.4 Robustness checks, further results and simulations 
 
2.5.4.1 Fixed effects and random effects results 
 
To check the results for robustness I estimate fixed effects and random effects 
regressions. Student fixed effects have the advantage that unobserved time invariant student 
characteristics are accounted for. That means endogeneity resulting from such variables as 
innate student ability that are expected to be constant over time are controlled for. If the 
matching procedure fails to account for these types of variables even though including the 
development paths of students in relevant observable variables then the fixed effects 
estimations are likely to show different results. Table 2.3 shows the results from the fixed 
effects regression and Table 2.4 those of the random effects regression for completeness for 
test score outcomes after one, two and three years. 
The random effects coefficients for repetition are always significantly negative. I will, 
however, focus on the estimates of the fixed effects regression as the hausman test clearly 
rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of the fixed effects and random effects estimations 
do not differ systematically. In column (1) of Table 2.3 we can see that repetition has a highly 
significant negative effect on student achievement after one year. However, the coefficients 
for achievement outcomes after two and three years (columns (2) and (3)) are not significant. 
Similarly to the results of the matching specifications we can state that repetition has either a 
negative or an insignificant effect on student achievement. Again there is no indication that 
there could be a positive effect of grade retention on test scores of students in the following 
years. 
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Table 2.3: The effect of repetition on achievement (fixed effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome after A: One year B: Two years C: Three years 
    
repetition -0.31*** 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.18) 
class size -0.01*** 0.01** -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
teacher job experience -0.00 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
test score -0.26*** -0.23*** 0.08 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
share math books -0.34** 0.29** -0.05 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) 
teacher training -0.04* 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
male teacher -0.04 0.07 0.16 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) 
double shift -0.07 0.10 0.02 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.23) 
student age 1.27*** 0.86*** 0.48*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
teacher speaks local language -0.16* 0.22** -0.14 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
teacher speaks French at home -0.04 0.02 0.09* 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
property at home 0.01 -0.05 - 
 (0.03) (0.03)  
media availability 0.03 0.13** - 
 (0.06) (0.06)  
work at home -0.03 -0.01 - 
 (0.02) (0.03)  
meals 0.24*** 0.10 - 
 (0.07) (0.08)  
student speaks French at home 0.09 -0.05 - 
 (0.12) (0.14)  
languages-student 0.04 0.00 - 
 (0.07) (0.09)  
study at home -0.03 -0.02 - 
 (0.07) (0.08)  
constant -10.43*** -7.24*** -2.19** 
 (0.74) (0.81) (0.91) 
hausman test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
observations 2,179 1,848 1,331 
R-squared (within) 0.53 0.36 0.24 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.4: The effect of repetition on achievement (random effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome after A: One year B: Two years C: Three years 
    
repetition -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.28*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
mean score of class (grade 2) 0.16*** 0.02 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.81*** 1.50*** 2.02*** 
 (0.31) (0.34) (0.39) 
class size -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
teacher job experience 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
prior repetition -0.30*** -0.35*** -0.20** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) 
test score 0.60*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
boy 0.05 0.08 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
property at home 0.00 -0.05** -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
media availability 0.07* 0.15*** 0.11** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
share math books 0.03 0.31*** 0.16 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
city size 0.06* 0.02 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
teacher training 0.03 0.06*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
work at home -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
meals 0.02 0.09 0.26 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.17) 
male teacher 0.07 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
double shift -0.06 0.07 0.08 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
student age 0.14*** 0.07** 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
student speaks French at home 0.25** 0.23** 0.13 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) 
languages-student 0.11** 0.10* 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
teacher speaks local language 0.00 0.17** -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
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Table 2.4 Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome after A: One year B: Two years C: Three years 
 
teacher speaks French at home -0.05* -0.02 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
study at home 0.08 -0.00 0.12 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
number of students -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
partnerships -0.05 0.02 0.08 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
teacher meetings 0.05 0.07* 0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
constant -0.76* -0.33 0.23 
 (0.45) (0.49) (0.68) 
    
observations 2,179 1,848 1,331 
R-squared (overall) 0.60 0.50 0.49 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
2.5.4.2 Results by initial test scores 
 
Finally, the dynamics after retention may differ depending on the initial achievement 
of the students before retention (see PASEC, 2004, p.97). In this regard, it may be particularly 
demotivating for a student with high test scores to be retained. This may lead to worse test 
scores in the following post-retention years. In comparison to a matched control group this 
may be even more evident if teachers focus on the good students of their classes supporting 
the high-achieving promoted students. In contrast, a high-achieving student who is retained 
may be less affected by the repetition decision if her knowledge is on such a high level that 
allows her to outweigh the negative consequences of a perceived failure such as grade 
retention. As we could think of these different effects, the issue is ultimately an empirical one. 
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Table 2.5: Matching results by initial test score 
 
Table 2.5 reports the ATTs of those students whose initial test score before repetition 
is below the mean test score of all students and those repeaters achieving higher than mean 
scores respectively. These numbers were calculated using specification 1, as it retains more 
observations than the other specifications and splitting the data set already decreases the 
number of observation per estimation. The sign of the effect of repetition is always negative 
and in many cases the effect is significant. In general, fewer cases show significance than in 
Table 2.2 where all students are analysed together, presumably because of the lower number 
of observations per estimation after dividing the data set. Comparing both types of students 
(initially lower- and initially higher-achieving students), there is no systematic difference. In 
  Initial test score below mean Initial test score above mean 
A: Outcome After ONE Year ATT N ATT N 
Grade 2 -0.05 95 -0.83** 14 
 (0.18) (86) (0.41) (12) 
Grade 3 -0.71*** 97 -1) - 
 (0.19) (95)   
Grade 4 -0.63* 33 -1.01*** 17 
 (0.33) (31) (0.31) (15) 
Grade 5 -1.04*** 41 -0.87* 9 
 (0.28) (30) (0.51) (8) 
B: Outcome After TWO Years 
Grade 2 -0.38 62 -1.01 9 
 (0.25) (60) (0.65) (6) 
Grade 31 -0.24 66 -1) - 
 (0.20) (64)   
Grade 4 -0.76** 19 -1.28*** 11 
 (0.32) (16) (0.22) (5) 
C: Outcome After THREE Years 
Grade 2 -0.76*** 55 -1.13 11 
 (0.24) (51) (0.71) (8) 
Grade 31 -0.43* 48 -1) - 
 (0.22) (45)   
D: Outcome After FOUR Years 
Grade 2 -0.42** 48 -1) - 
 (0.18) (43)   
See Table 2.2 notes. Specification 1 (cross-section) has been chosen for this analysis in order to retain as many observations as possible. 
1)
 Estimation did not converge. 
 
Grade Retention and Student Achievement in Senegalese Primary Schools 
52 
 
some grades lower-achieving students have a less negative effect than higher-achieving ones; 
in grade 5 for the outcome after one year the contrary is observed; and some estimations did 
not converge or show insignificant negative coefficients. This is in line with PASEC (2004) 
where interactions between test scores prior to repetition and grade retention were found to be 
insignificant predictors of subsequent student achievement. It seems that repeating a grade has 
a negative impact on both types of students without major differences across these groups. 
 
2.5.4.3 Selection and simulations 
 
Selection is potentially a problem in the context of the estimations since many students 
have dropped out from school during the five years of the panel. The remaining students may 
be a selection that differs from those who have dropped out and this may bias the estimations. 
Specifically, repeaters may be more likely to drop out as has been suggested in the literature 
(see Eide and Showalter, 2001; Jacob and Lefgren, 2009; André, 2012; Glick and Sahn, 2010; 
Manacorda, 2012) and therefore those repeaters who remain in school are more heavily 
selected. 
There is some reason to believe that the students who drop out may actually have 
performed worse if they had stayed at school than those who remained in school: If schooling 
is a cost-benefit consideration as proposed in section 2.2 (see Bedi and Marshall, 2002; Glick 
and Sahn, 2010), then the anticipation of low test scores in the future might make the 
opportunity costs of schooling appear too high and lead to dropout. It is difficult to gauge how 
strong dropouts affect the results as it is not possible to know the test scores they would have 
attained if they had remained in school. However, the initial motivation of this study was to 
find out if grade retention potentially has a positive impact on subsequent achievement, which 
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could justify the costs the education system is burdened with. So far, the matching 
coefficients of all three specifications have shown negative signs even though in some cases 
they were not significant. It is likely that these coefficients are an underestimation of the 
effect of grade retention on student achievement as students may drop out because of their 
anticipated low achievement in the future. If this is the case, the estimations would give us 
confidence in the results that grade retention is not favorable in terms of student achievement. 
In contrast, if students drop out simply because they have to repeat and therefore do 
not see the benefit of staying at school they may still have been well-performing students if 
they had stayed in school. In this case, leaving these students out from the estimations will 
bias the estimates leading to an overestimation of the negative effect. In fact, the data of this 
study show that 36 percent of dropouts attain test scores above their class mean for the year 
prior to dropping out. 
The selection problem for the data at hand is special as the information on control 
variables needed for matching is available for the sub-population of dropouts until the last 
year they attend school. The only information that is missing is the test score of the year of 
interest after dropout. To investigate the issue of selection, I therefore run simulations in 
which I treat students who drop out the following year as repeaters and assign them the 
average of the test score values of actual repeaters in their class who do not drop out for the 
period of comparison (e.g. the average test score in the subsequent year of current repeaters if 
the outcome after one year is considered). Then I gradually increase the test score values that 
are assigned to the future dropouts by one percentage point in each iteration until the sign of 
the respective coefficient becomes positive. 
Table 2.6 shows the results of this exercise for specification 1. For each year and 
grade, the respective cell shows by how much dropouts would have to perform better than 
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repeaters who remain in school to change the coefficient for the ATT to become positive.19 
The percentage increases necessary to change the signs of the coefficients to become positive 
are between 90 and 258 percent when all students are included. Splitting the data at the mean 
class score the ranges are between 37 and 227 percent if the initial score is below the mean 
and between 117 and 331 percent if it is above. The values for the simulations of students 
with initial test scores below the class mean are generally lower, presumably because there is 
a greater share of dropouts in this group lending them a stronger weight in the estimations. 
The percentage increases are very high and show that the simulated test scores of 
dropouts would need to be considerably above the average values of repeaters who remain at 
school to change the general results of a negative effect of repetition on achievement. The 
reason why these values are so high is that the average share of dropouts per grade is too 
small in terms of statistical relevance. As shown in the summary statistics of Table 2.1 the 
share of dropouts per grade varies between relatively low 7 and 14 percent. These numbers on 
the other hand are very high from the perspective that dropouts accumulate from grade to 
grade and that all these students drop out of school very early in their lives lacking a profound 
education. If these high dropout rates are mainly triggered by grade retention, then this is an 
additional cost to the education system that goes beyond the costs of retaining students 
without positive effects on their achievement. 
 
 
 
 
                         
19
 However, at the percentage where the estimate for the ATT turns positive the latter is of course highly 
insignificant and therefore the percentages given are still considered to be conservative values. 
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Table 2.6: Simulating test scores of students who have dropped out from school 
Note: In this simulation students who drop out the subsequent year are treated as if they had been told to repeat at the end of the current year 
(where we cannot observe the actual repetition decision any more). They are assigned the average respective test score value of the repeaters 
in their class who remain in school in the subsequent year. This value is gradually increased until the respective estimate for the ATT turns 
positive. The percentages show by how much the simulated test scores of dropouts have to be higher than the actual test scores of repeaters 
who remain in school to attain a positive value for the estimate. At this level the respective estimate is highly insignificant. 
 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this analysis I have researched the dynamics of retention over time for a variety of 
grades and specifications. I have used a unique data set that follows a large number of 
Senegalese primary students for five consecutive years starting in grade 2. It includes a large 
variety of relevant variables on the socio-economic background of the students as well as on 
 All 
 students 
Initial test score 
below mean 
Initial test score 
above mean A: Outcome After ONE Year 
Grade 2 + 92% + 37% + 129% 
    
Grade 3 + 258% + 227% + 331% 
    
Grade 4 + 191% + 118% + 303% 
    
Grade 5 - - - 
    
B: Outcome After TWO Years 
Grade 2 + 153% + 91% + 225% 
    
Grade 3 + 149% + 75% + 198% 
    
Grade 4 + 159% + 110% + 267% 
    
C: Outcome After THREE Years 
Grade 2 + 185% + 187% + 301% 
    
Grade 3 + 90% + 65% + 117% 
    
D: Outcome After FOUR Years 
Grade 2 + 167% + 101% + 237% 
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their teachers and schools. In accordance with the literature on repetition in Francophone Sub-
Saharan Africa, the results suggest that retention does not offer the expected benefits 
regarding student achievement in Senegal and cannot, therefore, counterbalance the increased 
costs the education system is burdened with. I have used descriptive graphic evaluation on the 
one hand and inferential statistical analysis on the other for the analysis. The statistical part 
consisted of propensity score matching that calculates the propensity score by a multi-level 
logit function, including the development of student test scores over time and variables 
detailing student, teacher and school characteristics as covariates. The results are tested for 
robustness in fixed effect and random effects estimations. In a preliminary analysis there was 
no evidence that repeaters are systematically selected into different classes than promoted 
students. I did, however, control for the possibility that sorting appears on the class level, i.e. 
that classes with certain characteristics such as high average test scores or a high share of 
repeaters may pursue a different path to classes with low score averages or a low share of 
repeaters. The results of these analyses and their robustness checks suggest that grade 
retention has a significant negative (or in some cases an insignificant) effect on student 
achievement in the year directly following retention as well as for more distant years. A 
significant positive effect of grade retention that could justify the costs of high repetition rates 
was not found in any of the specifications controlling for a wide range of relevant control 
variables independent of the number of years passed after the retention decision. 
Against the backdrop of the aims of the EFA initiative and the Millennium 
Development Goals these results appear highly relevant. The goal of universal primary 
education of high quality is ambitious and will be even more so if the education system gets 
overcrowded because of repetition. Using a rich data set with detailed information on 
students, teachers and schools in Senegal I employed elaborate statistical methods to show 
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that, in the context of Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, there is little to expect from a 
retention policy that promotes high repetition rates with respect to educational quality 
(measured as student achievement) even beyond the year directly following the retention 
decision. This example from Senegalese primary schools is also highly relevant for other 
Francophone Sub-Saharan African countries where repetition rates remain high. 
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Appendix A: Additional evidence and variable definitions 
 
Figure A1: Relationship between share of repeaters and mean score of non-repeaters per class 
 
Figure A2: Relationship between share of repeaters and mean score of repeaters per class 
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Figure A3: Relationship between share of repeaters and standard deviation of scores 
per class 
 
Figure A4: Comparing retained and promoted students (II) 
 
The circles encompass the observations to be compared. The solid circles represent concept (a): The students compared have the same 
amount of schooling since the point of the repetition decision. The dashed circles represent concept (b): A grade 2 repeater when in grade 3 is 
compared to a promoted student when in grade 3, etc. N=9 for repeaters and N=88 for non-repeaters. Starting point is approximately the 
mean between the mean of the repeaters and the mean of non-repeaters (maximum 0.5 greater or smaller than this value).
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Figure A5: Comparing retained and promoted students (III)
 
The circles encompass the observations to be compared. The solid circles represent concept (a): The students compared have the same 
amount of schooling since the point of the repetition decision. The dashed circles represent concept (b): A grade 2 repeater when in grade 3 is 
compared to a promoted student when in grade 3, etc. N=7 for repeaters starting at mean score of non-repeaters (maximum half a std.dev. 
greater or smaller than this value) and N=308 for non-repeaters. 
 
 
Figure A6: Allocation of matches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to specifications 2 and 3, students are matched based on the value of the covariate(s) in t1 and based on the changes from one 
grade to the next (∆1a, ∆1b etc.). In this example, student 1 is matched to student 3 even though each data point of student 2 is closer to that 
of student 1. The idea is that the development path (∆) is the most important criterion. 
time 
t
1
 t
2
 t
3
 
covariate repetition 
Student 1 
 
Student 2 
 
Student 3 
∆1b ∆1a 
∆2a ∆2b 
∆3a ∆3b 
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Table A1: Variable description 
repetition dummy (student repeats current year=1, else=0) 
mean score of class (grade 2) mean of test scores of second graders in first year of panel 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) share of repeaters of second grade in first year of panel 
class size number of students per class 
teacher job experience number of years of teaching experience 
prior repetition number of grade retentions including current year 
test scores math test scores 
boy dummy (male student=1, female student=0) 
property at home (0,…,7) student’s family possessions (car, fridge, flush toilet, electricity, 
water tap, armchair and kitchen with gas=7, all of these but one=6, …, 
none of these=0) 
media availability (0,…,3) student’s family possessions (TV, radio and video=3, all of 
these but one=2, one of these=1, none of these=0) 
share math books (0-1) share of math textbooks in class 
city size school location (small village=1, big village=2, suburb of big city=3, 
town=4)  
teacher training (0,…,5) duration of teacher training (more than one year of training=5, 
one year of training=4, 6 months of training=3, 1–3 months of 
training=2, less than one month of training=1, no training=0) 
work at home (0,…,8) work activities of student outside the school (cooking, cleaning, 
laundry, field work, animal husbandry, dishwashing, childcare and 
commercial=8, all of these but one=7,…, none of these=0) 
meals (0,…,3) student meals (breakfast, lunch and dinner on regular basis=3, 
all of these but one=2, one of these=1, none of these=0) 
male teacher dummy (male teacher=1, female teacher=0) 
double shift dummy (several classes using the same room at different times of the 
day=1, else=0)  
student age age of student 
student speaks French at home dummy (student speaks French at home=1, else=0) 
languages-student (0,…,7) number of languages other than French the student speaks with 
his or her parents (Wolof, Pulaar, Serer, Diola, Soninke, Mandinka, 
other) 
teacher speaks local language dummy (teacher speaks local language =1, else =0) 
teacher speaks French at home (1,…,4) teacher speaks French at home (never=1, rarely=2, often=3, 
almost always=4) 
study at home (0,1,2) student studies at home and gets help with studies at home=0, 
student studies at home or gets help with studies at home=1, neither of 
the two=0 
number of students sum of students in the first six grades of the school 
partnerships number of partnerships of the school (with a foreign school, with an 
NGO or other aid organization, with a bilateral co-operation (Italian, 
French, German…)  
teacher meetings (0,…,4) frequency of meetings between the director and all the teachers 
in the school (never=0, at least once per week=1, about once a month=2, 
about once per trimester=3, about once a year=4) 
 
Appendix B: Estimations for calculations of propensity scores 
62 
 
Table A2: Variables included in the specific matching estimations 
Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 
mean score of class 
(grade 2) 
mean score of class (grade 
2) 
mean score of class 
(grade 3) 
mean score of class 
(grade 4) 
share repeaters in class 
(grade 2) 
share repeaters in class 
(grade 2) 
share repeaters in class 
(grade 2) 
share repeaters in class 
(grade 2) 
prior repetition prior repetition prior repetition prior repetition 
test scores test scores test scores test scores 
boy Boy boy boy 
property at home property at home property at home property at home 
media availability media availability 伀edia availability media availability 
share math books share math books share math books share math books 
city size city size city size city size 
teacher training teacher training teacher training teacher training 
work at home work at home work at home work at home 
meals meals meals meals 
male teacher male teacher male teacher male teacher 
double shift double shift double shift double shift 
student age student age student age student age 
student speaks French at 
home 
student speaks French at 
home 
student speaks French at 
home 
student speaks French at 
home 
languages-student languages-student languages-student languages-student 
study at home study at home study at home study at home 
number of students number of students number of students number of students 
partnerships partnerships partnerships partnerships 
teacher meetings teacher meetings teacher meetings teacher meetings 
teacher speaks local 
language 
teacher speaks local 
language 
teacher speaks local 
language  
teacher speaks French at 
home 
teacher speaks French at 
home 
teacher speaks French at 
home  
class size class size class size  
teacher job experience teacher job experience teacher job experience   
Note that the variable mean score of class differs across grades and further note that four variables were not available for grade 5. In 
specification 2 the test score of the first year of the panel was included in addition to the change from one grade to the next up to the 
grade of analysis. In specification 3 this was done for all variables.  
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Appendix B: Estimations for calculations of propensity scores 
 
Table B1.1: Multi-level logit estimation of grade retention – Specification 1/Grade 2 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
mean score of class (grade 2) 1.56*** 1.83*** 1.60*** 1.43*** 
 (0.32) (0.45) (0.43) (0.44) 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 2.11 2.56 3.15 2.76 
 (1.75) (2.30) (2.43) (2.48) 
class size 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
teacher job experience 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
prior repetition -0.28 -0.68 -0.79 -0.74 
 (0.37) (0.50) (0.55) (0.55) 
test score -1.45*** -1.58*** -1.34*** -1.27*** 
 (0.16) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) 
boy -0.08 -0.54 -0.38 -0.26 
 (0.34) (0.43) (0.43) (0.48) 
property at home -0.06 -0.17 -0.04 0.03 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
media availability -0.21 -0.09 -0.07 -0.15 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.27) 
share math books -1.46* -1.46 -1.24 -1.41 
 (0.77) (1.06) (1.07) (1.13) 
city size 0.65*** 0.61** 0.41 0.49 
 (0.24) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) 
teacher training 0.35** 0.50** 0.29 0.43* 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.21) (0.24) 
work at home -0.09 -0.18 -0.04 -0.07 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) 
meals 0.56 -0.25 -0.79 -0.50 
 (0.62) (0.81) (0.79) (0.75) 
male teacher 0.18 0.73 0.30 0.34 
 (0.38) (0.52) (0.53) (0.54) 
double shift -0.33 -0.26 -0.06 0.24 
 (0.45) (0.62) (0.61) (0.63) 
student age -0.02 0.15 0.23 0.38 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) 
student speaks French at home -0.75 -1.15 0.47 -22.09 
 (0.90) (1.20) (0.92) (41028.32) 
languages-student -0.03 -0.18 -0.02 0.13 
 (0.27) (0.34) (0.36) (0.39) 
teacher speaks local language -0.21 -0.25 -0.12 0.00 
 (0.36) (0.48) (0.48) (0.51) 
teacher speaks French at home -0.29 -0.18 -0.27 -0.28 
 (0.25) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 
study at home -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.32 
 (0.32) (0.38) (0.38) (0.47) 
number of students 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
partnerships 0.14 -0.08 0.16 0.43 
 (0.25) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) 
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Table B1.1 Continued 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
 
teacher meetings -0.04 -0.08 0.12 0.13 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.27) (0.29) 
constant -5.32* -5.42 -4.22 -7.76* 
 (2.98) (4.06) (3.84) (4.20) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In column 1 the estimation correctly classifies about 99% of non-repeaters 
and about 12% of repeaters. In column 2, it correctly classifies about 99% and 12% respectively. In column 3, it correctly classifies about 
99% and 12% respectively. In column 4, it correctly classifies about 99% and 12% respectively. 
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Table B1.2: Multi-level logit estimation of grade retention – Specification 1/Grade 3 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
mean score of class (grade 2) 1.23*** 1.51*** 1.06** - 
 (0.36) (0.49) (0.47) 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 4.40** 5.52** 5.56** - 
 (1.74) (2.36) (2.41) 
class size 0.03* 0.06** 0.06** - 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
teacher job experience -0.07** -0.09** -0.07* - 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
prior repetition 0.07 0.33 0.28 - 
 (0.32) (0.37) (0.42) 
test score -1.13*** -1.13*** -1.13*** - 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.20) 
boy -0.01 0.07 -0.61 - 
 (0.32) (0.38) (0.43) 
property at home -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 - 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) 
media availability 0.00 -0.18 -0.08 - 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.28) 
share math books 0.20 0.25 0.60 - 
 (0.52) (0.66) (0.67) 
city size 0.49* 0.58* 1.01*** - 
 (0.25) (0.32) (0.34) 
teacher training 0.19 0.21 0.42** - 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.21) 
work at home -0.04 0.04 -0.25* - 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) 
meals 0.03 0.52 1.29 - 
 (0.57) (0.72) (0.90) 
male teacher 0.23 0.31 1.36** - 
 (0.39) (0.51) (0.59) 
double shift 0.53 1.01 0.40 - 
 (0.48) (0.71) (0.68) 
student age 0.31* 0.23 0.58** - 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.25) 
student speaks French at home -22.40 -22.28 -19.86 - 
 (37642.39) (46859.57) (18745.89) 
languages-student 0.43* 0.37 0.48 - 
 (0.25) (0.32) (0.36) 
teacher speaks local language -0.22 0.10 -0.50 - 
 (0.57) (0.74) (0.78) 
teacher speaks French at home 0.13 0.19 0.63** - 
 (0.22) (0.28) (0.30) 
study at home -0.57** -0.69** -0.96*** - 
 (0.26) (0.30) (0.34) 
number of students 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** - 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
partnerships 0.31 0.43 0.44 - 
 (0.26) (0.34) (0.33) 
teacher meetings 0.24 0.05 0.04 - 
 (0.22) (0.29) (0.28) 
constant -7.23** -9.21** -16.41*** - 
 (2.91) (3.73) (4.56) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In column 1 the estimation correctly classifies about 97% of non-repeaters 
and about 25% of repeaters. In column 2, it correctly classifies about 97% and 25% respectively. In column 3, it correctly classifies about 
97% and 25% respectively. 
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Table B1.3: Multi-level logit estimation of grade retention – Specification 1/Grade 4 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
mean score of class (grade 3) 0.27 0.06 - - 
 (0.36) (0.45) 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) -2.25 -6.92** - - 
 (2.26) (3.09) 
class size 0.03 0.01 - - 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
teacher job experience -0.03 -0.02 - - 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
prior repetition 0.48 1.06** - - 
 (0.42) (0.53) 
test score -0.51*** -0.35* - - 
 (0.15) (0.18) 
boy -0.51 -0.77 - - 
 (0.41) (0.55) 
property at home -0.11 -0.15 - - 
 (0.11) (0.14) 
media availability 0.00 0.11 - - 
 (0.24) (0.32) 
share math books -0.47 -0.84 - - 
 (0.76) (0.94) 
city size 0.28 0.22 - - 
 (0.33) (0.40) 
teacher training 0.01 -0.02 - - 
 (0.15) (0.17) 
work at home -0.13 -0.25* - - 
 (0.11) (0.14) 
meals -0.49 -0.67 - - 
 (0.42) (0.50) 
male teacher 0.52 0.37 - - 
 (0.50) (0.60) 
double shift -0.35 -0.20 - - 
 (0.57) (0.67) 
student age 0.25 -0.16 - - 
 (0.23) (0.31) 
student speaks French at home -0.48 0.48 - - 
 (0.63) (0.79) 
languages-student -0.33 -1.34** - - 
 (0.36) (0.53) 
teacher speaks local language -0.60 -0.28 - - 
 (0.57) (0.69) 
teacher speaks French at home -0.02 0.50 - - 
 (0.29) (0.34) 
study at home -0.40 -0.71* - - 
 (0.30) (0.38) 
number of students 0.00 0.00 - - 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
partnerships 0.09 -0.07 - - 
 (0.34) (0.38) 
teacher meetings -0.15 -0.32 - - 
 (0.24) (0.28) 
constant -2.80 3.68 - - 
 (2.89) (3.98) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In column 1 the estimation correctly classifies about 100% of non-repeaters 
and about 6% of repeaters. In column 2, it correctly classifies about 100% and 6% respectively. 
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Table B1.4: Multi-level logit estimation of grade retention – Specification 1/Grade 5 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
mean score of class (grade 4) 0.61 - - - 
 (0.55) 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) -0.02 - - - 
 (3.86) 
prior repetition 0.80 - - - 
 (0.68) 
test score -1.26*** - - - 
 (0.28) 
boy 0.17 - - - 
 (0.67) 
property at home -0.05 - - - 
 (0.17) 
media availability -0.48 - - - 
 (0.41) 
share math books -0.22 - - - 
 (1.00) 
city size -0.22 - - - 
 (0.47) 
teacher training 0.18 - - - 
 (0.32) 
work at home 0.08 - - - 
 (0.17) 
meals -1.46** - - - 
 (0.66) 
male teacher -0.42 - - - 
 (0.95) 
double shift -2.06 - - - 
 (1.31) 
student age -0.37 - - - 
 (0.35) 
student speaks French at home -0.92 - - - 
 (0.98) 
languages-student -1.45** - - - 
 (0.59) 
study at home -0.68 - - - 
 (0.55) 
number of students 0.00 - - - 
 (0.00) 
partnerships 0.17 - - - 
 (0.54) 
teacher meetings -0.42 - - - 
 (0.45) 
constant 9.63* - - - 
 (5.19) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimation correctly classifies about 98% of non-repeaters and about 
36% of repeaters. 
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Table B2.1: Multi-level logit estimation of grade retention – Specification 2/Grade 3 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
mean score of class (grade 2) 1.55*** 1.67*** 1.28*** - 
(0.39) (0.47) (0.47) 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 3.71** 4.22* 4.51** - 
(1.77) (2.21) (2.28) 
class size 0.04** 0.07*** 0.06*** - 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
teacher job experience -0.06* -0.07* -0.06* - 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
prior repetition 0.14 0.44 0.33 - 
(0.33) (0.38) (0.44) 
test score (grade 2) -1.31*** -1.29*** -1.25*** - 
(0.17) (0.20) (0.22) 
test score (difference grades 2/3) -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.75*** - 
(0.17) (0.20) (0.22) 
boy -0.04 0.00 -0.56 - 
(0.33) (0.38) (0.43) 
property at home -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 - 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14) 
media availability 0.04 -0.16 -0.02 - 
(0.19) (0.23) (0.27) 
share math books 0.17 0.43 0.73 - 
(0.53) (0.62) (0.65) 
city size 0.56** 0.57* 1.02*** - 
(0.26) (0.31) (0.33) 
teacher training 0.21 0.30* 0.43** - 
(0.15) (0.18) (0.20) 
work at home -0.03 0.00 -0.27* - 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.14) 
meals 0.23 0.91 1.50 - 
(0.61) (0.81) (0.93) 
male teacher 0.24 0.16 1.25** - 
(0.41) (0.49) (0.56) 
double shift 0.51 0.96 0.51 - 
(0.49) (0.67) (0.67) 
student age 0.30 0.24 0.51** - 
(0.19) (0.22) (0.25) 
student speaks French at home -22.35 -21.49 -20.15 - 
(36840.60) (33934.99) (21313.36) 
languages-student 0.38 0.36 0.48 - 
(0.26) (0.31) (0.35) 
teacher speaks local language -0.13 0.10 -0.40 - 
(0.61) (0.72) (0.75) 
teacher speaks French at home 0.20 0.26 0.67** - 
(0.23) (0.26) (0.28) 
study at home -0.47 -0.55* -1.03*** - 
(0.29) (0.32) (0.35) 
number of students 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** - 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table B2.1 Continued 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
partnerships 0.36 0.48 0.52 - 
(0.27) (0.33) (0.32) 
teacher meetings 0.15 -0.06 -0.03 - 
(0.23) (0.27) (0.27) 
constant -8.33*** -11.08*** -16.51*** - 
(3.13) (3.96) (4.59) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In column 1 the estimation correctly classifies about 97% of non-repeaters 
and about 19% of repeaters. In column 2, it correctly classifies about 97% and 19% respectively. In column 3, it correctly classifies about 
97% and 19% respectively. 
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Table B.2.2: Multi-level logit estimation of grade retention – Specification 2/Grade 4 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
mean score of class (grade 3) 0.24 0.30 - - 
(0.41) (0.66) 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) -3.60 -8.77** - - 
(2.54) (4.38) 
class size 0.02 -0.01 - - 
(0.02) (0.03) 
teacher job experience -0.04 -0.02 - - 
(0.03) (0.04) 
prior repetition 0.27 1.38** - - 
(0.49) (0.65) 
test score (grade 2) -0.67*** -0.87*** - - 
(0.20) (0.30) 
test score (difference grades 2/3) -0.80*** -1.12*** - - 
(0.25) (0.35) 
test score (difference grades 3/4) -0.13 -0.05 - - 
(0.20) (0.29) 
boy -0.43 -0.86 - - 
(0.45) (0.67) 
property at home -0.04 -0.05 - - 
(0.12) (0.16) 
media availability 0.06 0.03 - - 
(0.28) (0.36) 
share math books 0.15 0.01 - - 
(0.81) (1.21) 
city size 0.15 -0.02 - - 
(0.35) (0.52) 
teacher training 0.05 0.10 - - 
(0.16) (0.22) 
work at home -0.06 -0.21 - - 
(0.11) (0.17) 
meals -0.21 -0.21 - - 
(0.48) (0.64) 
male teacher 0.59 0.59 - - 
(0.52) (0.76) 
double shift -0.69 -0.74 - - 
(0.64) (0.91) 
student age 0.31 -0.26 - - 
(0.26) (0.41) 
student speaks French at home -0.20 0.96 - - 
(0.65) (0.91) 
languages-student -0.15 -1.30* - - 
(0.35) (0.67) 
teacher speaks local language -0.81 -0.93 - - 
(0.60) (0.82) 
teacher speaks French at home 0.32 1.19** - - 
(0.31) (0.49) 
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Table B.2.2 Continued 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
 
study at home -0.57* -0.68 - - 
(0.32) (0.43) 
number of students 0.00 0.00 - - 
(0.00) (0.00) 
partnerships 0.02 -0.40 - - 
(0.35) (0.49) 
teacher meetings 0.09 0.06 - - 
(0.25) (0.35) 
constant -5.58* 1.36 - - 
(3.23) (5.19) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In column 1 the estimation correctly classifies about 100% of non-repeaters 
and about 10% of repeaters. In column 2, it correctly classifies about 100% and 10% respectively. 
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Table B2.3: Multi-level logit estimation of grade retention – Specification 2/Grade 5 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
mean score of class (grade 4) 1.57** - - - 
(0.68) 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) -1.28 - - - 
(4.26) 
prior repetition 0.78 - - - 
(0.77) 
test score (grade 2) -2.26*** - - - 
(0.48) 
test score (difference grades 2/3) -2.22*** - - - 
(0.51) 
test score (difference grades 3/4) -1.42*** - - - 
(0.41) 
test score (difference grades 4/5) -0.72** - - - 
(0.30) 
boy 0.25 - - - 
(0.76) 
property at home 0.09 - - - 
(0.19) 
media availability -0.55 - - - 
(0.47) 
share math books 0.07 - - - 
(1.10) 
city size -0.25 - - - 
(0.51) 
teacher training 0.23 - - - 
(0.35) 
work at home 0.02 - - - 
(0.19) 
meals -1.82** - - - 
(0.76) 
male teacher -0.45 - - - 
(1.04) 
double shift -2.51 - - - 
(1.65) 
student age -0.37 - - - 
(0.40) 
student speaks French at home -0.80 - - - 
(1.06) 
languages-student -1.43** - - - 
(0.65) 
study at home -0.18 - - - 
(0.62) 
number of students 0.00 - - - 
(0.00) 
partnerships 0.35 - - - 
(0.57) 
teacher meetings -0.57 - - - 
(0.50) 
constant 8.27 - - - 
(5.78) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimation correctly classifies about 98% of non-repeaters and about 
43% of repeaters.  
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Table B3.1: Multi-level logit estimation of grade retention – Specification 3/Grade 3 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
mean score of class (grade 2) 1.90*** 2.10*** 3.29*** - 
(0.39) (0.48) (0.83)  
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 4.03** 4.65* 4.87 - 
(1.97) (2.43) (3.06)  
class size (grade 2) 0.05** 0.08*** 0.08** - 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  
class size (difference grades 2/3) 0.02 0.06** 0.05 - 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)  
teacher job experience (grade 2) -0.01 -0.03 0.05 - 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)  
teacher job experience (difference grades 2/3) -0.06* -0.10** -0.16***  
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)  
prior repetition 0.04 0.37 0.01 - 
(0.36) (0.43) (0.54)  
test score (grade 2) -1.42*** -1.29*** -1.54*** - 
(0.18) (0.20) (0.28)  
test score (difference grades 2/3) -0.90*** -0.95*** -1.08*** - 
(0.18) (0.21) (0.27)  
boy 0.13 0.31 -0.17 - 
(0.36) (0.43) (0.57)  
property at home (grade 2) -0.05 -0.02 -0.18 - 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.20)  
media availability (grade 2) -0.02 -0.25 -0.20 - 
(0.19) (0.24) (0.31)  
share math books (grade 2) 0.54 1.08 2.27* - 
(0.70) (0.87) (1.29)  
share math books (difference grades 2/3) -1.40* -1.20 -3.63** - 
(0.74) (0.92) (1.70)  
city size (grade 2) 0.97*** 0.93*** 1.62*** - 
(0.29) (0.35) (0.49)  
teacher training (grade 2) 0.55** 0.40 0.49 - 
(0.27) (0.31) (0.42)  
teacher training (difference grades 2/3) 0.08 -0.01 -0.25 - 
(0.16) (0.20) (0.33)  
work at home (grade 2) 0.04 0.13 -0.19 - 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.18)  
meals (grade 2) -0.22 0.39 1.03 - 
(0.64) (0.80) (1.05)  
male teacher (grade 2) 1.62*** 1.71*** 3.89*** - 
(0.50) (0.62) (1.15)  
male teacher (difference grades 2/3) -0.21 -0.13 2.32** - 
(0.46) (0.60) (1.02)  
double shift (grade 2) 1.07* 1.40* 1.24 - 
(0.58) (0.74) (1.00)  
double shift (difference grades 2/3) 1.46 3.13** 5.88*** - 
(0.96) (1.35) (2.28)  
student age 0.35* 0.22 0.59** - 
(0.20) (0.24) (0.30)  
student speaks French at home (grade 2) -22.57 -21.85 -23.74 - 
 (25254.83) (31962.19) (91145.02)  
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Table B3.1 Continued 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
 
languages-student (grade 2) 0.55** 0.61* 0.87** - 
(0.27) (0.32) (0.41)  
teacher speaks local language (grade 2) 1.77** 2.44** 3.87** - 
(0.82) (1.02) (1.64)  
teacher speaks local language (difference grades 2/3) 1.42* 2.12** 3.81** - 
(0.77) (0.94) (1.59)  
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 0.57 0.30 1.15* - 
(0.36) (0.42) (0.63)  
teacher speaks French at home (difference grades 2/3) 0.02 -0.01 0.13 - 
(0.24) (0.28) (0.37)  
study at home (grade 2) -0.74** -0.93** -2.05*** - 
(0.35) (0.40) (0.53)  
number of students 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.01*** - 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
partnerships 0.46* 0.53 0.43 - 
(0.26) (0.33) (0.41)  
teacher meetings 0.20 0.06 0.23 - 
(0.22) (0.26) (0.31)  
constant -14.27*** -15.06*** -23.97*** - 
(3.99) (4.90) (7.02)  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In column 1 the estimation correctly classifies about 97% of non-repeaters 
and about 27% of repeaters. In column 2, it correctly classifies about 97% and 27% respectively. In column 3, it correctly classifies about 
97% and 27% respectively. 
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Table B3.2: Multi-level logit estimation of grade retention – Specification 3/Grade 4 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
mean score of class (grade 2) -0.86 - - - 
(0.98) 
mean score of class (difference grades 2/3) -0.84 - - - 
(1.06) 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) -16.53** - - - 
(7.24) 
class size (grade 2) 0.16* - - - 
(0.09) 
class size (difference grades 2/3) 0.06 - - - 
(0.07) 
class size (difference grades 3/4) 0.03 - - - 
(0.08) 
teacher job experience (grade 2) -0.01 - - - 
(0.14) 
teacher job experience (grades 2/3) 0.02 - - - 
(0.09) 
teacher job experience (grades 3/4) -0.01 - - - 
(0.10) 
prior repetition 0.33 - - - 
(0.68) 
test score (grade 2) -1.19*** - - - 
(0.32) 
test score (difference grades 2/3) -0.88** - - - 
(0.37) 
test score (difference grades 3/4) -0.24 - - - 
(0.26) 
boy 0.07 - - - 
(0.85) 
property at home (grade 2) 0.11 - - - 
(0.26) 
property at home (difference grades 3/4) 0.22 - - - 
(0.20) 
media availability (grade 2) -0.12 - - - 
(0.47) 
media availability (difference grades 3/4) 0.08 - - - 
(0.38) 
share math books (grade 2) 3.11 - - - 
(3.42) 
share math books (difference grades 2/3) 0.17 - - - 
(2.67) 
share math books (difference grades 3/4) 3.91 - - - 
(4.07) 
city size (grade 2) 0.78 - - - 
(1.21) 
teacher training (grade 2) 1.87*** - - - 
(0.63) 
teacher training (difference grades 2/3) 1.29* - - - 
(0.68) 
teacher training (difference grades 3/4) 0.53 - - - 
(0.38) 
work at home (grade 2) 0.07 - - - 
(0.27) 
 
     
Appendix B: Estimations for calculations of propensity scores 
76 
 
 
     
Table B3.2 Continued 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
work at home (difference grades 3/4) -0.03 - - - 
(0.17) 
meals (grade 2) -0.11 - - - 
(1.58) 
meals (difference grades 3/4) 0.09 - - - 
(0.60) 
male teacher 2.01* - - - 
(1.13) 
double shift (grade 2) 1.37 - - - 
(1.76) 
double shift (difference grades 2/3) -5.59 - - - 
(4.02) 
double shift (difference grades 3/4) -5.57 - - - 
(3.44) 
student age 1.05** - - - 
(0.42) 
student speaks French at home (grade 2) -0.37 - - - 
(1.42) 
student speaks French at home (difference grades 3/4) -0.32 - - - 
(0.96) 
languages-student (grade 2) -0.04 - - - 
(0.83) 
languages-student (difference grades 3/4) -0.05 - - - 
(0.59) 
teacher speaks local language (grade 2) -3.23* - - - 
(1.70) 
teacher speaks local language (difference grades 2/3) -3.68* - - - 
(2.11) 
teacher speaks local language (difference grades 3/4) -8.97* - - - 
(5.34) 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 2.86* - - - 
(1.72) 
teacher speaks French at home (difference grades 2/3) 1.24 - - - 
(1.11) 
teacher speaks French at home (difference grades 3/4) -0.82 - - - 
(1.07) 
study at home (grade 2) 0.73 - - - 
(1.06) 
study at home (difference grades 3/4) -0.72 - - - 
(0.54) 
number of students -0.01** - - - 
(0.00) 
partnerships -0.87 - - - 
(0.92) 
teacher meetings 0.60 - - - 
(0.60) 
constant -34.79*** - - - 
(11.84) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimation correctly classifies about 99% of non-repeaters and about 
25% of repeaters. The estimation for the outcome after two years did not converge.  
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Table B3.3: Multi-level logit estimation of grade retention – Specification 3/Grade 5 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
mean score of class (grade 2) 3.51*** - - - 
(1.36) 
mean score of class (difference grades 2/3) 2.58* - - - 
(1.49) 
mean score of class (difference grades 3/4) 2.94** - - - 
(1.38) 
Share repeaters in class (grade 2) -3.77 - - - 
(6.01) 
prior repetition -0.09 - - - 
(1.18) 
test score (grade 2) -3.09*** - - - 
(0.79) 
test score (difference grades 2/3) -2.67*** - - - 
(0.78) 
test score (difference grades 3/4) -1.69*** - - - 
(0.58) 
test score (difference grades 4/5) -0.54 - - - 
(0.39) 
boy -1.06 - - - 
(1.42) 
property at home (grade 2) -0.69* - - - 
(0.39) 
property at home (difference grades 3/4) -0.07 - - - 
(0.27) 
media availability (grade 2) -0.72 - - - 
(0.82) 
media availability (difference grades 3/4) -1.23 - - - 
(0.77) 
share math books (grade 2) 6.11* - - - 
(3.27) 
share math books (difference grades 2/3) 3.94** - - - 
(1.95) 
share math books (difference grades 3/4) -6.04 - - - 
(4.69) 
share math books (difference grades 4/5) -10.42** - - - 
(5.11) 
city size (grade 2) -0.57 - - - 
(0.83) 
teacher training (grade 2) -0.16 - - - 
(0.65) 
teacher training (difference grades 2/3) 0.04 - - - 
(0.57) 
teacher training (difference grades 3/4) -0.82 - - - 
(0.60) 
teacher training (difference grades 4/5) -1.34** - - - 
(0.56) 
work at home (grade 2) -0.73 - - - 
(0.47) 
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Table B3.3 Continued 
Grade retention One year Two years Three years Four years 
work at home (difference grades 3/4) -0.55* - - - 
(0.29) 
meals (grade 2) -2.69 - - - 
(2.12) 
meals (difference grades 3/4) -2.53** - - - 
(1.13) 
male teacher -1.52 - - - 
(1.33) 
double shift (grade 2) -2.58 - - - 
(2.45) 
double shift (difference grades 2/3) -3.70 - - - 
(2.79) 
double shift (difference grades 3/4) -0.35 - - - 
(2.52) 
double shift (difference grades 4/5) -6.66** - - - 
(2.85) 
student age 0.28 - - - 
(0.50) 
student speaks French at home (grade 2) -0.69 - - - 
(2.79) 
student speaks French at home (difference 
grades 3/4) -3.36 - - - 
(2.36) 
languages-student (grade 2) -4.08*** - - - 
(1.38) 
languages-student (difference grades 3/4) -2.83** - - - 
(1.35) 
study at home (grade 2) -0.11 - - - 
(1.23) 
study at home (difference grades 3/4) -0.22 - - - 
(0.81) 
number of students 0.01** - - - 
(0.00) 
partnerships 0.87 - - - 
(0.65) 
teacher meetings -1.69** - - - 
(0.72) 
constant 12.81 - - - 
(11.02) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimation correctly classifies about 97% of non-repeaters and about 
71% of repeaters.  
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Table C1.1.1: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 1/Grade 2/One year 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.27 -1.24 -0.03 0.78 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.68 
class size 57.48 56.17 1.31 0.47 
teacher job experience 14.29 14.07 0.22 0.84 
prior repetition 0.18 0.21 -0.03 0.57 
test score -2.43 -2.35 -0.08 0.64 
boy 0.39 0.46 -0.08 0.27 
property at home 3.34 3.43 -0.09 0.75 
media availability 1.43 1.41 0.02 0.85 
share math books 0.32 0.32 -0.01 0.88 
city size 3.43 3.42 0.02 0.91 
teacher training 3.71 3.70 0.01 0.97 
work at home 2.91 2.62 0.29 0.26 
meals 2.94 2.96 -0.02 0.59 
male teacher 0.56 0.59 -0.03 0.61 
double shift 0.29 0.33 -0.04 0.51 
student age 8.16 8.15 0.01 0.92 
student speaks French at home 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.65 
languages-student 1.22 1.18 0.03 0.60 
teacher speaks local language 0.61 0.61 0.00 0.98 
teacher speaks French at home 2.67 2.69 -0.02 0.84 
study at home 1.89 1.82 0.07 0.28 
number of students 748.63 745.10 3.53 0.94 
partnerships 0.66 0.56 0.10 0.35 
teacher meetings 2.62 2.60 0.03 0.83 
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Table C1.1.2: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 1/Grade 3/One year 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.22 -1.21 -0.01 0.93 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.89 
class size 50.08 49.89 0.19 0.90 
teacher job experience 13.15 13.30 -0.15 0.88 
prior repetition 0.40 0.41 0.00 0.95 
test score -1.20 -1.13 -0.07 0.68 
boy 0.54 0.58 -0.04 0.59 
property at home 3.12 3.10 0.02 0.95 
media availability 1.43 1.39 0.04 0.74 
share math books 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.98 
city size 3.13 3.12 0.01 0.97 
teacher training 3.89 3.83 0.07 0.67 
work at home 2.56 2.43 0.13 0.57 
meals 2.95 2.91 0.03 0.38 
male teacher 0.63 0.60 0.03 0.66 
double shift 0.28 0.30 -0.02 0.71 
student age 9.42 9.48 -0.06 0.61 
student speaks French at home 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 
languages-student 1.23 1.25 -0.02 0.79 
teacher speaks local language 0.87 0.85 0.01 0.75 
teacher speaks French at home 2.46 2.56 -0.09 0.42 
study at home 1.78 1.76 0.02 0.83 
number of students 650.10 672.76 -22.66 0.57 
partnerships 0.57 0.57 0.00 0.96 
teacher meetings 2.71 2.65 0.06 0.58 
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Table C1.1.3: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 1/Grade 4/One year 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 3) -0.20 -0.20 0.00 0.98 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.87 
class size 53.13 52.36 0.77 0.78 
teacher job experience 13.98 14.41 -0.44 0.81 
prior repetition 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.97 
test score 0.77 0.82 -0.05 0.86 
boy 0.53 0.54 -0.01 0.93 
property at home 3.55 3.70 -0.14 0.75 
media availability 1.77 1.81 -0.04 0.84 
share math books 0.48 0.48 -0.01 0.92 
city size 3.43 3.43 0.00 1.00 
teacher training 3.43 3.43 0.00 0.99 
work at home 3.36 3.37 0.00 0.99 
meals 1.89 1.88 0.02 0.83 
male teacher 0.66 0.66 0.00 0.97 
double shift 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.97 
student age 10.40 10.40 0.01 0.97 
student speaks French at home 0.09 0.09 0.00 1.00 
languages-student 1.06 1.07 0.00 0.99 
teacher speaks local language 0.77 0.78 -0.02 0.85 
teacher speaks French at home 2.62 2.61 0.00 0.98 
study at home 1.64 1.63 0.01 0.94 
number of students 794.51 795.73 -1.22 0.98 
partnerships 0.51 0.47 0.04 0.78 
teacher meetings 2.55 2.52 0.03 0.89 
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Table C1.1.4: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 1/Grade 5/One year 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 4) 1.03 1.05 -0.02 0.89 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.29 
prior repetition 0.34 0.28 0.06 0.56 
test score 1.19 0.75 0.44 0.22 
boy 0.50 0.62 -0.12 0.27 
property at home 3.66 3.23 0.43 0.39 
media availability 1.59 1.68 -0.09 0.65 
share math books 0.46 0.40 0.06 0.46 
city size 2.95 2.96 0.00 1.00 
teacher training 3.68 3.60 0.08 0.73 
work at home 3.98 3.32 0.65 0.19 
meals 1.82 1.82 0.00 0.99 
male teacher 0.80 0.81 -0.02 0.85 
double shift 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.56 
student age 11.18 11.30 -0.12 0.49 
student speaks French at home 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.50 
languages-student 0.95 1.02 -0.06 0.54 
study at home 1.61 1.52 0.10 0.50 
number of students 699.66 637.60 62.06 0.42 
partnerships 0.43 0.41 0.03 0.84 
teacher meetings 2.52 2.70 -0.18 0.42 
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Table C1.2.1: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 1/Grade 2/Two years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.27 -1.29 0.02 0.85 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.96 
class size 56.45 55.62 0.83 0.69 
teacher job experience 15.67 14.57 1.10 0.42 
prior repetition 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.69 
test score -2.33 -2.27 -0.06 0.80 
boy 0.36 0.45 -0.08 0.32 
property at home 3.45 3.43 0.02 0.96 
media availability 1.48 1.47 0.01 0.94 
share math books 0.32 0.34 -0.02 0.63 
city size 3.42 3.37 0.05 0.76 
teacher training 3.59 3.49 0.11 0.60 
work at home 2.97 2.75 0.22 0.51 
meals 2.93 2.96 -0.03 0.46 
male teacher 0.59 0.64 -0.04 0.61 
double shift 0.30 0.34 -0.03 0.68 
student age 8.13 8.06 0.07 0.57 
student speaks French at home 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.76 
languages-student 1.20 1.20 0.00 1.00 
teacher speaks local language 0.65 0.64 0.01 0.88 
teacher speaks French at home 2.68 2.65 0.03 0.82 
study at home 1.88 1.86 0.03 0.73 
number of students 762.32 722.30 40.02 0.45 
partnerships 0.57 0.49 0.07 0.57 
teacher meetings 2.52 2.56 -0.04 0.79 
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Table C1.2.2: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 1/Grade 3/Two years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.21 -1.18 -0.03 0.71 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.81 
class size 51.00 51.62 -0.62 0.76 
teacher job experience 12.73 13.08 -0.36 0.76 
prior repetition 0.38 0.36 0.02 0.79 
test score -1.11 -0.97 -0.14 0.53 
boy 0.52 0.54 -0.03 0.76 
property at home 2.95 3.14 -0.19 0.63 
media availability 1.39 1.45 -0.06 0.70 
share math books 0.39 0.38 0.00 0.96 
city size 3.05 3.12 -0.06 0.73 
teacher training 3.92 3.85 0.07 0.70 
work at home 2.60 2.40 0.20 0.48 
meals 2.95 2.94 0.02 0.61 
male teacher 0.65 0.65 0.00 0.97 
double shift 0.27 0.29 -0.01 0.85 
student age 9.34 9.35 -0.02 0.91 
student speaks French at home 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.53 
languages-student 1.19 1.18 0.01 0.91 
teacher speaks local language 0.88 0.89 0.00 0.95 
teacher speaks French at home 2.43 2.47 -0.04 0.76 
study at home 1.73 1.72 0.01 0.95 
number of students 619.53 654.59 -35.06 0.46 
partnerships 0.49 0.50 -0.01 0.95 
teacher meetings 2.66 2.64 0.02 0.88 
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Table C1.2.3: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 1/Grade 4/Two years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 3) -0.13 -0.14 0.01 0.93 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.10 0.11 -0.01 0.62 
class size 49.62 49.70 -0.08 0.98 
teacher job experience 14.62 14.36 0.25 0.92 
prior repetition 0.27 0.27 0.00 0.99 
test score 0.74 0.81 -0.07 0.86 
boy 0.54 0.55 -0.01 0.93 
property at home 3.58 3.66 -0.08 0.90 
media availability 1.81 1.78 0.03 0.92 
share math books 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.97 
city size 3.54 3.43 0.10 0.68 
teacher training 3.38 3.36 0.03 0.95 
work at home 3.15 3.31 -0.15 0.79 
meals 1.85 1.84 0.00 0.98 
male teacher 0.65 0.66 -0.01 0.97 
double shift 0.19 0.22 -0.02 0.84 
student age 10.23 10.19 0.04 0.85 
student speaks French at home 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.86 
languages-student 0.96 0.95 0.01 0.93 
teacher speaks local language 0.81 0.79 0.02 0.89 
teacher speaks French at home 2.81 2.75 0.06 0.81 
study at home 1.58 1.62 -0.04 0.83 
number of students 788.81 785.63 3.18 0.97 
partnerships 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.98 
teacher meetings 2.50 2.51 -0.01 0.98 
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Table C1.3.1: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 1/Grade 2/Three years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.32 -1.32 0.00 0.98 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.95 
class size 56.07 55.97 0.10 0.97 
teacher job experience 15.23 14.74 0.49 0.74 
prior repetition 0.11 0.14 -0.02 0.70 
test score -2.38 -2.23 -0.15 0.59 
boy 0.39 0.46 -0.07 0.43 
property at home 3.21 3.44 -0.23 0.56 
media availability 1.48 1.47 0.00 1.00 
share math books 0.31 0.32 -0.01 0.90 
city size 3.36 3.30 0.06 0.74 
teacher training 3.64 3.57 0.07 0.75 
work at home 3.07 2.68 0.39 0.26 
meals 2.92 2.94 -0.02 0.63 
male teacher 0.61 0.63 -0.02 0.82 
double shift 0.33 0.35 -0.02 0.78 
student age 8.13 8.08 0.05 0.75 
student speaks French at home 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.49 
languages-student 1.23 1.22 0.01 0.87 
teacher speaks local language 0.59 0.60 -0.01 0.93 
teacher speaks French at home 2.62 2.61 0.01 0.96 
study at home 1.85 1.83 0.02 0.82 
number of students 761.26 735.93 25.33 0.68 
partnerships 0.69 0.57 0.12 0.41 
teacher meetings 2.59 2.60 -0.01 0.96 
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Table C1.3.2: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 1/Grade 3/Three years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.23 -1.17 -0.06 0.57 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.18 0.18 0.00 1.00 
class size 51.22 52.03 -0.80 0.73 
teacher job experience 13.09 14.13 -1.04 0.47 
prior repetition 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.99 
test score -1.07 -0.96 -0.12 0.65 
boy 0.52 0.50 0.02 0.86 
property at home 2.81 2.90 -0.09 0.85 
media availability 1.43 1.48 -0.05 0.78 
share math books 0.35 0.39 -0.05 0.49 
city size 3.07 3.19 -0.12 0.58 
teacher training 3.97 3.75 0.22 0.33 
work at home 2.28 2.26 0.01 0.97 
meals 2.97 2.96 0.01 0.82 
male teacher 0.76 0.73 0.03 0.72 
double shift 0.26 0.28 -0.02 0.83 
student age 9.43 9.42 0.01 0.96 
student speaks French at home 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 
languages-student 1.21 1.33 -0.12 0.26 
teacher speaks local language 0.91 0.91 0.01 0.90 
teacher speaks French at home 2.45 2.59 -0.14 0.41 
study at home 1.71 1.77 -0.06 0.59 
number of students 597.40 634.32 -36.92 0.49 
partnerships 0.50 0.49 0.01 0.91 
teacher meetings 2.62 2.63 -0.01 0.95 
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Table C1.4: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 1/Grade 2/Four years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.35 -1.37 0.02 0.90 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.93 
class size 54.74 54.71 0.03 0.99 
teacher job experience 14.15 14.84 -0.69 0.66 
prior repetition 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.86 
test score -2.42 -2.34 -0.08 0.77 
boy 0.40 0.46 -0.06 0.51 
property at home 3.15 3.48 -0.32 0.44 
media availability 1.45 1.57 -0.11 0.50 
share math books 0.29 0.32 -0.03 0.52 
city size 3.40 3.33 0.07 0.73 
teacher training 3.74 3.71 0.03 0.88 
work at home 2.96 2.70 0.26 0.47 
meals 2.92 2.93 -0.02 0.78 
male teacher 0.62 0.61 0.01 0.91 
double shift 0.30 0.34 -0.04 0.66 
student age 8.13 8.05 0.09 0.57 
student speaks French at home 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.52 
languages-student 1.21 1.19 0.01 0.87 
teacher speaks local language 0.66 0.69 -0.03 0.78 
teacher speaks French at home 2.70 2.58 0.12 0.50 
study at home 1.89 1.87 0.02 0.83 
number of students 712.23 734.37 -22.14 0.73 
partnerships 0.83 0.64 0.19 0.26 
teacher meetings 2.60 2.64 -0.03 0.83 
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Table C2.1.1: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 2/Grade 3/One year 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.20 -1.16 -0.04 0.60 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.93 
class size 50.01 50.19 -0.18 0.92 
teacher job experience 13.13 14.10 -0.97 0.34 
prior repetition 0.39 0.40 -0.02 0.81 
test score (grade 2) -1.73 -1.64 -0.09 0.59 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.60 0.55 0.05 0.70 
boy 0.50 0.53 -0.03 0.68 
property at home 3.25 3.39 -0.15 0.67 
media availability 1.49 1.50 -0.01 0.92 
share math books 0.40 0.39 0.01 0.91 
city size 3.18 3.21 -0.03 0.84 
teacher training 3.92 3.84 0.08 0.63 
work at home 2.60 2.41 0.19 0.45 
meals 2.95 2.94 0.01 0.73 
male teacher 0.61 0.62 -0.01 0.94 
double shift 0.26 0.28 -0.02 0.74 
student age 9.39 9.43 -0.04 0.74 
student speaks French at home 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 
languages-student 1.23 1.22 0.01 0.88 
teacher speaks local language 0.88 0.89 -0.01 0.87 
teacher speaks French at home 2.52 2.55 -0.03 0.81 
study at home 1.80 1.79 0.01 0.88 
number of students 657.67 680.58 -22.91 0.59 
partnerships 0.58 0.53 0.06 0.58 
teacher meetings 2.70 2.62 0.08 0.47 
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Table C2.1.2: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 2/Grade 4/One year 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 3) -0.25 -0.25 0.00 0.98 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.68 
class size 54.03 52.83 1.20 0.73 
teacher job experience 13.27 13.54 -0.28 0.90 
prior repetition 0.26 0.28 -0.01 0.89 
test score (grade 2) -1.27 -1.26 -0.01 0.97 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.65 0.69 -0.04 0.85 
test score (difference grades 3/4) 1.41 1.34 0.07 0.83 
boy 0.50 0.51 -0.01 0.94 
property at home 3.79 3.82 -0.02 0.97 
media availability 1.82 1.86 -0.03 0.89 
share math books 0.52 0.51 0.00 0.97 
city size 3.41 3.36 0.05 0.83 
teacher training 3.53 3.45 0.07 0.82 
work at home 3.59 3.67 -0.08 0.88 
meals 1.90 1.87 0.03 0.75 
male teacher 0.65 0.65 0.00 1.00 
double shift 0.18 0.17 0.00 0.98 
student age 10.38 10.37 0.01 0.94 
student speaks French at home 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.97 
languages-student 1.12 1.12 0.00 0.99 
teacher speaks local language 0.76 0.77 -0.01 0.92 
teacher speaks French at home 2.74 2.67 0.07 0.74 
study at home 1.56 1.55 0.01 0.95 
number of students 783.79 760.50 23.29 0.72 
partnerships 0.56 0.58 -0.02 0.91 
teacher meetings 2.71 2.60 0.11 0.65 
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Table C2.1.3: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 2/Grade 5/One year 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 4) 1.05 1.14 -0.09 0.55 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.37 
prior repetition 0.31 0.27 0.04 0.66 
test score (grade 2) -1.24 -1.23 0.00 0.99 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.52 0.69 -0.17 0.47 
test score (difference grades 3/4) 1.33 1.16 0.17 0.55 
test score (difference grades 4/5) 0.57 0.41 0.16 0.67 
boy 0.50 0.58 -0.08 0.48 
property at home 3.40 3.53 -0.13 0.81 
media availability 1.57 1.81 -0.24 0.21 
share math books 0.42 0.47 -0.05 0.57 
city size 2.83 2.89 -0.06 0.83 
teacher training 3.79 3.62 0.17 0.48 
work at home 3.90 3.01 0.89 0.08 
meals 1.88 1.81 0.08 0.48 
male teacher 0.86 0.77 0.09 0.30 
double shift 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.74 
student age 11.14 11.28 -0.13 0.40 
student speaks French at home 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.43 
languages-student 0.98 1.01 -0.04 0.71 
study at home 1.57 1.47 0.10 0.51 
number of students 676.48 653.13 23.35 0.77 
partnerships 0.55 0.37 0.17 0.24 
teacher meetings 2.62 2.85 -0.23 0.23 
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Table C2.2.1: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 2/Grade 3/Two years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.19 -1.13 -0.06 0.50 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.94 
class size 51.65 51.55 0.10 0.96 
teacher job experience 12.93 13.31 -0.38 0.75 
prior repetition 0.38 0.38 0.00 1.00 
test score (grade 2) -1.63 -1.49 -0.14 0.45 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.54 0.52 0.02 0.91 
boy 0.51 0.51 0.00 1.00 
property at home 3.04 3.52 -0.47 0.26 
media availability 1.44 1.55 -0.11 0.46 
share math books 0.39 0.43 -0.04 0.55 
city size 3.08 3.19 -0.11 0.57 
teacher training 3.93 3.90 0.03 0.88 
work at home 2.55 2.48 0.07 0.80 
meals 2.96 2.95 0.01 0.77 
male teacher 0.63 0.61 0.03 0.75 
double shift 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.99 
student age 9.31 9.29 0.02 0.87 
student speaks French at home 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 
languages-student 1.21 1.22 -0.01 0.89 
teacher speaks local language 0.89 0.90 -0.01 0.80 
teacher speaks French at home 2.45 2.48 -0.03 0.85 
study at home 1.80 1.78 0.02 0.82 
number of students 632.52 652.15 -19.63 0.69 
partnerships 0.51 0.49 0.02 0.87 
teacher meetings 2.63 2.57 0.06 0.65 
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Table C2.2.2: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 2/Grade 4/Two years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 3) -0.17 -0.25 0.08 0.67 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.10 0.11 -0.01 0.64 
class size 51.16 50.11 1.05 0.74 
teacher job experience 13.79 13.87 -0.08 0.98 
prior repetition 0.32 0.27 0.05 0.77 
test score (grade 2) -1.27 -1.27 0.00 0.99 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.56 0.37 0.19 0.51 
test score (difference grades 3/4) 1.41 1.60 -0.20 0.67 
boy 0.53 0.57 -0.04 0.81 
property at home 3.58 3.95 -0.37 0.63 
media availability 1.68 1.91 -0.23 0.47 
share math books 0.49 0.53 -0.04 0.66 
city size 3.42 3.48 -0.06 0.85 
teacher training 3.42 3.45 -0.03 0.95 
work at home 3.37 3.95 -0.59 0.43 
meals 1.87 1.71 0.16 0.35 
male teacher 0.68 0.69 -0.01 0.97 
double shift 0.21 0.26 -0.05 0.75 
student age 10.16 10.19 -0.03 0.91 
student speaks French at home 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.53 
languages-student 0.95 0.91 0.04 0.78 
teacher speaks local language 0.68 0.80 -0.12 0.42 
teacher speaks French at home 2.95 2.93 0.02 0.93 
study at home 1.47 1.41 0.06 0.80 
number of students 772.58 784.45 -11.87 0.89 
partnerships 0.58 0.54 0.04 0.88 
teacher meetings 2.74 2.58 0.15 0.61 
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Table C2.3: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 2/Grade 3/Three years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.22 -1.20 -0.02 0.85 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.78 
class size 51.18 49.90 1.28 0.58 
teacher job experience 13.13 13.52 -0.39 0.78 
prior repetition 0.39 0.37 0.03 0.76 
test score (grade 2) -1.66 -1.67 0.01 0.97 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.62 0.56 0.06 0.74 
boy 0.52 0.54 -0.02 0.83 
property at home 2.88 3.06 -0.18 0.71 
media availability 1.46 1.46 0.00 0.98 
share math books 0.35 0.40 -0.05 0.49 
city size 3.11 3.09 0.02 0.94 
teacher training 3.95 3.85 0.10 0.66 
work at home 2.23 2.17 0.06 0.82 
meals 2.96 2.96 0.01 0.89 
male teacher 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.97 
double shift 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.98 
student age 9.38 9.35 0.02 0.89 
student speaks French at home 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 
languages-student 1.20 1.27 -0.07 0.49 
teacher speaks local language 0.91 0.89 0.02 0.74 
teacher speaks French at home 2.48 2.55 -0.07 0.68 
study at home 1.73 1.75 -0.01 0.91 
number of students 597.00 616.49 -19.49 0.72 
partnerships 0.52 0.55 -0.03 0.82 
teacher meetings 2.61 2.56 0.05 0.78 
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Table C3.1.1: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 3/Grade 3/One year 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.15 -1.11 -0.04 0.67 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.80 
class size (grade 2) 56.84 55.99 0.85 0.70 
class size (difference grades 2/3) -7.48 -6.81 -0.67 0.74 
teacher job experience (grade 2) 15.19 15.85 -0.65 0.60 
teacher job experience (grades 2/3) -1.65 -1.67 0.02 0.99 
prior repetition 0.40 0.44 -0.04 0.57 
test score (grade 2) -1.61 -1.56 -0.05 0.77 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.56 0.56 0.00 0.98 
boy 0.52 0.49 0.03 0.70 
property at home (grade 2) 3.70 3.82 -0.12 0.74 
media availability (grade 2) 1.54 1.54 0.00 0.99 
share math books (grade 2) 0.38 0.37 0.01 0.83 
share math books (difference grades 2/3) 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.92 
city size (grade 2) 3.35 3.38 -0.03 0.84 
teacher training (grade 2) 3.58 3.50 0.07 0.69 
teacher training (difference grades 2/3) 0.23 0.33 -0.10 0.72 
work at home (grade 2) 2.66 2.64 0.02 0.93 
meals (grade 2) 2.94 2.93 0.01 0.87 
male teacher (grade 2) 0.61 0.61 0.00 0.96 
male teacher (difference grades 2/3) -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.83 
double shift (grade 2) 0.25 0.26 -0.01 0.91 
double shift (difference grades 2/3) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.92 
student age 9.34 9.42 -0.08 0.59 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 
languages-student (grade 2) 1.28 1.29 -0.01 0.90 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 0.65 0.68 -0.03 0.73 
teacher speaks local language (difference grades 2/3) 0.22 0.21 0.01 0.91 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 2.65 2.61 0.04 0.72 
teacher speaks French at home (difference grades 2/3) -0.12 -0.03 -0.09 0.60 
study at home (grade 2) 1.84 1.85 0.00 0.97 
number of students 689.17 693.85 -4.68 0.92 
partnerships 0.59 0.53 0.06 0.59 
teacher meetings 2.67 2.60 0.08 0.58 
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Table C3.1.2: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 3/Grade 4/One year 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.36 -1.35 -0.01 0.97 
mean score of class (difference grades 2/3) 1.14 1.11 0.03 0.85 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.12 0.12 -0.01 0.79 
class size (grade 2) 56.13 56.49 -0.36 0.92 
class size (difference grades 2/3) -3.96 -6.25 2.29 0.66 
class size (difference grades 3/4) 0.58 1.41 -0.83 0.87 
teacher job experience (grade 2) 15.79 15.09 0.70 0.80 
teacher job experience (grades 2/3) 0.08 -0.88 0.96 0.70 
teacher job experience (grades 3/4) -2.42 -1.81 -0.61 0.78 
prior repetition 0.21 0.20 0.01 0.96 
test score (grade 2) -1.24 -1.31 0.07 0.82 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.78 0.84 -0.06 0.78 
test score (difference grades 3/4) 1.27 1.15 0.11 0.78 
boy 0.50 0.45 0.05 0.71 
property at home (grade 2) 3.96 3.76 0.20 0.76 
property at home (difference grades 3/4) 0.13 0.25 -0.12 0.84 
media availability (grade 2) 1.67 1.70 -0.03 0.91 
media availability (difference grades 3/4) 0.17 0.25 -0.08 0.77 
share math books (grade 2) 0.29 0.31 -0.02 0.73 
share math books (difference grades 2/3) 0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.66 
share math books (difference grades 3/4) 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.76 
city size (grade 2) 3.46 3.31 0.15 0.58 
teacher training (grade 2) 3.58 3.78 -0.19 0.60 
teacher training (difference grades 2/3) 0.00 -0.27 0.27 0.56 
teacher training (difference grades 3/4) 0.04 0.20 -0.16 0.71 
work at home (grade 2) 3.00 3.12 -0.12 0.84 
work at home (difference grades 3/4) 0.33 0.46 -0.13 0.85 
meals (grade 2) 2.94 2.96 -0.02 0.73 
meals (difference grades 3/4) -1.08 -1.03 -0.05 0.68 
male teacher 0.63 0.64 -0.02 0.90 
double shift (grade 2) 0.29 0.30 -0.01 0.95 
double shift (difference grades 2/3) -0.13 -0.09 -0.03 0.72 
double shift (difference grades 3/4) -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 0.84 
student age 10.42 10.35 0.07 0.78 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.81 
teacher speaks French at home (difference grades 3/4) 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.81 
languages-student (grade 2) 1.17 1.19 -0.02 0.87 
languages-student (difference grades 3/4) -0.04 -0.13 0.09 0.57 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 0.63 0.63 0.00 0.99 
teacher speaks local language (difference grades 2/3) 0.25 0.26 -0.01 0.96 
teacher speaks local language (difference grades 3/4) -0.08 -0.11 0.02 0.80 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 2.75 2.72 0.03 0.88 
teacher speaks French at home (difference grades 2/3) -0.21 -0.31 0.10 0.78 
teacher speaks French at home (difference grades 3/4) 0.21 0.32 -0.11 0.73 
study at home (grade 2) 1.92 1.94 -0.02 0.85 
study at home (difference grades 3/4) -0.29 -0.30 0.00 0.98 
number of students 804.96 779.72 25.24 0.73 
partnerships 0.58 0.60 -0.02 0.93 
teacher meetings 2.67 2.58 0.09 0.75 
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Table C3.1.3: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 3/Grade 5/One year 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.38 -1.60 0.22 0.51 
mean score of class (difference grades 2/3) 1.24 1.45 -0.21 0.21 
mean score of class (difference grades 3/4) 1.14 1.22 -0.07 0.63 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.30 
prior repetition 0.21 0.19 0.02 0.88 
test score (grade 2) -1.29 -1.52 0.23 0.59 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.89 1.28 -0.39 0.33 
test score (difference grades 3/4) 1.02 1.00 0.02 0.97 
test score (difference grades 4/5) 0.74 0.42 0.32 0.57 
boy 0.57 0.52 0.05 0.81 
property at home (grade 2) 3.93 2.92 1.01 0.22 
property at home (difference grades 3/4) 0.43 0.53 -0.11 0.87 
media availability (grade 2) 1.64 1.42 0.23 0.45 
media availability (difference grades 3/4) 0.36 0.32 0.04 0.90 
share math books (grade 2) 0.36 0.27 0.09 0.35 
share math books (difference grades 2/3) 0.12 0.15 -0.03 0.76 
share math books (difference grades 3/4) 0.10 0.12 -0.02 0.76 
share math books (difference grades 4/5) -0.08 -0.10 0.02 0.79 
city size (grade 2) 3.64 3.19 0.46 0.17 
teacher training (grade 2) 3.71 3.68 0.03 0.94 
teacher training (difference grades 2/3) 0.00 -0.37 0.37 0.49 
teacher training (difference grades 3/4) -0.14 0.33 -0.47 0.24 
teacher training (difference grades 4/5) 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.94 
work at home (grade 2) 1.79 2.18 -0.39 0.58 
work at home (difference grades 3/4) 1.64 1.77 -0.13 0.87 
meals (grade 2) 2.96 2.99 -0.02 0.64 
meals (difference grades 3/4) -0.93 -0.96 0.03 0.70 
male teacher 0.79 0.83 -0.05 0.76 
double shift (grade 2) 0.29 0.26 0.02 0.90 
double shift (difference grades 2/3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 
double shift (difference grades 3/4) -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 0.57 
double shift (difference grades 4/5) -0.14 -0.09 -0.05 0.69 
student age 11.00 10.86 0.14 0.60 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 0.14 0.32 -0.18 0.29 
teacher speaks French at home (difference grades 3/4) -0.07 -0.27 0.20 0.32 
languages-student (grade 2) 1.14 1.13 0.01 0.96 
languages-student (difference grades 3/4) -0.14 -0.12 -0.02 0.92 
study at home (grade 2) 1.93 1.94 -0.02 0.89 
study at home (difference grades 3/4) -0.21 -0.14 -0.08 0.75 
number of students 872.64 773.02 99.62 0.50 
Partnerships 0.50 0.28 0.22 0.44 
teacher meetings 2.79 2.46 0.32 0.36 
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Table C3.2: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 3/Grade 3/Two years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.14 -1.10 -0.04 0.72 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.16 0.16 -0.01 0.74 
class size (grade 2) 56.38 56.35 0.03 0.99 
class size (difference grades 2/3) -5.78 -6.54 0.77 0.72 
teacher job experience (grade 2) 15.48 15.27 0.21 0.89 
teacher job experience (grades 2/3) -2.12 -1.69 -0.43 0.79 
prior repetition 0.36 0.35 0.01 0.91 
test score (grade 2) -1.57 -1.46 -0.10 0.62 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.51 0.54 -0.03 0.89 
boy 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
property at home (grade 2) 3.50 3.48 0.02 0.96 
media availability (grade 2) 1.48 1.47 0.01 0.94 
share math books (grade 2) 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.94 
share math books (difference grades 2/3) 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.88 
city size (grade 2) 3.31 3.36 -0.05 0.79 
teacher training (grade 2) 3.53 3.55 -0.01 0.96 
teacher training (difference grades 2/3) 0.31 0.20 0.11 0.73 
work at home (grade 2) 2.67 2.65 0.02 0.94 
meals (grade 2) 2.96 2.93 0.02 0.57 
male teacher (grade 2) 0.67 0.64 0.04 0.68 
male teacher (difference grades 2/3) -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 0.88 
double shift (grade 2) 0.24 0.28 -0.04 0.63 
double shift (difference grades 2/3) 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.91 
student age 9.22 9.25 -0.03 0.87 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 
languages-student (grade 2) 1.26 1.27 -0.01 0.90 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 0.67 0.65 0.02 0.79 
teacher speaks local language (difference grades 2/3) 0.19 0.20 -0.01 0.87 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 2.60 2.63 -0.02 0.88 
teacher speaks French at home (difference grades 2/3) -0.16 -0.12 -0.03 0.87 
study at home (grade 2) 1.83 1.80 0.03 0.77 
number of students 663.53 697.61 -34.08 0.51 
partnerships 0.53 0.56 -0.03 0.83 
teacher meetings 2.62 2.64 -0.02 0.91 
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Table C3.3: Balance of variables after matching – Specification 3/Grade 3/Three years 
 Mean   
variable Treated Control Difference p-value 
mean score of class (grade 2) -1.16 -1.13 -0.04 0.77 
share repeaters in class (grade 2) 0.16 0.17 -0.01 0.63 
class size (grade 2) 55.91 56.86 -0.95 0.74 
class size (difference grades 2/3) -5.95 -6.64 0.69 0.80 
teacher job experience (grade 2) 16.00 15.94 0.06 0.97 
teacher job experience (grades 2/3) -2.19 -1.69 -0.49 0.79 
prior repetition 0.37 0.34 0.04 0.73 
test score (grade 2) -1.55 -1.54 -0.01 0.97 
test score (difference grades 2/3) 0.62 0.50 0.12 0.59 
boy 0.53 0.60 -0.06 0.56 
property at home (grade 2) 3.49 3.46 0.03 0.95 
media availability (grade 2) 1.56 1.57 -0.01 0.94 
share math books (grade 2) 0.35 0.40 -0.06 0.40 
share math books (difference grades 2/3) 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.70 
city size (grade 2) 3.42 3.33 0.09 0.68 
teacher training (grade 2) 3.47 3.62 -0.15 0.52 
teacher training (difference grades 2/3) 0.37 0.15 0.22 0.51 
work at home (grade 2) 2.26 2.11 0.14 0.66 
meals (grade 2) 2.95 2.96 0.00 0.92 
male teacher (grade 2) 0.70 0.71 -0.01 0.90 
male teacher (difference grades 2/3) 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.76 
double shift (grade 2) 0.23 0.25 -0.01 0.89 
double shift (difference grades 2/3) 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.85 
student age 9.28 9.19 0.09 0.65 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 
languages-student (grade 2) 1.26 1.28 -0.02 0.85 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 0.67 0.68 -0.01 0.94 
teacher speaks local language (difference grades 2/3) 0.21 0.13 0.08 0.46 
teacher speaks French at home (grade 2) 2.53 2.50 0.04 0.82 
teacher speaks French at home (difference grades 2/3) 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.89 
study at home (grade 2) 1.77 1.78 -0.01 0.93 
number of students 637.42 674.99 -37.57 0.52 
partnerships 0.58 0.59 0.00 0.98 
teacher meetings 2.60 2.60 0.00 1.00 
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Appendix D: Data management – editing and imputations 
 
Editing and imputations of the data were necessary because: 
1. There are inconsistencies in the data (contradictions). 
2. Some questions changed from one questionnaire to the next (or were not included at 
all). 
3. Students and directors were not questioned in every wave. 
The explanations below detail how we proceeded in the construction of the variables from the 
raw data to the final data set. 
 
Repetition 
The survey period includes the school years from 1995/1996 (wave 1) to 1999/2000 (wave5). 
There were inconsistencies and missing values in the variable repetition. As there was no 
information on this in the year 96/97, repetition was assigned the value 0 if the student 
attended the third grade in that school year. Since there was no student questionnaire in the 
school year 1998/99, the respective values have been imputed using the grades students were 
attending in the school years before and after 98/99. For inconsistencies, repetition has been 
assigned the value one if students are in the same grade as in the year before. It has been 
assigned the value zero if they have proceeded by one grade or if it is a missing value 
although the students have not dropped out and if they are not in the same grade as in the year 
before. When students have dropped out, they are assigned a missing value for repetition. 
 
Property at home 
The components of property at home are from the students questionnaires in 95/96 and 97/98. 
The students were not asked the respective questions in the other waves of the panel. I have 
assigned the values of the first wave of the panel to the second wave. Similarly, I have 
assigned the values of the third wave of the panel to the fourth and fifth wave. If the third 
wave information was missing I have used the information of the first wave for all succeeding 
waves and if the first wave information was missing I have used the third wave information 
for all remaining waves. 
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City size 
The components of city size are from the director’s questionnaire in 95/96. As the school 
location is fixed, I have assigned the respective values to the following years according to the 
information of the school year 95/96. 
 
Class size 
Information on class size was only asked in the first three waves of the panel 95/96, 96/97 and 
97/98. Class size reflects the number of students who are effectively present on average. This 
should include the total number of students when there is a double shift. However, sometimes, 
in cases of double shift classes, the class size is much smaller and so it is assumed that this 
division has already taken place. I use half of this effective number if instruction takes place 
in double shifts and if the sum of the indicated number of boys and girls is less than two thirds 
of the effective number of students. As it is not possible to plausibly assign values for class 
size in the last two waves I have refrained from doing so. However, when there were missing 
values for a student in the final panel data set and there was information for the same class by 
another student, I have replaced the missing value accordingly. 
 
Teacher training 
Since students who are in the same class have the same teacher and therefore are faced with 
the same teacher characteristics, missing values for students have been assigned the value of 
other students with non-missing values who attend the same class. 
 
Mean score of class 
This variable is constructed from all the students of each grade per school. This means that it 
also includes the scores of repeaters of later waves, which is necessary to avoid considering 
the scores of non-repeating students only. For grade 2, only the first wave has been considered 
since there were already repeaters in the initial sample. 
 
Share math books 
This variable was created from individual information of students regarding their possession 
of math books. Missing values for students in 96/97 who were in third grade were assigned 
their respective values of 95/96 if they were the same as their values indicated for 97/98. 
Missing values in 98/99 were assigned the values of 95/96 if these were equal to their values 
Appendix D: Data management – editing and imputations 
102 
 
in 97/98. For the remaining missing values I have calculated the share of math books from the 
non-missing values within a class and assigned this value to all students of the class. 
 
Student age 
A few students were indicated to be between zero and two years old in wave three. These 
observations were considered to be nonsensical and their age indicated in the first wave was 
used to calculate how old they were in each year. Students who had missing information on 
their age in the first wave of the panel were assigned the value 8, which is the modal value for 
the first wave. To make sure that no further data entry mistake could happen I have used the 
first wave’s age and added one in every succeeding wave. 
 
Boy 
Missing information was filled based on the information given in the first wave as this 
variable does not change over time. In case of contradictions between first wave and third 
wave information I used the first wave information. In case of a missing value in the first 
wave, the value of the third wave was used if it was available. 
 
Student speaks French at home  
Analogous to property at home (see above). 
 
Languages-student 
Analogous to property at home (see above). 
 
Teacher speaks French at home 
Inconsistent responses (if teachers indicated they speak often and rarely French at home) have 
been set to missing values. Imputation using Stata’s impute command using teachers’ 
information on their gender, marital status, living status (alone, with family), knowledge of 
the local language, professional status, diplomas obtained, where they have obtained their 
professional education, how long they have been teachers, how long they have been teachers 
at the current school, what courses they teach and what types of classes they teach. The 
variable was rounded to whole numbers. Further missing values were imputed as for class size 
(see above). 
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Teacher speaks local language 
Analogous to class size (see above). 
 
Male teacher 
Analogous to class size (see above). 
 
Teacher job experience 
Information on teacher job experience was only asked in the first three waves of the panel 
95/96, 96/97 and 97/98. Imputation using Stata’s impute command using teachers’ 
information on their gender, age, civil status, living status (alone, with family), living 
location, professional status, diplomas obtained, where they have obtained their professional 
education, how long they have been teachers at current school and what courses they teach. 
Remaining inconsistencies have been imputed by calculating the mean value per class and 
attaching the maximum value for average values nearer to the maximum value and minimum 
values otherwise. 
 
Media availability 
Same as for property at home (see above). 
 
Student speaks French at home 
Same as for property at home (see above). 
 
Languages-student 
Same as for property at home (see above). 
 
Work at home 
Information on the components of this variable is available from the student questionnaires in 
95/96, 97/98 and 99/00, that is from the first, third, and fifth wave of the panel. Missing 
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values have been imputed by assigning the value of the preceding year. For the remaining 
missing values, the value of the succeeding years (if non-missing) has been assigned. 
 
Meals 
The variable meals consists of the components breakfast, lunch and dinner. Value 0 denotes 
that they never have the respective component, value 1 regularly and value 0.5 that they have 
it sometimes. Breakfast was constructed from questions to the students if they have breakfast 
and if they have a snack at recess. If they have one or the other regularly or if they have both 
sometimes, the value 1 was given to the observation. If they have one of the two sometimes 
and the other one never or information on the other one is missing or if both are missing, 
value 0.5 was assigned. Lunch was assigned value 1 if students have lunch regularly and 0.5 if 
they have it sometimes or if this information was missing. Dinner was constructed in the same 
way as lunch. Since these questions have only been asked in 95/96 and 97/98, missing values 
of 96/97 have been assigned the values of 95/96 and missing values of 98/99 and 99/00 have 
been assigned the values of 97/98. 
 
Double shift 
No imputations. 
 
Study at home 
The variable study at home consists of the components student studies at home and student 
gets help with studies at home, which were asked in the student questionnaires of 95/96, 97/98 
and 99/00. The missing values of 96/97 have been assigned the respective values of 95/96 and 
the missing values of 98/99 were assigned the respective values of 97/98. Remaining missing 
values have been assigned the values of the previous years. 
 
Number of students/partnerships/teacher meetings 
There is a questionnaire with questions to directors in 98/99. However, there is no information 
on these three variables, so I have used the first wave answers (from the 95/96 director 
questionnaire) as proxies for the complete panel. There is also a director’s questionnaire for 
the last wave of the panel. However, this one is not relevant for my estimations. 
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Number of students 
Imputed using variables indicating the number of teachers at school, the number of classes at 
school and the number of girls at school (then the variable was rounded to whole numbers). 
 
Partnerships 
No imputations. 
 
Teacher meetings 
Inconsistencies in the frequency have been replaced by choosing the more frequent value. 
(For example, if meetings take place once a week, they cannot also take place once a month. 
If both were selected simultaneously I opted for once a week.)  
Other editing 
Some variables were needed to identify the observations. Specifically the variable wave 
denotes which wave is currently considered. This variable is inconsistent in the case of four 
students where it jumped ahead (for example from 2 to 4). These observations were dropped 
as it is not clear how to use them in the final analysis. Missing values of the variable denoting 
the grade the student is currently attending were assigned the value 2 in the first wave of the 
panel (in 95/96) and 3 in 96/97. As there was also no student questionnaire in 98/99, 
information on the grade of the students from 97/98 and 99/00 were used to infer the grade in 
98/99. Further missing values were filled with the information on grades from the test files. 
Remaining inconsistent values were assigned the value of the previous year if the student was 
a repeater. Moreover, in a few cases there were repetitive values of the student identification 
number within a class, which had to be deleted to be able to unambiguously identify each 
student. The variable dropout was needed for some of the data management and also for the 
simulations of dropouts in one of the robustness checks. Students were considered to have 
dropped out if they were not in the sample for two consecutive years and if they did not 
reappear later. 
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3 Occupational Choice, Remittances and Human Capital 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 2, I have looked at the problems of an education system with high retention 
rates that may suffer from overcrowding, generate high costs for the government and 
households and lead to lower achievement or even dropout of students. Of course, increasing 
educational attainment and quality has an intrinsic value but it is also highly relevant for the 
labor market decisions of individuals. This chapter looks at the moderating effect of education 
on the relationship between remittances sent by migrant household members and labor market 
outcomes of non-migrant recipients. Remaining in the African context, Senegal is again used 
as the country of analysis. 
The flow of remittances to Africa has increased tremendously in the last decade, with 
the size of these flows having intermittently surpassed those of FDI and official aid (see Ratha 
et al., 2011). In a number of African countries they amount to more than 5 percent of GDP 
and they are less volatile than aid flows and FDIs (see Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh, 2009). For 
Senegal, remittances flows increased substantially in the first decade of this century as did 
their share in the country’s GDP. Remittances surged more than five-fold from USD 233 
million in 2000 to USD 1,437 million in 2011, with a peak in 2008. In terms of economic 
performance, remittances amounted to 5 percent of GDP in 2000 and marked 10 percent in 
2011 (UNCTAD, 2013; World Bank, 2013). This stands in contrast to the development of aid 
flows and FDI. While the former decreased from 6 percent of GDP in 2000 to 4 percent of 
GDP in 2011 (OECD, 2012; World Bank, 2013), FDI increased by a mere percentage point to 
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2.34 percent of GDP during this period (UNCTAD, 2013; World Bank, 2013). The rise in 
total remittances comes as no surprise as the number of Senegalese migrants appears to be 
increasing. Migration to OECD countries has doubled in the same period from roughly 9,000 
people to more than 19,000 annually (OECD, 2014). The steep upward trend within this time 
span suggests that the increase of remittances flows may further proceed. 
What effects do these massive money transfers by migrants have on the economic 
behavior of non-migrant family members, especially in relation to labor supply and 
occupational choice? 
The existing literature on the relationship between remittances and labor market 
outcomes yields divergent results. Much of the literature argues that an increase in the 
reservation wage due to the receipt of remittances induces individuals to supply less labor 
(e.g. Funkhouser, 1992; Acosta, 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Rodriguez and 
Tiongson, 2001; Binzel and Assaad, 2011; Kim, 2007; Jadotte, 2009). However, the results 
are mixed. Some find that remittances decrease labor force participation in general (Jadotte, 
2009; Kim, 2007; Rodriguez and Tiongson, 2001), while others find differential effects by 
gender (Funkhouser, 1992; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006) or no effect of remittances on 
wage income (Yang, 2008). 
In this chapter I develop a model that reconciles the contradictory results of the 
remittances literature, linking its currently prevalent theory to insights from the literature on 
the labor market behavior of return migrants (e.g. Massey and Parrado, 1998; Ilahi, 1999; 
McCormick and Wahba, 2001; Dustman and Kirchkamp, 2002; Mesnard, 2004; Mesnard and 
Ravallion, 2006). This body of work argues that alleviating credit constraints enables return 
migrants to enter entrepreneurial activities. Parts of the literature also apply this argument to 
the entry into self-employment of non-migrant family members receiving remittances (e.g. 
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Funkhouser, 1992; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Acosta, 2006; Jadotte, 2009). In this 
chapter, these two arguments are explicitly combined with one another. I show that under 
plausible assumptions human capital is a decisive factor in explaining in which cases the 
argument of labor-decreasing reservation wages weighs stronger than the rationale of self-
employment enhancing alleviation of credit constraints. In a formal theoretical model I 
combine the arguments of the remittances and return migration literature on reservation wages 
and credit constraints with the theoretical and empirical literature on occupational choice. 
In a second step, I examine data on Senegalese individuals in migration and non-
migration households from a World Bank survey carried out in 2009 to test the theoretical 
predictions. Thereby, this chapter also contributes to the improvement of the econometric 
approach in the existing empirical literature as it includes both considerations of selection 
problems regarding migration households and endogeneity concerns with respect to 
remittances. The bias arising when neglecting either issue may be considerable and creates 
doubts about the validity of the estimates found in the literature. In addition, to the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first large country-level study on the effects of migrant remittances on 
labor supply and occupational choice of non-migrant family members in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is a particularly interesting region to study the importance of human capital in this context, 
given that education levels across the population are highly heterogeneous. 
The results of the analysis suggest that an increase in remittances of 100,000 West-
African Francs or about 219 US Dollars increases the likelihood of self-employment by about 
12 percentage points or 24 percent, while decreasing the likelihood of wage employment by 
about 12 percentage points or about 32 percent for men with education levels above primary 
schooling. They do not show an effect on men with no education or on women independently 
of the level of education. These results show that self-employment will be preferred for highly 
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educated men who receive remittances. The lack of this effect for women may be a result of 
their role in a traditional society. Empowerment of women in the labor market, however, may 
also make the theoretical dynamics applicable to women in the future.  
The literature on labor markets in developing countries emphasizes their heterogeneity 
and the necessity to distinguish between different segments. Decent wage employment 
opportunities are rare and therefore many people enter self-employment. Jobs in developing 
countries often do not only pay little but are also uncertain. Moreover, the employment 
situations of women are often worse than those of men (Fields, 2001, p.S17; Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2011). One reason why wage employment opportunities are very scarce appears to be 
the slow creation of new jobs in contrast to the increase of school enrolments. Bennell (1996, 
p.188, Table 5) shows that school enrolment increases were four times higher than the 
increase in wage jobs in the same period for Senegal, and most of Sub-Saharan African 
countries displayed similar patterns. While there have been further increases in wage 
employment since Bennell undertook his study, the share of wage earners in the Senegalese 
economy was still at a low 17.4 percent in 2005 (International Labour Organization, 2010, 
p.13). These dynamics suggest that taking account of different segments in the labor markets 
in developing countries is important when studying the effects of remittances on labor supply 
and occupational choice. 
The literature emphasizes that reservation wages may increase when non-migrant 
family members receive remittances because they can afford the same consumption level as 
before while supplying less labor. As a consequence it is expected that the higher the amount 
of remittances the more consumption needs are satisfied and the less labor is supplied. A 
number of studies has researched these adverse effects with varying results. 
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Funkhouser (1992) for Nicaragua and Acosta (2006) for El Salvador find that 
remittances decrease labor force participation for women but that this is not the case for men. 
Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) find that migration per se and remittances decrease labor 
supply of both men and women in the urban Philippines and similarly Kim (2007) finds that 
remittances generally decrease labor force participation in Jamaica. A negative effect is also 
found by Jadotte (2009) for Haiti. Regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, Azam and Gubert (2005) 
show that in eight villages in the Kayes region in Western Mali, the possibility of receiving 
remittances due to family members who have migrated is an insurance mechanism and leads 
to worse agricultural performance, which is likely to be a result of lower work effort.  
On the other hand, several authors have researched the idea that remittances may 
alleviate credit constraints and may be used as start-up capital for businesses – also with 
varying results. Funkhouser (1992) finds that remittances increase self-employment among 
men but not among women. Massey and Parrado (1998) show that receipt of US earnings by 
migrants increases the odds of business formation and productive investment at the household 
level. In contrast, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) show that remittances reduce male 
urban self-employment in Mexico, whereas they do not have an effect on women. 
More prominently, the idea of start-up capital is researched in the return migration 
literature. The savings of returning migrants in Turkey are an important source of start-up 
capital in micro-enterprises (Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002). The authors demonstrate that 
remittances may loosen financial restrictions and mitigate capital market imperfections, thus 
providing the necessary financial means to open (small) businesses. In the North-African 
context, Mesnard (2004) and Mesnard and Ravallion (2006) find a positive connection 
between savings of returning migrants and entry into self-employment in Tunisia. Similar 
evidence is also found for Pakistan by Ilahi (1999). 
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As is evident from this overview of the literature, the relationship between migration, 
remittances and employment is not yet established in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
employment situation in Senegal, as in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, is tense, with high 
unemployment, low wages and a sizable informal sector (see, for example, Some, 2009). 
Against this backdrop, I analyze under what circumstances remittances alter the labor 
market decisions of members of migrant households who are left behind. I argue that the 
impact of remittances depends decisively on the level of human capital of the individual. This 
is in stark contrast to the existing literature, which has generated ambiguous results 
concerning the likelihood of wage- and self-employment. I propose two main arguments. The 
first is that additional income from migrants outside the household may be used for (self-) 
employment-generating investments in micro-enterprises or other businesses, where these 
investments may only be usefully made with at least a minimum level of knowledge acquired 
at school (e.g. in math, reading and writing). The second is that, for more highly skilled 
individuals, transfers may increase labor effort as the expected utility from increased output 
outweighs the benefit from more leisure, which serves as a substitute for labor. In contrast, 
lower skilled individuals are more likely to decrease their work effort in favor of leisure 
because they can afford less labor at equal consumption and entry into self-employment 
appears less promising. 
The empirical identification of these effects is not trivial. On the one hand, migration 
and non-migration households may differ and this may be the true reason for differential labor 
supply and occupational choice. Moreover, the incidence and amount of remittances are 
subject to endogeneity concerns.20 However, most of the existing studies have not accounted 
                         
20
 In addition, almost all of the literature uses cross-sectional survey data that make clear identification strategies 
even more important. Yang (2008) is an exception in this context as he is able to combine information on 
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for one or the other source of bias.21 I specify Heckman selection models (Heckman, 1979) to 
address selection and instrument remittances using migrant characteristics. 
The following section will provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the 
moderating effect of human capital on the impact of remittances on labor supply and 
occupational choice. After a brief description of the data in section 3.3, I explain the 
methodology applied in section 3.4. The results are discussed in section 3.5, with the 
conclusions following in section 3.6. 
 
3.2 A theoretical model on remittances and labor choices 
 
To illustrate the expected labor supply and occupational choice-related decisions in 
response to the receipt of remittances for different human capital levels, I use a 
straightforward extension of the standard labor-leisure model (see, for example, Borjas, 
2013).22 In this adapted model I consider the recipients of transfers, who are all family 
members above 15 years who were left behind in the country of origin. These individuals 
provide labor and receive income (or output) that may be used for consumption. The higher 
the labor supply the more income is generated and the more may be consumed. Each 
individual derives utility from leisure  and consumption	. Utility monotonically increases in 
both and marginal utilities diminish in C and L, that is	 > 0,  > 0,  < 0,  < 0. 
                                                                             
migrant and non-migrant household members from two time periods. However, he does not study labor force 
participation and confines his analysis to migrant households. 
21
 Jadotte (2009) is an exception as he predicts the number of migrants in the first stage and uses this variable as 
one of the instruments for remittances. In this way, however, the author only tackles the part of selection that 
affects non-migrant household members via remittances. 
22
 The model is also related to the literature on occupational choice under liquidity constraints (Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989) and to recent literature on entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa (Alby et al., 2013). These 
studies only consider the decision between self- and wage employment and hence do not allow for 
unemployment. The present study embeds the labor decisions in a model of consumption and leisure and 
therefore explicitly considers the possibility of unemployment. 
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Moreover, cross derivatives are assumed to be positive:  > 0,  > 0. Individuals who 
invest may consume the output of their production function  = 	(, 	– 	)	in which 
remittances  are used as capital input,  denotes individual skills or education, and  
denotes the total time budget so that 	– 	 is the amount of labor supplied. The function  is 
increasing and concave with respect to both of its arguments. For the purpose of illustration, 
we may use the Cobb-Douglas specification,  =  = 		 	– 	!"#, where $ lies within 
the unit interval. I follow Alby, Auriol, and Nguimkeu (2013) in assuming that businesses are 
generally credit constrained in Sub-Saharan Africa. If individuals choose to become self-
employed they will invest all of the remittances they have received in their business. In case 
they choose wage employment they will receive a given wage	%.23 
Individuals face the following constrained maximization problem: 
 
 &'()(, ) (3.1) 
*+,-./0	01 
  C = 3 		 	– 	!"#				*.4 − .&6417&.80		%	 	– 	! + 							%':. − .&6417&.80																																	+8.&6417&.80									    (3.2) 
%;0ℎ	 > 0,  > 1	'8=	$ ∈ (0,1)	 
 
Obviously, the more individuals work the more they will earn and consume, 
irrespective of their occupational choice. Utility is maximized by choosing the optimal 
                         
23
 The assumption that this wage	% is fixed will be relaxed later. 
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amount of leisure and consumption. I will compare the utilities form three cases: Self-
employment, wage employment and unemployment. 
 
Case a: The individual chooses self-employment and invests all remittances received. The 
maximization decision reduces to : 
   &'(	)?	(		 	– 	!"#, )	.    (3.3) 
The first order condition therefore is 
@A? :	C 	= 	−(1 − ')	)"?			 	– 	!# 	+ 	)D? 	= 	0,(3.4) 
where ) is the derivative of ) with respect to its ;’th argument. Let "∗  be the amount of 
leisure that maximizes the utility function	)?. 
 
Case b: The individual chooses wage employment. The maximization decision is 
   &'(	)F	(%	 	– 	! + , )     (3.5) 
	
The first order condition therefore is 
   @AF :	G 	= 	−)"F	% + )DF 	= 	0	    (3.6) 
	
Let D∗  be the amount of leisure that maximizes the utility function	)?. 
 
Case c: The individual chooses unemployment. In this case utility is simply 
   )H(, (I = ).      (3.7) 
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Summarizing, we have an expression for maximum utility for both types of occupation 
and for unemployment: 
)?∗,F∗,H∗ = JK
L)?∗ = ) M		 	–	"∗ !"#, "∗N 					*.4 − .&6417&.80		)F∗ = ) %	 	–	D∗ ! + , D∗ !										%':. − .&6417&.80)H∗ = ) , (I∗ = )!																								+8.&6417&.80											  (3.8) 
It is essentially the comparison of these three utility levels that induces individuals to 
opt for one type of employment or the other, if at all. It is easy to see that the amount of 
remittances and the skill level will play a decisive role in this choice. The model allows us to 
establish a number of insights that will be discussed in detail. I start by putting aside the 
possibility of unemployment in order to focus solely on occupational choice for the moment. 
We can state 
 
Proposition 1: The impact of an increase in  on occupational choice depends on the degree 
to which the investment enhances income from self-employment 
 
Proof: Since consumption strictly increases in R and utility strictly increases in consumption, 
utility also strictly increases in	R, that is	PQRPS 	= PQRPTR PTRPS > 0. Similarly, we have 
	PQUPS = PQUPTU PTUPS > 0 . To increase the likelihood of self-employment in response to an increase 
in R, we need: PQUPS < PQRPS  PQUPTU PTUPS < PQRPTR PTRPS  PTRPS > 	VWUVXU 	VXUVYVWRVXR . 
 
This shows that receiving remittances by itself and therefore alleviating credit 
constraints does not clearly indicate that one type of employment or the other would be 
preferable. The intuition behind this result is simple. Each individual obtains income from 
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self-employment depending on their respective production technology. For some individuals 
an additional unit of investment may increase output by a large amount, even for higher levels 
of remittances. For others the production technology may be very flat and wage employment 
therefore preferable. Let Z be the skill level at which individuals are indifferent between both 
types of occupation. We can state 
 
Proposition 2: For a given	 > 0, an individual choses self-employment if and only if	 ≥ Z.  
 
Proof: Since	? = 			 	– 	!"#, consumption in self-employment is a strictly 
increasing function of	 and as	C > 0, we have	C\ > 0 . In contrast, since	G\ = 0 , an 
increase in  does not affect	)F. □ 
 
In this second proposition, I am specifically interested in the composition of the 
production function. Higher skills clearly increase output from production and therefore the 
likelihood of choosing self-employment for the highly skilled is higher when credit 
constraints are alleviated by means of remittances. 
 Let us now reintroduce unemployment. More specifically, I will start by considering a 
situation where wage employment opportunities exist for anybody willing to work. Starting 
with wage-employed individuals, we know that )F = )F(%	 	– 	! + , )	and as above 
the respective first order condition is G 	= 	−)"F	% + )DF 	= 0 and D∗  maximizes utility in 
wage employment. To see how leisure decisions react to changes in the amount of remittances 
received, we can use the implicit function theorem. We have 
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G 	= 	)""F 	%D − )"DF % − )D"F % + )DDF < 0   (3.9) 
as well as 
G] 	= 	−)""F % + )D"F > 0     (3.10) 
and therefore 
] = − #^G^ _`G^^G^ 	_#^G _#G^ _`G > 0.    (3.11) 
We thus obtain the well-known result that an increase in non-labor income 
(remittances in this study) decreases the labor supply of the respective individual. 
 Next, let us consider self-employment. From proposition 1, we know that if C]  is too 
small, wage employment is preferred and labor supply behavior is according to the case of 
wage employment. From proposition 2, we know that Ca > 0 and for some skill level	θ, 
which is sufficiently high, an individual chooses self-employment as	)? > )F and there will 
be some (, θ	) combinations for which the utility of self-employment is higher than those of 
wage employment or unemployment, that is )? > )F > )H. Furthermore, abstracting from 
the possibility of a switch from self-employment to wage employment, we thus state 
 
Proposition 3: For a constant skill level  at self-employment, a further increase in	 will at 
some level of	, which is high enough, lead to a switch to unemployment. 
 
Proof: Due to the concavity of ) with respect to  and the concavity of the production 
function θ 	– 	!"# with respect to	 for the self-employed, and as  is a linear 
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function of	 for the unemployed, we know that the marginal increase in utility from 
remittances will be higher for the unemployed than for the self-employed at some level of	.□ 
Clearly, if we consider a constant skill level at self-employment, an increase in 
remittances could also first lead to a switch to wage employment and, finally, for further 
increases in remittances, to unemployment. As is evident from proposition 2, this becomes 
less likely the higher the skill level	. 
 Figure 3.1 illustrates the implications of the model that I have derived so far. The 
abscissa indicates the level of remittances received and the ordinate the level of utility. The 
functions drawn show the level of utility attained depending on the type of employment, the 
skill level of the individual and remittances. We can see that utility for the self-employed )? 
is initially very low for very small amounts of R. Since they do not have the capital to invest 
productively, they would rather choose to be wage-employed. The wage-employed have 
higher utility ()F > )?) even without remittances since they are employed and obtain a wage 
% irrespective of	. If the skill level is very low, for example at	θ, self-employment will 
never be chosen as both wage employment and unemployment will be preferable. In the case 
of very high skill levels, individuals enter self-employment for low amounts of remittances as 
indicated by the curve of individuals with skill level	θD. 
The reason for this is that production is very efficient for more highly skilled 
individuals. The abscissa shows the occupational choices for the respective amounts of 
remittances and the skill level	θ". Point A indicates occupational indifference for these 
individuals. Fewer remittances than in point A will make wage employment more attractive, 
whereas self-employment will be chosen for higher values of	. Unemployment is indicated 
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for all those who would choose one type of occupation or the other for values of	 below 
point B but whose	(, θ	 combinations are below	)H
 for higher values of	.24 
 
Figure 3.1: Occupational choice and unemployment 
 
 
As a next step, let us consider a situation in which only limited wage employment 
opportunities exist. Anyone, however, may become self-employed if they wish to do so. 
                         
24
 A note on the assumption that businesses are generally credit constrained: Even though this assumption has 
been made in the theoretical literature (see, for example, Alby et al., 2013) it may appear strong. However, 
allowing individuals in this model to choose any combination of R for investment in businesses and consumption 
would strongly complicate the model. An alternative technical assumption that constitutes a sufficient condition 
to attain very similar results would be to assume that PQ
R
PS

PQc
PS
 for any θ greater than a threshold of skills θd . 
For skills below this threshold 
θ  θd, we would need to assume that PQ
R
PS

PQc
PS
. Obviously, these are the 
bounds within which much weaker scenarios hold as well. Moreover, there are also non-technical reasons to 
believe that R may indeed be fully used up in a business. Analogously to the arguments set forth in Alby et al. 
(2013) and the literature cited therein, individuals in African societies have an incentive to hide their wealth in 
order to avoid obligatory sharing with (extended) family members. If they receive remittances and invest in a 
business they show their financial possibilities. However, if they do not invest all or a substantial amount in the 
business, members of their social network may ask for parts of what is left. In contrast, profits from an 
investment are much less visible and can therefore be hidden more easily. 
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Those affected by this limit, that is those who do not find a wage job, will be unemployed if 
 = 0 since they cannot start a business or the like. If	R  0, self-employment becomes 
possible at any skill level θ and will be chosen if	Uf  Ug. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates this alternative situation. For	R  0, self-employment is chosen if 
PQR
PT
PT
PS

PQc
PS
, which will once again be the case if the output from an additional unit	R in 
production is sufficiently high. As before, this likelihood increases in	θ. This case is 
particularly relevant in Sub-Saharan Africa where wage employment opportunities remain 
scarce and self-employment is very widespread (as explained in section 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.2: Self-employment and unemployment 
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Finally, let wages be a function of the skills similar to the production function, since it 
is likely that higher skill levels will increase wages of employees.25 In this case the relative 
efficiency of using skills in self-employment as opposed to using them in wage employment 
becomes decisive for the selection of one type of occupation or the other. If the relative 
efficiency of skills in self-employment is higher, then we have the situation as above. If, 
however, wage increases are comparatively high with rising skill levels, then wage 
employment will become the more attractive choice. In this case a non-linear effect of 
remittances on employment type with respect to education may be expected. By putting more 
emphasis on the first case during the exposition of the model, I have implicitly displayed the 
assumption that skills will more likely play an important role in the case of a business start-up 
than in the case of wage employment. One important reason for this assumption is the narrow 
opportunity for wage employment, whereas entry into self-employment is unlimited. 
From a slightly different theoretical point of view, higher education or higher skill 
levels of an individual could be associated with increased intrinsic motivation to work as 
opposed to lower levels of education. This may be the case if, at a given place of employment, 
highly skilled individuals need to expend less effort to finish the tasks involved in the job than 
those with fewer skills or if the latter feel overburdened by the workload more easily as they 
are not sufficiently educated to comfortably undertake the work activities. In this case, the 
utility from leisure as compared to consumption will be higher for those with fewer skills than 
for the highly skilled. This would not change the underlying dynamics of the model as 
elaborated above but it will likely change the exact amounts of remittances or skill levels that 
induce an individual to change occupation or to become (un-)employed. For example, if 
                         
25
 See Jovanovic (1994) for a detailed discussion on the correlation between managerial and working skills. 
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leisure is very important, unemployment may be chosen for lower levels of remittances since 
consumption needs may be satisfied easily and labor appears highly burdensome. 
Let us summarize the implications of the model. Non-migrant household members 
may receive remittances. If they do not receive any, they cannot become self-employed since 
they lack the means for investment. If they do receive remittances, they will compare the three 
alternatives they have. The remittances alleviate credit constraints but if their skill or 
educational levels are very low, they do not know how to efficiently use these means to obtain 
a high income. They will subsequently choose wage employment or, if remittances are 
sufficiently high, they may even prefer unemployment. If their skill levels are high enough, 
then the combination of remittances that alleviate their credit constraints on the one hand and 
efficiency in their business that originates from their skills on the other hand will make self-
employment appear the more attractive choice. 
Moreover, and specifically relevant for Sub-Saharan African countries, if wage 
employment opportunities are very scarce the choice essentially reduces to one between self-
employment and unemployment. The latter will be more likely if the former needs at least 
some basic skills like reading, writing or math and if individuals do not possess these. 
The standard theoretical framework of labor economics when dealing with labor 
decisions is that of a trade-off between labor and leisure. Individuals would like to consume a 
certain amount of goods, for which they will have to supply labor and receive wages. In the 
context of remittances, capital sent from former household members who have migrated may 
substitute for part or all of the wages earned on the labor market and make leisure the more 
attractive choice as opposed to working. 
While this standard theory explains why individuals may reduce their work efforts, it 
nonetheless lacks the opportunity (or ability) perspective that complements this theoretical 
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framework. I have introduced and formalized this ability perspective in terms of the 
differential response between the highly skilled and those with low skill levels to remittances 
sent from household members who have migrated. While additional means are useful as start-
up capital for micro-enterprises or productivity-enhancing investments, it is also likely that 
these investments need prior knowledge to be success- and purposeful. For a small enterprise, 
we would expect the individual starting this enterprise to have a minimum body of knowledge 
in writing, reading and arithmetic to be able to order and buy products, to negotiate prices and 
for simple accounting. Without these basic skills individuals are much less likely to risk an 
undertaking of this scope, however small it may seem in absolute terms. This hypothesis is 
highly relevant in Sub-Saharan African countries where literacy levels and enrolment rates 
remain low. Specifically, consider the case of illiterate individuals without training in math as 
they have never attended school but who work as street vendors where income is extremely 
low. In such a case, financial flows from a former household member who has migrated may 
enable them to afford the necessary consumption goods without any further labor, meaning 
they may therefore retreat from the labor activity. In contrast, considering primary school 
graduates who are willing to work but who do not find an opportunity corresponding to their 
qualifications, additional income may open up the opportunity to start a micro-enterprise. This 
will be considered if the utility of the expected returns from such an investment is assumed to 
exceed the utility in the case where remittances substitute for some or all of the labor activity. 
We can of course think of situations where formal education is less important because 
it is not directly used in the tasks of one’s work, as for example in some service jobs. 
However, basic knowledge on arithmetic may also be useful for a taxi driver who will need to 
calculate and estimate revenue relative to investment costs for a car and gasoline prices. Or 
consider self-employed tourist guides who will not directly need any skills from school since 
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they know the location of the important places of interest. Nevertheless, the ability to read a 
map or a sign may tremendously increase their efficiency and their revenues. Many other 
examples with similar implications are conceivable. 
The following sections of this chapter elaborate on the operationalization and the 
empirical application of this theoretical framework in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
aim is to test the hypothesis that human capital has a moderating effect on the impact of 
remittances on labor supply and occupational choices in Senegal. We may expect more highly 
educated individuals to be more likely to enter self-employment in response to remittances 
that alleviate their credit constraints. In contrast, the less educated are expected to withdraw 
from labor activities. 
 
3.3 The data 
 
This analysis uses the Migration and Remittances Household Survey 2009 carried out by the 
Consortium Pour La Recherche Économique et Sociale (CRES) and funded by the World 
Bank (World Bank, 2009).26 In an effort to shed light on the issue of remittances in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the World Bank and CRES questioned all of the members of roughly 2,100 
Senegalese households, of which about 700 were non-migration households and 1,400 were 
migration households. The data therefore contain information on 17,878 non-migrants and 
2,277 migrants. The data are nationally representative in the sense that all geographical areas 
have been covered. Two major problems are usually encountered with remittances data. First, 
as Gupta et al. (2009, p.104) stress, the official remittances flows to a country may actually be 
“destined for neighboring countries”. Second, Freund and Spatafora (2008) estimate that the 
                         
26
 This section draws from World Bank and CRES (2009, p.3). 
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share of informal remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa is relatively high. Since the World Bank 
data are directly collected from the households, we do not worry about these two issues. Just 
like the data of most studies in this context these data are cross-sectional, that is respondents 
were not followed over several years. This has some implications for the choice of the 
estimation technique that need to be considered (see section 3.4). 
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The variables 
are illustrated for the adult population in the sample, i.e. for those aged 15 or above. The key 
variables for the purpose of this study are wage employment, self-employment, education and 
remittances per capita. Wage (and self-) employment are dummy variables that take the value 
1 if the individual is wage (or self-) employed and 0 otherwise. These variables are defined as 
full-time employed or part-time employed. Unemployment is defined as unemployed 
individuals and those taking care of the household. Full-time students, long-term sick or 
people with disabilities as well as those serving in the military or working as civil servants 
have not been defined for this variable. Education has three distinct categories: No education 
and illiterate; at least some primary education but not completion of the primary school cycle 
(or no education but literate) and, as a third category, at least completion of six grades (i.e. the 
primary school cycle) with success. 
Furthermore, the table shows summary statistics for the migrants. As there are several 
migrants for a number of households I take the mean values of their employment status, their 
age and their destination country. For example, if there are two migrants in one household the 
variable mean age indicates the arithmetic mean of the ages of these two migrants. If there is 
only one migrant the variable would indicate the age of this individual. For the length of the 
duration of migration I consider the migrant with the longest duration. 
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of households, adult household members in Senegal & migrants 
 Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum N 
Characteristics of adult household members in Senegal 
remittances p.c. (in 100.000 XOF) 0.75 1.81 0 44 8270 
self-employment 0.46 0.50 0 1 8270 
wage employment 0.14 0.34 0 1 8270 
female 0.59 0.49 0 1 8270 
education (categories) 0.80 0.89 0 2 8270 
age 35.30 14.16 15 90 8270 
      
Characteristics of households in Senegal 
Dakar 0.26 0.44 0 1 8270 
other urban areas 0.35 0.48 0 1 8270 
wealth -0.06 1.62 -2.4 5 8270 
no. of children at migration 3.82 3.24 0 29 8270 
household size at migration 9.67 5.95 0 57 8270 
share of migration households in 
region 
0.61 0.19 0.1 1 8270 
      
Characteristics of migrants 
female 0.22 0.41 0 1 2277 
mean employment 0.78 0.35 0 1 2145 
mean age (years) 34.22 10.10 5.0 99 2277 
duration (max) 10.61 9.17 0.1 69 2259 
Africa (mean) 0.18 0.33 0 1 2259 
non-Africa (mean) 0.33 0.43 0 1 2259 
Note: The table shows values for the unweighted data sample (estimations below generally include weights). The wealth index is calculated 
from a principal component analysis carried out using long-term household characteristics that indicate wealth (such as whether a household 
possesses a separate room for cooking, electricity, agricultural land, non-agricultural land, a house, other buildings, a refrigerator, air 
conditioners, a computer, a car/truck and/or a tractor/harvester). In this way I try to avoid capturing wealth that is induced by the receipt of 
remittances. (Correlation between the wealth index and remittances p.c. is only 0.2). The number of children per household and the number 
of household members are counted at time of first migration for migration households and at time of data collection for non-migration 
households. Education is a categorical variable taking a value of 0 for those without education and the illiterate (no education), a value of 1 
for those who have completed at least one grade and a maximum of five grades with success (low education), and a value of 2 for those who 
completed at least six grades (i.e. the primary school cycle) with success (high education). 
 
The mean value of schooling for non-migrants is 3.3 years. A considerable number of people 
in the sample did not successfully complete a single year at school (61 percent), mostly 
because they did not attend school in the first place. 
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3.4 Methodology 
 
The relationship between remittances of migrants and labor supply of household 
members left at home is a complex one. An important aspect that has often been neglected in 
the literature on the remittances–labor supply nexus is selection into migration. Remittances 
are only observed for migration households. However, the characteristics of these households 
may differ from non-migration households and potential differences in labor supply may be a 
result of these differences. In addition, the literature often ignores other problems of 
endogeneity resulting from, for example, reverse causality, as the working decisions of family 
members at home may influence the amount of remittances sent by the migrant. Moreover, 
there may be endogeneity resulting from omitted demand-side factors of the labor market.  
To my knowledge, almost none of the existing studies27 tackle both problems 
simultaneously. I control for these issues in the following manner. Consider the following 
equation explaining employment h&6 of a family member left at home: 
 
Pr	(h&6 = 1|, h, ) = Φ($] + h 	$l + ( ∗ h)$]∗l + $m + n) (3.12) 
 
where Empr is a binary variable that denotes if individual i is employed or not. 
Employment can be self-employment, wage employment or employment in general 
depending on the estimation. Rr denotes the remittances the migrant has sent back home, and Er is the educational attainment of the individual who receives the remittances. The 
                         
27
 Jadotte (2009) is an exception, but – as mentioned above – his procedure is likely to capture only parts of the 
selection effect. Furthermore, Massey and Parrado (1998) attempt to control for both selection and endogeneity 
in a somewhat similar fashion to the approach of this chapter. However, they only study business formation. 
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multiplicative term Rr ∗ Er is an interaction term between remittances and educational 
attainment that is incorporated to test if the employment decisions differ for distinct values of 
educational attainment. X is a vector denoting other characteristics of individuals and their 
household and ε denotes a random error. Note that for the purpose of illustration I have 
included the interaction between remittances and education in the equations. In most of the 
estimations, however, I split the data into three categories of education (see section 3.3) and 
estimate the parameters of the model separately for each category. The reason for this choice 
is the complex estimation procedure detailed in the following paragraphs. 
Concerning the first statistical problem, namely the selection bias, assume that the 
households who have sent a migrant abroad differ systematically from those households who 
have not. These differences in household characteristics may be the actual driving force 
explaining labor supply of family members. This problem can be solved using Heckman’s 
(1979) two-step model. Accordingly, we may perceive this problem as being equivalent to 
omitted variable bias. I estimate the probability of being a migrant household in a first step as 
follows 
 
Pr	(vw = 1) = Φ(xw	yz + {wy| + }w)     (3.13) 
 
where v is a binary variable indicating if household - has sent a migrant abroad or not and x 
is a variable that indicates the number of migrant households in a district in Senegal to proxy 
for migration networks of this district (see Hanson and Woodruff, 2003). Furthermore, { is a 
vector of household characteristics. Following Heckman (1979), I calculate the Inverse Mill’s 
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Ratio (~)28 from this equation that may be included in equation (3.12) as an additional 
variable and therefore corrects for selection. 
Moreover, I address possible endogeneity from reverse causality or other sources by 
instrumenting for remittances. According to the underlying assumptions of the instrumental 
variable methodology, these variables have to be highly correlated with remittances and must 
not be correlated with the residuals from equation (3.12). I use migrant characteristics, such as 
whether they have a job in the country of current residence or their duration of migration, that 
are likely to be highly correlated with the amount of remittances sent.29 Remittances are 
therefore regressed on these variables. As remittances are left-censored at 0, I use a Tobit 
model: 
 
 =		 		 			;	∗ = Z + w	m +  > 0		0					;	∗ = Z + w	m +  ≤ 0	,																																						  (3.14) 
  
where ∗ is a latent variable. The endogeneity problem arises if  and n are correlated. 
Following the two-step methodology of Rivers and Vuong (1988; see also Wooldridge, 2002, 
pp.472-474), I assume that (, n) are bivariate normally distributed.30 As in probit models, 
'(n) is normalized to one. We can write n =  + ., where  = 1(, n)/'() 
and . is independent of  and all exogenous variables (including the instruments) and 
normally distributed with mean zero. A simple calculation shows that '(.) = 1 − D, 
                         
28
 The Inverse Mill’s Ratio ~ is calculated as ()(#), where φ and Φ are, respectively, the probability density 
function and the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal variable Z and Z = N	β + Hβ (see 
Heckman, 1979; Van De Ven and Van Praag, 1981). 
29
 The exogeneity of these instruments is discussed in subsection 3.5.3. In this context, I also apply an 
overidentification test. 
30
 In the following sentences I show the adaptation of the model of Rivers and Vuong (1988) to my equations 
based on the explanations in Wooldridge (2002, pp.472-474). 
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where  = 1(, n). I predict the residuals from equation (3.14) as they are not observed. 
The predicted values   from this regression are then used in the estimation of equation 
(3.12).31 Together with the inverse Mill’s ratio calculated from equation (3.13), equation 
(3.12) now reads: 
 
Pr	(h&6 = 1|, h, , ) = 
	Φ[($] + h 	$l + ( ∗ h)$]∗l + $m + ~ +  	$)/(1 − D).¡]  (3.15) 
 
where  = 1( , n). This procedure consistently estimates all parameters divided by the 
factor (1 − D).¡.32 
I include several variables with respect to household and geographical characteristics 
that may explain if a household has a migrant or not (equation 3.13). Among the geographical 
variables, I include a dummy if the household resides in Dakar and a dummy if it resides in 
another urban area. The reference category is the rural area. Another geographical variable is 
the number of migrants as a share of total population in a district. This variable is meant to 
measure the strength of the migration network. In order to generate variation in this variable I 
have multiplied this share by the squared age of the household head of each household (see 
Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Acosta, 2011). Hanson and Woodruff (2003, p.21-22) point out 
that household characteristics may be relevant for the migration decision and therefore are a 
suitable term for interaction with regional migration rates. This achieves variation in the 
household level but comes with the potential disadvantage that the household characteristics 
                         
31
 Note that since μ¤  can only be estimated for migrants it is set to 0 for all non-migration households. 
32
 Since the estimation procedure includes several estimation steps the standard errors are jackknifed in general. 
For robustness I also run alternative estimations with bootstrapped standard errors with 300 replications and 
obtain qualitatively very similar results. 
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used (in this case the square of the age of the household head) may be directly linked with 
labor decisions. For the household characteristics explaining migration, I include the number 
of children, the household size and a variable indicating the wealth of the household.33 
 For the estimation of the moderating effect of education on the impact of remittances 
on labor supply and occupational choice (equation 3.15), I generate a variable denoting three 
levels of education as noted above. First, an individual has not received any education at all, 
i.e. they did not attend school. Second, at least one year and a maximum of five years of 
primary school were completed with success. I add to this second category those who have 
not attended school at all but are able to read or write (they are not included in the first 
category). In a third category, those individuals are included who have at least finished sixth 
grade (the final grade of primary education) with success. The variable indicating the amount 
of remittances encompasses the sum of the transfers received from their former household 
members who have migrated and former non-household members who have migrated, as well 
as the value of the goods the household received from them. I divide this amount by the 
number of adult household members, that is, I use per capita remittances for the estimations. 
Further control variables are the age of the household member and the number of children 
currently in the household. Furthermore, as in the selection equation, I use dummies for 
Dakar and other urban areas as well as the wealth indicator. As we may expect differential 
results for men and women, I estimate separate models by gender. Moreover, since I expect 
distinct outcomes for different job types I differentiate between wage and self-employment. 
 
 
                         
33
 See the caption of Table 3.1 for the calculation of the wealth index, the number of children and the household 
size. 
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3.5 Results 
 
3.5.1 General results 
 
Table 3.2 shows the selection equation that is estimated to calculate the inverse Mill’s 
ratio. The dependent variable indicates whether the household has currently at least one 
migrant living outside the household. I include a number of household characteristics to 
estimate the probability of being a migration household, namely: Residency in Dakar or other 
urban areas as opposed to rural areas, share of migrants in a district multiplied by the squared 
age of the household head, a wealth index, the number of children at migration and the 
number of household members at migration. Since the outcome equation differentiates 
between men and women, this selection eqauation also estimates separate models by gender. 
The estimation shows that all variables are highly significant at the one percent level (except 
age for female recipients) and therefore seem to be important in predicting migration for both 
men and women. The results are fairly similar across genders since the variable of interest is 
at the household level. 
Moreover, I conduct an estimation explaining the size of remittances that are sent back 
to the household in the country of origin (equation 3.14). Table 3.3 shows that employed 
migrants and those whose migration dates back longer send significantly more remittances to 
their families back home. The reason may be that migrants have more money available when 
they are employed and that migrants who have resided in the destination country for a longer 
period have higher paid jobs. Moreover, migration outside Africa has a highly significant 
positive impact on the size of remittances, which is likely to be the result of higher 
remuneration outside Africa. In contrast, migrants whose families reside in Dakar send 
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significantly fewer remittances. Wealthier families (for females) and those with more children 
(for males) also receive more remittances. 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Selection equation for the probability of migration by gender of recipient 
 (1) (2) 
migration Male Female 
   
Dakar -0.68*** -0.82*** 
 (0.20) (0.19) 
other urban areas -0.47*** -0.57*** 
 (0.17) (0.14) 
share of migration households in region 0.55*** 0.43*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) 
wealth 0.25*** 0.28*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
no. of children at migration 0.23*** 0.22*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
household size at migration -0.16*** -0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
age -0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
constant 0.49** 0.50** 
 (0.24) (0.24) 
   
pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.19 
observations 4,868 6,042 
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters (districts) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account 
sample weights. 
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Table 3.3: Variables explaining the size of remittances by gender of recipient 
 (1) (1) 
remittances p.c. Male Female 
   
mean employment 4.05*** 3.50*** 
 (0.71) (0.75) 
mean age -0.02 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
duration (maximum) 0.09*** 0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
Africa -0.60 -0.25 
 (0.57) (0.63) 
non-Africa 2.87*** 2.60*** 
 (0.69) (0.74) 
age 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
Dakar -1.84** -2.23*** 
 (0.92) (0.72) 
other urban areas -0.16 -1.22* 
 (0.81) (0.69) 
wealth 0.49 0.73*** 
 (0.31) (0.20) 
no. of children 0.08* 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
constant -1.44 -0.40 
 (1.16) (1.07) 
   
pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.10 
observations 2,907 3,984 
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters (districts) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account 
sample weights. 
 
3.5.2 Estimation results for male recipients 
 
I now turn to the main estimations of the impact of remittances on employment of the 
household members in the origin country (equation 3.15). As the literature suggests, there are 
likely differential effects by gender. In this and the following subsection the results and their 
robustness are discussed for men. Subsection 3.5.4 elaborates on the results for women. The 
estimates are separately reported for high levels of education, low levels of education and no 
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education. The explanatory variable remittances per capita is divided into deciles for positive 
amounts of remittances in addition to zero remittances as its own category, resulting in 11 
categories for this variable. An increase in this variable therefore reflects a substantial 
increase in the amount of remittances received.34 In subsection 3.5.3 I test the robustness of 
this measurement to a number of alternative ones. 
Table 3.4 is based on the two-step estimator by Rivers and Vuong (1988) detailed 
above. Columns (1) and (2) show that remittances lead to a higher probability of self-
employment for highly educated men and men with low levels of education, whereas no effect 
can be found for men without education. The coefficients for the highly educated and those 
with low levels of education are significant at the five and ten percent level, respectively. 
Conversely, columns (4) and (5) reveal that highly educated men and men with low levels of 
education are less likely to be in wage employment when they receive remittances. 
                         
34
 Measuring transfers in deciles may be more appropriate than using the actual amount of remittances since 
there may be some fixed initial start-up costs for self-employment that require higher amounts of transfers (see 
Mesnard, 2004; Mesnard and Ravallion, 2006). 
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Table 3.4: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage Tobit) 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.08** 0.12* 0.06 -0.09** -0.13* -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
age -0.02** -0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.86*** -1.23** -0.46 0.48 1.21* 0.04 
 (0.33) (0.51) (0.42) (0.31) (0.65) (0.53) 
other urban areas -0.72** -0.26 -0.40 0.57** 0.29 0.26 
 (0.29) (0.42) (0.28) (0.27) (0.56) (0.35) 
no. of children 0.04* 0.08 0.00 -0.04* -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
wealth -0.05 0.01 -0.45*** 0.04 -0.04 0.41*** 
 (0.08) (0.14) (0.12) (0.08) (0.17) (0.15) 
residual -0.11** -0.05 -0.13 0.14*** 0.01 0.13 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.40* 0.32 0.22 -0.22 -0.19 -0.13 
 (0.21) (0.35) (0.26) (0.22) (0.36) (0.33) 
constant 0.71* 0.75 0.56* -1.34*** -1.22 -0.94** 
 (0.40) (0.63) (0.32) (0.38) (0.80) (0.40) 
       
observations 1,291 707 1,245 1,291 707 1,245 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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These results are mainly in line with the expectations in the theoretical model. 
Individuals whose knowledge exceeds a certain level show a higher propensity to be self-
employed. It may be easier for them to set up businesses or enlarge ongoing commerce. They 
may switch from unemployment to self-employment if the expected income from working is 
high enough and exceeds their utility from supplying no labor. Similarly, they may switch from 
wage employment to self-employment as the expected returns in self-employment may 
sufficiently exceed those from wage employment to justify the change in job type. 
For individuals with no education this opportunity does not seem to exist. According to 
the estimates in columns (3) and (6), they are not more likely to be self-employed or less likely 
to be in wage employment. However, the lack of an effect for men without education deviates 
from the expectation that these individuals are more likely to quit their jobs in favor of leisure. 
One possible reason is that remittances are not sufficient and that for most people it is not an 
alternative not to work. That is, if individuals quit their jobs they may only do so in favor of a 
different job (type). If individuals lack this possibility due to insufficient skills they may have to 
stay in the current job. 
For highly educated men, living in the capital Dakar or other urban areas seems to 
decrease the chance of being self-employed. The reason for this may be a greater supply of wage 
employment possibilities in urban centers. A higher age is negatively related to self-employment, 
in contrast to the number of children, which shows a positive association. Correspondingly, these 
control variables are inversely related to wage employment (except living in Dakar, which shows 
a positive coefficient but is not significant). Men with no education are more likely to be in wage 
employment (column 6) and less likely to be self-employed (column 3) when their wealth 
increases. 
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Overall, the main estimations in Table 3.4 support the theory of differential labor supply 
responses to remittances. The following subsection considers the exogeneity assumptions for the 
instruments and provides a number of alternative estimations. 
 
3.5.3 Exogeneity assumptions, robustness and effect sizes 
 
As a first robustness test, I repeat the above estimations using Newey’s (1987) two-step 
estimator. The reason for this choice is that it provides an overidentification test for the 
exogeneity of the instruments used. The instruments, however, have to be specified differently 
for this estimation. As noted above, the variables explaining the amount of remittances the 
migrant sends back are only observed for migration households. In this alternative specification I 
set the respective observations to 0 when dealing with non-migration households.35 
 Table 3.5 shows the results of this estimation. Here, remittances only have a significant 
impact on labor supply for highly educated males. However, they are now highly significant at 
the one percent level. This estimation suggests that highly educated individuals do indeed 
respond differently to remittances, while the effect on individuals with lower education levels is 
not robust. 
 The Wald test of exogeneity at the bottom of the columns shows that endogeneity seems 
to be a problem for the estimations in columns (1) and (4). As shown in Table 3.3, the migrant 
characteristics that I use as instruments are good predictors of the amount of remittances sent 
back to the family members in the country of origin and are therefore relevant. Concerning 
                         
35
 If I did not set these observations to 0 for non-migration households the corresponding observations would be 
missing and the analysis would be confined to migration households. Intuitively, considering these observations by 
setting them to 0 is equal to imagining that non-migration households in fact have a migrant. The latter, however, 
has values 0 for age, employment, duration of migration and African or non-African destination, which may only be 
true if there is no migrant in the household. This procedure ensures that as many observations as possible are 
retained for the analysis. 
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exogeneity, identification rests upon the assumption that there is no direct link between the 
instruments and labor decisions of non-migrant family members. Specifically, the mean age of a 
household’s migrants or the duration of their migration should not be correlated with unobserved 
characteristics that predict employment of family members back home. The destination of the 
migrant (Africa or outside Africa) may well be shaped by the employment of a family member 
since families with more resources derived from labor income may be able to send a family 
member to a different destination compared to families without labor income. Controlling for 
wealth, however, the destination of a migrant should be exogenous to the labor decision of a 
family member. Finally, employment of a migrant as another instrument may be driven by 
unobserved family characteristics such as work ethics, which may also drive labor decisions of 
non-migrant family members. If the latter is the case, a test of overidentifiying restriction would 
produce significant results. I conduct the Amemiya-Lee-Newey Minimum ¥D test (see Amemiya, 
1978; Newey, 1987; Lee, 1992) of the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. This 
hypothesis is not rejected for the relevant estimates in columns (1) and (4), with p-values of 0.56 
and 0.24.36 These results seem to suggest that the instruments may be considered to be valid. 
 
                         
36
 More precisely, the Amemiya-Lee-Newey Minimum χD statistic is χD(4) = 3 resulting in a p-value of 0.56 for 
column (1) and χD(4) = 5.53 resulting in a p-value of 0.24 for column (4). 
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Table 3.5: Probit model using two-step Newey estimator and accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.05*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.06*** -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
age -0.00 0.01* 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.78*** -1.09*** -0.92*** 0.35** 1.04*** 0.42 
 (0.15) (0.23) (0.22) (0.16) (0.28) (0.26) 
other urban areas -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.71*** 0.27* 0.41** 0.36** 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.16) 
no. of children 0.02* 0.05*** 0.03* -0.01 -0.03 -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth -0.12*** -0.06 -0.17*** 0.15*** 0.03 0.12** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.15 0.26** 0.06 -0.06 -0.13 0.06 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) 
constant 0.29 0.47** 0.80*** -1.05*** -1.26*** -1.44*** 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.23) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.07 0.17 0.68 0.00 0.13 0.20 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.6: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage OLS) 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.09** 0.07 0.04 -0.11** -0.06 -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
age -0.02** -0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
dakar -0.93*** -1.23** -0.52 0.57* 1.19* 0.09 
 (0.33) (0.51) (0.42) (0.31) (0.64) (0.52) 
other urban areas -0.78*** -0.25 -0.39 0.65** 0.28 0.24 
 (0.28) (0.43) (0.28) (0.26) (0.57) (0.35) 
no. of children 0.04 0.10* 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
wealth -0.04 0.03 -0.42*** 0.03 -0.07 0.39*** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.08) (0.17) (0.15) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.52** 0.21 0.24 -0.38* -0.02 -0.20 
 (0.22) (0.40) (0.29) (0.23) (0.39) (0.37) 
constant 0.58 0.86 0.48 -1.14*** -1.34 -0.76 
 (0.40) (0.68) (0.37) (0.38) (0.82) (0.47) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.03 0.47 0.27 0.01 0.08 0.11 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table 3.7: Simultaneous equation model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.05*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.06*** -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age 0.00 0.01** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
dakar -0.78*** -1.08*** -0.93*** 0.35** 1.03*** 0.42* 
 (0.15) (0.22) (0.20) (0.15) (0.24) (0.25) 
other urban areas -0.43*** -0.41*** -0.72*** 0.27** 0.40** 0.36** 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) 
no. of children 0.02* 0.05*** 0.03* -0.01 -0.03 -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth -0.12*** -0.06 -0.17*** 0.15*** 0.03 0.13** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.15 0.26** 0.06 -0.06 -0.14 0.06 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) 
constant 0.29 0.47** 0.80*** -1.06*** -1.27*** -1.44*** 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.19) (0.18) (0.26) (0.24) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.8: 2SLS model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.03** 0.02 0.01 -0.04** -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
age -0.01*** -0.00 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
dakar -0.34*** -0.41*** -0.16 0.18* 0.34*** 0.04 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) 
other urban areas -0.28*** -0.06 -0.05 0.21** 0.05 0.02 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
no. of children 0.01 0.01** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
wealth -0.01 0.00 -0.08*** 0.01 -0.01 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.19** 0.08 0.03 -0.15* -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) 
constant 0.71*** 0.81*** 0.74*** 0.10 0.08 0.18*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.07) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
R-squared 0.10 0.23 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.08 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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 Next, I estimate a version of the main specification using an ordinary least squares 
regression for remittances instead of a Tobit regression and include the instruments as 
specified in Newey’s (1987) two-step estimator above. In this way I check the results for 
small deviations from the main specification and am provided with a simple way to compute 
marginal effects. The results for highly educated men shown in Table 3.6 are very similar. 
Remittances increase the chance of self-employment and decrease the probability of wage 
employment. In contrast, there is no effect for men with low levels of education for either job 
type, as was the case in the two-step estimator.  
 In another robustness check I consider the possibility that not only remittances may 
influence labor supply and occupational choice but also that the latter may influence the 
remittance-sending behavior.37 A migrant abroad may be more likely to send back remittances 
if recipients are unemployed than if they have a job. Moreover, the amount of remittances 
may also be a function of the type of employment. It is possible that the self-employed need 
more money for their businesses or alternatively that individuals in wage employment may 
request more money if the wages are low. For this purpose I estimate a simultaneous equation 
model. The structural model may be written as (see Keshk, 2003): 
 
 = h&6∗$lª« + h	$l + (h&6∗ ∗ h)$lª«¬∗∗l + $m + n   (3.16) 
 
h&6∗ = y] + h	yl + ( ∗ h)y]∗l + ym + 38    (3.17) 
 
                         
37
 The instrumental variable regressions applied in this section also account for endogeneity resulting from 
reverse causation. The simultaneous equation achieves the same and, in addition, explicitly models the reverse 
relationship. 
38
 Note that for the purpose of illustration I include the interaction between remittances and education in the 
equations again. In the estimation, as seen so far, I split the data into three categories of education and estimate 
the parameters of the model separately for each category. 
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The methodology is based on an ordinary least squares and a probit estimation, where 
fitted values are computed and plugged into the respective equations. Since the values that are 
inserted are estimates, the standard errors are subsequently corrected (see Keshk, 2003, 
pp.159-162 for details of this methodology).  
 The results of these estimations are presented in Table 3.7. Remittances have a highly 
significant positive impact on the probability of being self-employed and a highly significant 
negative influence on wage employment for highly educated males. In the cases of those with 
a low level of education or no education there is no significant impact of remittances. These 
results corroborate the results of the estimations using Newey’s (1987) two-step estimator in 
Table 3.5 and the results of the instrumental variable probit estimates in Table 3.6. 
 Finally, I consider a straightforward two-stage least squares procedure. The 
advantages of a non-linear probit model over a linear probability model are well known.39 In 
the latter, however, no additional distributional assumptions have to be met, unlike is the case 
in the main estimation using the methodology of Rivers and Vuong (1988) where normality of 
 is necessary (see Wooldrige, 2002, p.474). Table 3.8 shows the results for this alternative 
specification. The pattern corresponds to the preceding robustness checks: Highly educated 
males are more likely to be self-employed whereas they are less likely to be in wage 
employment when they receive remittances. Furthermore, men with low levels of education or 
with no education do not seem to respond to remittances in either direction. 
 To fully understand the meaning of these results we would need to find out if the 
coefficients of the variable remittances per capita are different from one another across the 
estimations for the three education levels. This is not an easy task as the coefficients are not 
                         
39
 The linear probability model may produce out-of-bound predictions (below 0 and above 1) and has built-in 
heteroscedasticity. 
Occupational Choice, Remittances and Human Capital 
146 
 
obtained within a single estimation. For a simple way of comparing the coefficients, I 
estimate the linear two-stage least squares model again, including interactions of education 
dummies with remittances. While this is not exactly equivalent to the main specification it is a 
closely related model where interactions can be included and their interpretation is 
straightforward. The instruments for this model are the instruments used so far and the 
interactions between these instruments and the respective education levels. The results of this 
model are shown in Table 3.9. Columns (1) and (2) use no education as the reference 
category. In column (1) remittances interacted with low education as well as remittances 
interacted with high education have positive signs and are significant at the 10% level, 
suggesting that individuals with some primary education or higher education are more likely 
to be self-employed when receiving remittances than individuals without education. 
Correspondingly, column (2) shows that, for the highly educated, wage-employment 
decreases in remittances in comparison with individuals without education. For a simple 
interpretation, columns (3) and (4) repeat the estimations using low education as the reference 
category to test if there are differences between low and highly educated men. The 
coefficients of the interaction terms of remittances with high levels of education are 
insignificant. Therefore, the increase in the likelihood of being self-employed for individuals 
with a low level of education does not seem to be different for the highly educated. 
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Table 3.9: Education interacted with remittances per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Self-
employment 
Wage 
employment 
Self-
employment 
Wage 
employment 
     
remittances p.c. 0.00 -0.01 0.03** -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
no education   0.10** -0.07 
   (0.05) (0.04) 
remittances p.c. x no education   -0.03* 0.01 
   (0.02) (0.01) 
low education -0.10** 0.07   
 (0.05) (0.04)   
remittances p.c. x low education 0.03* -0.01   
 (0.02) (0.01)   
high education -0.23*** 0.23*** -0.14** 0.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
remittances p.c. x high education 0.03* -0.03** 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
age -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.26*** 0.15** -0.26*** 0.15** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
other urban areas -0.14*** 0.11** -0.14*** 0.11** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
no. of children 0.01** -0.01*** 0.01** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
wealth -0.04** 0.03 -0.04** 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
inverse Mill’s ratio 0.08** -0.05 0.08** -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
constant 0.81*** 0.08 0.72*** 0.15** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
     
observations 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,234 
R-squared 0.26 0.18 0.26 0.18 
Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. In columns (1) and (2) the 
reference category for education is no education, while in columns (3) and (4) it is low education. 
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 Overall, this suggests that there is a difference with respect to occupational decisions 
between individuals with no education and those with at least some education. The likelihood of 
self-employment for individuals with low or high levels of education appears to increase with 
remittances if compared to those with no education.  
After the discussion of the five major specifications, I now turn to the issue that the 
instruments are only available for migrant households. I therefore run all five specifications 
shown above for a subset of the sample, encompassing migration households only (see Appendix 
E1). The results are less significant in general, which is likely to be caused by the lower numbers 
of observations. The results of this robustness check concerning the two-step Newey estimator 
and the simultaneous equations regressions are in line with the results obtained earlier.40 
 Furthermore, the decision to take up employment and what type to choose may depend 
on the specific regional situation of the job market. In areas with more companies and shops the 
opportunity for wage employment may be larger than in others. Moreover, for the selection 
equation to be valid, migration networks need to be exogenous of labor market outcomes. 
However, if a district has a large share of migrants this may increase wages (see Jadotte, 2009, 
p.5) making wage employment relatively more attractive. In order to alleviate these concerns, I 
include dummies for 29 Senegalese départements to control for regional labor market 
particularities and other region-specific effects (see Appendix E2). The results from the five 
major specifications including these additional variables corroborate the main results for highly 
educated men. 
                         
40
 The results from the main estimation using Rivers and Vuong’s (1988) methodology (Table E1.1) suggest, 
however, that instead of the highly skilled those with low skill levels are significantly more likely to be self-
employed when they receive remittances. This could be an indication of an inverted u-shaped curve of the effect, 
with no impact for very highly educated individuals. This, perhaps, indicates that for this high level of education 
wages are more elastic with respect to human capital than income from self-employment, as discussed as an option 
in the theoretical part of this chapter. 
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 As a further set of robustness checks I test a number of alternative measurements of the 
explanatory variable remittances. So far, I have used a variable consisting of 11 categories, 
which are the ten deciles for positive amounts of remittances in addition to zero as its own 
category. I estimate the five major specifications measuring the explanatory variable simply as 
remittances per capita and as logarithm to include non-linearity, as the marginal utility of 
additional remittances may be decreasing. The results of these alternative specifications are also 
in line with those of the main specifications (see Appendices E3 and E4). 
 Furthermore, I am concerned that it might not be remittances that are driving the effects 
but rather the fact that a migrant household may diversify its risks since a family member abroad 
could potentially absorb losses from an unsuccessful business (see Azam and Gubert, 2005).41 
For this reason, I run the main specification again using a dummy defined as 1 if it is a migration 
household and 0 otherwise. I instrument this dummy using the measure for migration networks. 
The coefficients are generally insignificant except for a significant negative effect on the wage 
employment of men with low levels of education (see Appendix E5). Hence, the main results for 
highly educated men do not seem to be driven by household diversification strategies. 
 Who are the individuals who become self-employed or leave wage employment as a 
response to remittances? The analysis, so far, cannot answer the question of whether waged 
individuals change to self-employment or if it is the unemployed who chose to become self-
employed. To answer this question I run the five major specifications using employment in 
general (irrespective of self-employment or wage employment; see Appendix E.6) as a binary 
dependent variable. The results show that remittances per capita is generally an insignificant 
                         
41
 Alternatively or in addition there may be a disruptive effect if non-migrant family members have to replace labor 
activities a migrant formerly carried out (e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). This effect is described in more 
detail in subsection 3.5.4 for women. 
Occupational Choice, Remittances and Human Capital 
150 
 
predictor for employment for any education level, suggesting that it is rather a change in job type 
than a change in the employment status that drives the results for the highly educated. 
 Finally, I check the robustness of these results by changing the measurement of the 
dependent variables. Self-employment and wage employment – as detailed in the data 
description – were defined as 0 if an individual is unemployed or taking care of the household. 
This measurement takes the point of view that those taking care of the household may want to be 
employed as well but as they cannot find a job opportunity they stay at home instead. However, 
these individuals may be taking care of the household because they wish to do so and not be 
actively searching for a job or willing to accept a job offer. That is, they should not be counted as 
unemployed. I change the measurement of the self- and wage employment variables to account 
for this and run all 25 estimations again.42 The results qualitatively corroborate the prior findings 
of an increase in self-employment and decrease in wage employment as a response to receiving 
remittances for highly educated individuals. 
Based on the main estimation and the various robustness checks we may conclude that 
Senegalese men receiving remittances from former household members who have migrated do 
indeed respond to remittances by changing their occupational choice. In line with the arguments 
derived in the theoretical framework I find that more highly educated men are more likely to be 
self-employed as a result of remittances flows. In contrast, individuals with no education do not 
show responses in their labor activity when they receive remittances. 
As indicated above, I will compute the average marginal effects from the instrumental 
variable probit estimation. For ease of interpretation, however, I do not interpret the specification 
using remittances measured in deciles but rather the estimation using the actual amount of 
                         
42
 These 25 estimations include the five specifications shown in the main text, the same estimations for the subset of 
migration households only, variations including regional dummies and alternative measurements of remittances as 
actual amounts transferred and logarithmized amounts transferred. These estimations are not shown but are available 
from the author upon request. 
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remittances received. The results suggest than an increase in remittances of one unit (100,000 
West-African Francs or about 219 US Dollars in 2009)43 enhances the chances of self-
employment of highly skilled men by about 12 percentage points or – considering the mean 
value of self-employment for the highly educated – about 24 percent. An increase of the same 
size reduces the likelihood of wage employment by about 12 percentage points or about 32 
percent. 44 As the sizes of these effects are considerable, the differential occupational choice of 
individuals in response to remittances depending on their human capital seems to be an 
important factor in explaining the composition of the Senegalese labor market.  
 
3.5.4 Estimation results for female recipients 
 
Turning to the case of women we may expect results that differ from those of men, as the 
general literature review has shown in section 3.1. The dynamics regarding the relationship 
between remittances, labor supply and education may differ for women due to their role in 
Senegalese society. For example, if men are traditionally responsible for earning (most of) the 
household income, then women may possibly respond weakly to the receipt of remittances (see 
Rodriguez and Tiongson, 2001, pp.712-713). They may not have had a job in the first place and 
therefore there would be no reduction in labor supply. If they are employed, receiving money 
from household members who have migrated may induce them to supply less labor, as Lokshin 
and Glinskaya (2009) argue in the case of Nepalese women. On the other hand, there may be a 
disruptive effect: If a husband migrates, his wife may have to take over tasks formerly carried 
out by the man (see Hanson, 2007, p.74; Mendola and Carletto, 2009, p.4; Amuedo-Dorantes 
                         
43
 Exchange rate on 31 December 2009 from Bloomberg (2014).  
44
 The mean values of highly educated men are 51 percent for self-employment and 37 percent for wage 
employment. 
Occupational Choice, Remittances and Human Capital 
152 
 
and Pozo, 2006, p.222). She may have to find an employment or – from a different point of view 
– she may be empowered in her decision-making and choose to find employment (see Ratha et 
al., 2011, p.31; Deshingkar and Grimm, 2005, p.39). Since these opposing effects are both 
conceivable, it is ultimately an empirical question as to what effect prevails. Regarding job type, 
the theoretical framework used so far could explain occupational choice behavior for women as 
well. More education may increase the probability of choosing self-employment in response to 
remittances if its relative utility is higher than that of wage employment. 
 The results of the main estimation for women and the four major robustness checks 
carried out throughout this chapter are shown in Appendix F1. They suggest that there is no 
effect of remittances on self-employment or on wage employment, irrespective of the level of 
education. Remittances do not seem to play a role for female labor supply or occupational 
choice. We may thus conjecture that it is rather a disruptive effect that plays a role for 
Senegalese women, as indeed about 78 percent of the migrants in our data set are men (see 
summary statistics in Table 3.1). To see if there is indeed a disruptive effect, Appendix F2 shows 
the results of an estimation including migration per se instead of remittances as explanatory 
variable. The results are generally insignificant except for women without education and self-
employment. This possibly suggests that uneducated women are empowered by the migration 
decision of a household member and take up self-employment in a situation where wage 
employment is scarce (only 2 percent of uneducated women are wage employed based on this 
sample, versus 40 percent who are self-employed). The employment situation of more educated 
women is better for wage employment and may therefore not show a disruptive effect in the 
estimations. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
 
The amount of remittances to Sub-Saharan African countries as a share of GDP is 
considerable and is likely to have an effect on labor market outcomes. In Senegal, this share 
reached about 10 percent in 2011, with an upward trend (UNCTAD, 2013; World Bank, 2013). 
The results of past studies on the effect of remittances on labor supply are ambiguous. The 
standard argument, in a neo-classical sense, is that reservation wages increase with non-labor 
income. In this study, I expand this theory by introducing human capital-related considerations. I 
argue that in the case of those with low levels of education labor supply responses to remittances 
may be negative. For more educated individuals, however, there may be an incentive to take up 
employment. Specifically, more highly educated individuals may have the basic knowledge 
necessary for opening up a small business or investing more productively in agricultural 
activities. I develop a formal theoretical framework that encompasses these two lines of 
argument and combines them with the literature on occupational choice in order to show how the 
level of education may alter the predictions regarding labor supply and occupational choice when 
individuals receive remittances. 
Consequently, I examine the impact of remittances on labor supply and occupational 
choice of household members left behind for different levels of education. Using the two-step 
estimator by Rivers and Vuong (1988) I find evidence that men receiving remittances are less 
likely to be in wage employment but more likely to be in self-employment if they are more 
highly educated. There is also some evidence that this effect may be non-linear, as highly 
educated men may also be offered well-paid wage jobs that seem more attractive than setting up 
an own business. In contrast, women and less educated men generally do not show significant 
effects in either direction. The results for highly educated men are robust to a number of 
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alternative specifications using Newey’s (1987) two-step estimator, simultaneous equations and 
two-stage least squares. The sizes of these effects are considerable and this finding may prove 
useful in understanding the dynamics of the labor markets in Sub-Saharan African economies. If 
labor supply responses to non-labor income are brought forth by the ability to build up a self-
employment business rather than by work preferences, then this has important implications. 
Against the backdrop of low education levels and low school enrolment rates in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, positive labor supply responses from money transfers may not be expected for large parts 
of the society. In contrast, additional efforts by governments to increase education levels may be 
rewarded by lower unemployment rates and more economic activity. 
The findings of this chapter offer a number of promising suggestions for future research 
in this area to increase our understanding of labor supply and occupational choice behavior of 
non-migrant family members in sending countries. First, the impact of remittances on economic 
activity may be limited if the level of education is too low for people to profitably use these 
additional financial means. Therefore, the differential effect of human capital on employment 
and job creation should be further studied. A natural starting point would be the analysis of 
countries with higher levels of education in general. 
Second, it seems important to distinguish between rural and urban areas more specifically 
in future research to find out if human capital is as important a moderator in the countryside as in 
cities or if there are varying effects. However, this differentiated analysis was not possible in this 
chapter due to the limited number of observations. Third, I did not find any effects for women. 
However, this is likely to be the outcome in a society where men are traditionally responsible for 
work outside the home. Taking this one step further, this means that if women are empowered in 
such societies they are likely to face the same considerations in relation to labor supply and 
occupational choice that men do. Human capital may then also play an important role in their 
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labor market decisions in response to remittances. Finally, almost all of the literature in this field 
uses cross-sectional survey data to establish the effects remittances have on labor supply and 
occupational choice. Information on the same non-migrant family members of migration 
households and on the same individuals from non-migration control households for several time 
periods would greatly enhance our understanding of the prevailing dynamics. 
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Appendix E: Robustness checks (men) 
E1 Subset of migration households 
Table E1.1: Probit model corrected for selection & endogeneity (first-stage Tobit) 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.00 0.22** 0.03 -0.02 -0.26** -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) 
age -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.69* -1.56*** -0.43 0.10 1.60** -0.61 
 (0.39) (0.57) (0.64) (0.40) (0.72) (0.79) 
other urban areas -0.40 -0.84** -0.28 0.15 0.83 -0.18 
 (0.34) (0.42) (0.34) (0.34) (0.58) (0.44) 
no. of children 0.07** -0.00 0.03 -0.06* 0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
wealth 0.05 0.05 -0.35** -0.04 -0.01 0.46* 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.17) (0.11) (0.23) (0.24) 
residual -0.05 -0.13 -0.09 0.09* 0.10 0.14 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.11 0.47 0.22 -0.04 -0.09 0.07 
 (0.27) (0.54) (0.45) (0.28) (0.68) (0.61) 
constant 0.71 1.14 0.60 -1.24** -1.60 -1.16* 
 (0.46) (0.76) (0.51) (0.48) (1.03) (0.68) 
       
observations 774 418 755 774 418 755 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table E1.2: Probit model using two-step Newey estimator and accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.05* 0.09 0.02 -0.08*** 0.03 -0.06 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) 
age -0.00 0.01 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.88*** -1.07*** -1.04*** 0.48** 0.68* 0.34 
 (0.20) (0.31) (0.29) (0.21) (0.37) (0.37) 
other urban areas -0.39** -0.48** -0.80*** 0.36* 0.42 0.21 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.15) (0.19) (0.26) (0.20) 
no. of children 0.02 0.02 0.03* -0.00 -0.00 -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth -0.08* -0.07 -0.17*** 0.11** 0.02 0.14* 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.18 0.15 -0.02 -0.07 0.35 0.30 
 (0.14) (0.23) (0.18) (0.14) (0.26) (0.22) 
constant 0.29 0.43 0.62** -1.13*** -1.87*** -1.35*** 
 (0.26) (0.41) (0.27) (0.27) (0.47) (0.34) 
       
observations 774 418 755 774 418 755 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.09 0.67 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.07 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E1.3: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage OLS) 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.04 0.19 0.04 -0.07 -0.22 -0.11 
 (0.07) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.15) (0.12) 
age -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02*** 0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.77* -1.57*** -0.49 0.25 1.65** -0.50 
 (0.41) (0.57) (0.63) (0.41) (0.70) (0.74) 
other urban areas -0.49 -0.81* -0.24 0.29 0.81 -0.24 
 (0.35) (0.45) (0.34) (0.35) (0.61) (0.44) 
no. of children 0.06* 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
wealth 0.05 0.06 -0.34** -0.04 -0.03 0.45** 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.16) (0.12) (0.23) (0.22) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.26 0.41 0.28 -0.26 -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.32) (0.60) (0.46) (0.29) (0.76) (0.59) 
constant 0.51 1.21 0.34 -0.89* -1.73 -0.61 
 (0.52) (0.96) (0.77) (0.52) (1.21) (0.94) 
       
observations 774 418 755 774 418 755 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.25 0.56 0.39 0.04 0.81 0.12 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table E1.4: Simultaneous equation model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.05* 0.09* 0.02 -0.08*** 0.03 -0.06 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) 
age 0.00 0.01 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.88*** -1.05*** -1.05*** 0.48** 0.68* 0.38 
 (0.19) (0.29) (0.28) (0.20) (0.35) (0.35) 
other urban areas -0.39** -0.46** -0.80*** 0.36** 0.41* 0.24 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18) (0.23) (0.19) 
no. of children 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth -0.08* -0.08 -0.16*** 0.11** 0.03 0.14* 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.18 0.16 -0.03 -0.07 0.34 0.30 
 (0.14) (0.22) (0.17) (0.14) (0.25) (0.21) 
constant 0.29 0.42 0.63** -1.14*** -1.87*** -1.38*** 
 (0.25) (0.38) (0.28) (0.27) (0.47) (0.35) 
       
observations 774 418 755 774 418 755 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E1.5: 2SLS model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
age -0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.29** -0.42*** -0.16 0.08 0.34*** -0.06 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
other urban areas -0.17 -0.16* -0.02 0.10 0.11 -0.06 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) 
no. of children 0.02** 0.00 0.01 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
wealth 0.02 0.00 -0.07* -0.01 0.01 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.10 0.11 0.03 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.05) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04) 
constant 0.69*** 0.85*** 0.71*** 0.17 0.06 0.20* 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.12) 
       
observations 774 418 755 774 418 755 
R-squared 0.06 0.16 0.12 0.02 0.18 0.04 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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E2 Including Senegalese départements 
 
Table E2.1: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage Tobit) – including regional dummies 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.07* 0.13* 0.07 -0.08** -0.13 -0.09 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) 
age -0.02** -0.01 0.02 0.03*** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.31 1.91** 0.55 1.09* -2.25*** -0.14 
 (1.08) (0.90) (0.67) (0.64) (0.84) (4.80) 
other urban areas -0.73* -0.97** -1.39*** 0.47 1.53*** 1.14*** 
 (0.40) (0.48) (0.30) (0.42) (0.52) (0.36) 
no. of children 0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
wealth 0.05 0.15 -0.08 -0.02 -0.31 0.15 
 (0.10) (0.18) (0.17) (0.10) (0.19) (0.20) 
Residual -0.09* -0.08 -0.11 0.14*** 0.05 0.12 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.46* 0.72* -0.15 -0.24 -0.69 0.34 
 (0.26) (0.43) (0.35) (0.26) (0.49) (0.39) 
constant 0.63 0.65 2.83*** -1.01 -1.74 -2.35* 
 (0.69) (0.67) (0.49) (0.70) (1.79) (1.20) 
départements dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
observations 1,288 643 1,098 1,278 568 967 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table E2.2: Probit model using two-step Newey estimator and accounting for selection & endogeneity – including regional dummies 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.05** 0.03 -0.03 -0.07*** -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
age -0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.01 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.50 1.59 -0.24 0.38 -1.75 1.28 
 (0.50) (4.01) (4.03) (0.63) (4.01) (5.69) 
other urban areas -0.08 -0.62*** -0.93*** 0.01 1.07*** 0.45** 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.17) (0.20) (0.27) (0.22) 
no. of children 0.03* 0.06*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth -0.11*** -0.03 -0.06 0.13*** -0.04 -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.16 0.45*** 0.15 -0.11 -0.39*** -0.04 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) 
constant -0.51 -0.54 1.04*** -0.08 -0.99** -1.28** 
 (0.43) (0.38) (0.40) (0.43) (0.50) (0.62) 
départements dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
observations 1,286 641 1,093 1,276 566 962 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.16 0.39 0.76 0.00 0.61 0.15 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E2.3: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage OLS) – including regional dummies 
 Self-employment  Wage employment  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.08* 0.05 n/a -0.10** -0.06 n/a 
 (0.04) (0.08)  (0.04) (0.09)  
age -0.02** -0.01 n/a 0.02*** 0.00 n/a 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  
Dakar -0.31 1.75* n/a 1.06* -2.13 n/a 
 (1.05) (0.95)  (0.61) (5.74)  
other urban areas -0.67* -1.05** n/a 0.38 1.65*** n/a 
 (0.39) (0.47)  (0.40) (0.52)  
no. of children 0.04 0.10* n/a -0.04 -0.02 n/a 
 (0.03) (0.05)  (0.03) (0.05)  
wealth 0.06 0.18 n/a -0.03 -0.32* n/a 
 (0.11) (0.18)  (0.11) (0.18)  
inverse Mill's ratio 0.58** 0.57 n/a -0.40 -0.58 n/a 
 (0.28) (0.42)  (0.27) (0.53)  
constant 0.34 0.70 n/a -0.60 -1.75 n/a 
 (0.69) (0.64)  (0.68) (1.72)  
départements dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
observations 1,286 641 n/a 1,276 566 n/a 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.05 0.15 n/a 0.01 0.19 n/a 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table E2.4: Simultaneous equation model accounting for selection & endogeneity – including regional dummies 
 Self-employment  Wage employment  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
 
      
remittances p.c. 0.04** 0.02 -0.03 -0.07*** -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
age 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.50 -0.19 -0.26 0.38 -1.66** 2.16*** 
 (0.45) (0.52) (0.82) (0.48) (0.82) (0.57) 
other urban areas -0.07 -0.50** -0.93*** 0.01 0.87*** 0.43** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.16) (0.21) (0.28) (0.22) 
no. of children 0.03* 0.06*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth -0.11*** -0.05 -0.06 0.13*** -0.05 -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.13 0.39*** 0.14 -0.11 -0.37** -0.01 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) 
constant 0.08 1.21*** 2.45*** -1.68*** -2.48*** -3.19*** 
 (0.66) (0.42) (0.47) (0.50) (0.48) (0.57) 
départements dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E2.5: 2SLS model accounting for selection & endogeneity – including regional dummies 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.03** 0.01 0.01 -0.04*** 0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
age -0.01*** -0.00* 0.00** 0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.10 0.54*** 0.10 0.17** -0.70*** -0.01 
 (0.18) (0.08) (0.17) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) 
other urban areas -0.22*** -0.18*** -0.19*** 0.10 0.20*** 0.09* 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) 
no. of children 0.01 0.01** -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
wealth 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06** 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.20** 0.14* -0.03 -0.14* -0.08 0.03 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) 
constant 0.74*** 0.76*** 0.73*** -0.08 0.02 0.27 
 (0.14) (0.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17) 
départements dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
R-squared 0.16 0.42 0.30 0.13 0.38 0.20 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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E3 Remittances in actual units 
 
Table E3.1: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage Tobit) 
 Self-employed Wage employed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.17 0.42 0.19 -0.20* -0.55** -0.18 
 (0.10) (0.31) (0.19) (0.10) (0.28) (0.27) 
age -0.02** -0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.79** -1.03** -0.37 0.41 1.02 -0.02 
 (0.34) (0.52) (0.44) (0.32) (0.65) (0.55) 
other urban areas -0.69** -0.15 -0.34 0.55** 0.20 0.23 
 (0.29) (0.42) (0.29) (0.27) (0.55) (0.35) 
no. of children 0.05** 0.09* 0.01 -0.05** -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
wealth -0.05 -0.06 -0.48*** 0.05 0.03 0.43*** 
 (0.09) (0.15) (0.14) (0.09) (0.17) (0.16) 
residual -0.20* -0.36 -0.21 0.26** 0.32 0.23 
 (0.12) (0.22) (0.20) (0.11) (0.25) (0.19) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.32 0.19 0.20 -0.14 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.20) (0.35) (0.27) (0.21) (0.36) (0.33) 
constant 0.77* 0.75 0.48 -1.40*** -1.20 -0.94** 
 (0.40) (0.59) (0.30) (0.38) (0.75) (0.37) 
       
observations 1,291 707 1,245 1,291 707 1,245 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table E3.2: Probit model using two-step Newey estimator and accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.16*** 0.08 -0.08 -0.21*** 0.02 -0.08 
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.14) (0.11) 
age -0.00 0.01* 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.76*** -1.05*** -0.95*** 0.32** 1.03*** 0.38 
 (0.15) (0.23) (0.22) (0.16) (0.28) (0.27) 
other urban areas -0.45*** -0.41** -0.71*** 0.30** 0.40** 0.36** 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.16) 
no. of children 0.03* 0.05*** 0.03* -0.02 -0.03 -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth -0.14*** -0.07 -0.16*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.13** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.15 0.25** 0.08 -0.05 -0.12 0.07 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
constant 0.33* 0.46* 0.79*** -1.11*** -1.30*** -1.42*** 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.19) (0.18) (0.27) (0.22) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.02 0.99 0.32 0.00 0.81 0.25 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E3.3: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage OLS) 
 Self-employment  Wage employment  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.34** 0.09 n/a -0.36** -0.04 n/a 
 (0.15) (0.47)  (0.14) (0.38)  
age -0.02** -0.01 n/a 0.02*** 0.01 n/a 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  
Dakar -0.73** -1.19** n/a 0.38 1.18* n/a 
 (0.32) (0.50)  (0.29) (0.61)  
other urban areas -0.65** -0.23 n/a 0.51** 0.29 n/a 
 (0.27) (0.43)  (0.24) (0.56)  
no. of children 0.04* 0.10** n/a -0.04* -0.06 n/a 
 (0.03) (0.05)  (0.03) (0.05)  
wealth -0.08 0.03 n/a 0.08 -0.09 n/a 
 (0.09) (0.15)  (0.08) (0.18)  
inverse Mill's ratio 0.50** 0.10 n/a -0.35* 0.11 n/a 
 (0.20) (0.43)  (0.20) (0.40)  
constant 0.45 0.97 n/a -0.96** -1.48* n/a 
 (0.42) (0.74)  (0.41) (0.83)  
       
observations 1,289 705 n/a 1,289 705 n/a 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.02 0.69 n/a 0.01 0.14 n/a 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table E3.4: Simultaneous equation model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.16*** 0.08 -0.08 -0.21*** 0.02 -0.10 
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.13) (0.10) 
age 0.00 0.01** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.76*** -1.05*** -0.95*** 0.32** 1.03*** 0.38 
 (0.15) (0.22) (0.21) (0.15) (0.24) (0.25) 
other urban areas -0.45*** -0.40*** -0.72*** 0.30** 0.40** 0.36** 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) 
no. of children 0.03** 0.05*** 0.03* -0.02 -0.03 -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth -0.14*** -0.07 -0.16*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.14** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.14 0.26** 0.08 -0.05 -0.12 0.08 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) 
constant 0.33* 0.46** 0.80*** -1.12*** -1.31*** -1.43*** 
 (0.17) (0.23) (0.19) (0.18) (0.27) (0.23) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E3.5: 2SLS model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.13** 0.03 0.00 -0.15** 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) 
age -0.01*** -0.00 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.29** -0.40*** -0.16 0.12 0.34*** 0.02 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) 
other urban areas -0.25*** -0.05 -0.05 0.18** 0.06 0.00 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) 
no. of children 0.02* 0.02** 0.00 -0.02* -0.01* -0.00* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
wealth -0.03 0.00 -0.08** 0.03 -0.02 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.19** 0.05 0.01 -0.14* 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) 
constant 0.68*** 0.84*** 0.76*** 0.13 0.05 0.18** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) (0.07) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
R-squared 0.02 0.22 0.16 - 0.15 0.07 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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E4 Logarithm of remittances 
 
Table E4.1: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage Tobit) 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.55** 1.02* 0.44 -0.62** -1.21** -0.48 
 (0.27) (0.62) (0.52) (0.27) (0.56) (0.59) 
age -0.02** -0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.81** -1.13** -0.43 0.42 1.14* 0.02 
 (0.33) (0.52) (0.44) (0.31) (0.66) (0.55) 
other urban areas -0.69** -0.20 -0.38 0.54** 0.26 0.25 
 (0.29) (0.42) (0.29) (0.27) (0.56) (0.36) 
no. of children 0.05* 0.08 0.01 -0.05* -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
wealth -0.06 -0.03 -0.46*** 0.05 -0.01 0.42*** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.17) (0.16) 
residual -0.68** -0.73 -0.73 0.91*** 0.46 0.78 
 (0.34) (0.57) (0.60) (0.32) (0.64) (0.62) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.38* 0.27 0.22 -0.19 -0.16 -0.10 
 (0.21) (0.35) (0.26) (0.21) (0.36) (0.33) 
constant 0.71* 0.74 0.54* -1.34*** -1.20 -0.96** 
 (0.40) (0.61) (0.31) (0.38) (0.78) (0.40) 
       
observations 1,291 707 1,245 1,291 707 1,245 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table E4.2: Probit model using two-step Newey estimator and accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.36*** 0.16 -0.20 -0.48*** -0.02 -0.16 
 (0.13) (0.24) (0.19) (0.14) (0.29) (0.26) 
age -0.00 0.01* 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.77*** -1.07*** -0.93*** 0.34** 1.03*** 0.40 
 (0.15) (0.23) (0.22) (0.16) (0.28) (0.26) 
other urban areas -0.44*** -0.42*** -0.71*** 0.29** 0.40** 0.35** 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.16) 
no. of children 0.02* 0.05*** 0.03* -0.01 -0.03 -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth -0.13*** -0.06 -0.17*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.13** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.15 0.26** 0.07 -0.06 -0.12 0.06 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
constant 0.31* 0.47** 0.80*** -1.08*** -1.28*** -1.42*** 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.23) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.05 0.50 0.93 0.00 0.42 0.15 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E4.3: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage OLS) 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.76** 0.38 0.24 -0.84** -0.41 -0.57 
 (0.35) (0.84) (0.56) (0.34) (0.61) (0.65) 
age -0.02** -0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.86*** -1.20** -0.49 0.49 1.20* 0.01 
 (0.32) (0.50) (0.44) (0.30) (0.63) (0.55) 
other urban areas -0.73*** -0.24 -0.37 0.59** 0.28 0.18 
 (0.28) (0.43) (0.30) (0.25) (0.57) (0.37) 
no. of children 0.04 0.10** 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04* 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
wealth -0.06 0.02 -0.42*** 0.05 -0.08 0.42** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.08) (0.17) (0.16) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.53** 0.15 0.19 -0.39* 0.05 -0.15 
 (0.22) (0.42) (0.29) (0.22) (0.40) (0.36) 
constant 0.53 0.92 0.53 -1.07*** -1.41* -0.75 
 (0.41) (0.72) (0.41) (0.39) (0.82) (0.52) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.03 0.60 0.56 0.00 0.09 0.19 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table E4.4: Simultaneous equation model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.36*** 0.16 -0.21 -0.48*** -0.02 -0.21 
 (0.13) (0.24) (0.18) (0.13) (0.27) (0.24) 
age 0.00 0.01** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.77*** -1.07*** -0.94*** 0.34** 1.03*** 0.40 
 (0.15) (0.22) (0.21) (0.15) (0.24) (0.25) 
other urban areas -0.44*** -0.41*** -0.72*** 0.29** 0.40** 0.36** 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) 
no. of children 0.02* 0.05*** 0.03* -0.01 -0.03 -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth -0.13*** -0.07 -0.17*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.13** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.15 0.26** 0.06 -0.06 -0.13 0.07 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) 
constant 0.31* 0.47** 0.81*** -1.08*** -1.29*** -1.42*** 
 (0.17) (0.23) (0.19) (0.18) (0.27) (0.24) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E4.5: 2SLS model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. 0.28** 0.10 0.04 -0.32** -0.00 -0.07 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) 
age -0.01*** -0.00 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.32*** -0.41*** -0.15 0.16 0.34*** 0.03 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) 
other urban areas -0.27*** -0.06 -0.05 0.20** 0.05 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
no. of children 0.01 0.02** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
wealth -0.02 0.00 -0.08*** 0.02 -0.01 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.20** 0.06 0.02 -0.15* -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) 
constant 0.70*** 0.82*** 0.75*** 0.11 0.06 0.18*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.07) 
       
observations 1,289 705 1,240 1,289 705 1,240 
R-squared 0.08 0.22 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.08 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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E5 Migration instead of remittances 
 
Table E5: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage OLS) 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
migration -0.39 0.53 -0.14 -0.00 -1.54** -0.26 
 (0.35) (1.36) (0.79) (0.37) (0.63) (0.97) 
age -0.02*** -0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.72** -0.94 -0.56 0.45 0.34 0.13 
 (0.30) (0.71) (0.44) (0.29) (0.63) (0.56) 
other urban areas -0.60** -0.07 -0.40 0.56** 0.03 0.24 
 (0.27) (0.41) (0.29) (0.26) (0.37) (0.37) 
no. of children 0.05** 0.08 0.01 -0.05* -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
wealth -0.02 0.00 -0.40*** 0.01 0.03 0.36** 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) 
constant 1.24*** 0.70 0.86 -1.65*** -0.09 -1.02 
 (0.41) (1.06) (0.56) (0.36) (0.85) (0.82) 
       
observations 1,348 732 1,289 1,348 732 1,289 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.05 0.65 0.81 0.37 0.04 0.81 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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E6 Employment in general 
 
Table E6.1: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage Tobit) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 High education Low education No education 
    
remittances p.c. -0.01 0.06 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) 
age 0.02* -0.01 0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Dakar -1.00 -0.41 -0.71 
 (0.81) (0.38) (0.56) 
other urban areas -0.57 -0.00 -0.49 
 (0.77) (0.46) (0.37) 
no. of children 0.00 0.11** -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
wealth -0.01 -0.06 -0.28** 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.14) 
residual 0.04 -0.05 -0.08 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.13) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.25 0.38 0.19 
 (0.30) (0.51) (0.35) 
constant 1.00 1.02** 1.29*** 
 (0.93) (0.44) (0.39) 
    
observations 1,291 707 1,245 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table E6.2: Probit model using two-step Newey estimator and accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 High education Low education No education 
    
remittances p.c. -0.02 0.01 -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age 0.03*** 0.01* 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.93*** -0.55** -1.10*** 
 (0.20) (0.25) (0.26) 
other urban areas -0.46** -0.28* -0.86*** 
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.15) 
no. of children 0.02 0.05** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth 0.04 -0.06 -0.14** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.10 0.25* 0.14 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
constant 0.66*** 0.78*** 1.13*** 
 (0.24) (0.30) (0.25) 
    
observations 1,289 705 1,240 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.11 0.79 0.64 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E6.3 Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 High education Low education No education 
    
remittances p.c. -0.02 0.09 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) 
age 0.02* -0.01 0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.96 -0.39 -0.78 
 (0.80) (0.38) (0.58) 
other urban areas -0.53 -0.00 -0.48 
 (0.75) (0.45) (0.37) 
no. of children 0.00 0.10** -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
wealth -0.01 -0.08 -0.25* 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.14) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.20 0.49 0.12 
 (0.32) (0.51) (0.40) 
constant 1.04 0.87* 1.38*** 
 (0.94) (0.46) (0.44) 
    
observations 1,289 705 1,240 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.43 0.22 0.91 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table E6.4: Simultaneous equation model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 High education Low education No education 
    
remittances p.c. -0.02 0.02 -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
age 0.03*** 0.01** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.94*** -0.54** -1.10*** 
 (0.20) (0.27) (0.24) 
other urban areas -0.47** -0.28 -0.87*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) 
no. of children 0.02 0.05** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
wealth 0.04 -0.07 -0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.10 0.25 0.14 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) 
constant 0.67*** 0.76*** 1.14*** 
 (0.23) (0.28) (0.23) 
    
observations 1,289 705 1,240 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table E6.5: 2SLS model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 High education Low education No education 
    
remittances p.c. -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
age 0.00** -0.00 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.16** -0.07 -0.12 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) 
other urban areas -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) 
no. of children 0.00 0.01** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
wealth -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
inverse Mill's ratio 0.05 0.06 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) 
constant 0.81*** 0.89*** 0.92*** 
 (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) 
    
observations 1,289 705 1,240 
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.08 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Appendix F: Women 
F1 Main specifications 
Table F1.1: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage Tobit) 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.11) (0.05) 
age 0.01* 0.03** 0.01** 0.01* 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar 0.18 -0.64 0.20 -0.22 0.53 1.20** 
 (0.40) (0.53) (0.20) (0.48) (1.11) (0.50) 
other urban areas 0.10 -0.99** -0.26* -0.29 0.71 1.05*** 
 (0.33) (0.40) (0.14) (0.47) (0.77) (0.38) 
no. of children -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
wealth -0.30*** -0.23 -0.32*** 0.25*** -0.07 -0.17 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.06) (0.09) (0.26) (0.13) 
residual -0.01 -0.11 -0.00 0.05 -0.12 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) 
inverse Mill's ratio -0.10 0.21 -0.59*** -0.38 -0.17 -0.06 
 (0.30) (0.43) (0.15) (0.28) (0.79) (0.38) 
constant -0.96** -0.64 -0.52** -0.91 -2.48** -2.64*** 
 (0.42) (0.54) (0.21) (0.58) (1.12) (0.78) 
       
observations 1,220 550 2,883 1,220 550 2,883 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table F1.2: Probit model using two-step Newey estimator and accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** -0.00 -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.44** -0.75*** -0.18 0.46** 1.03*** 0.82*** 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.11) (0.22) (0.39) (0.21) 
other urban areas -0.08 -0.65*** -0.17*** 0.19 0.62* 0.38** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.06) (0.21) (0.32) (0.17) 
no. of children -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.04** -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
wealth -0.10** -0.06 -0.15*** 0.19*** -0.02 0.15*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) 
inverse Mill's ratio -0.17 0.28 -0.35*** -0.10 0.11 0.02 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.08) (0.16) (0.32) (0.21) 
constant -0.81*** -0.75*** -0.83*** -1.30*** -2.03*** -1.48*** 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.10) (0.23) (0.42) (0.28) 
       
observations 1,219 550 2,875 1,219 550 2,875 
       
Wald test of exogeneity 0.51 0.31 0.35 0.21 0.12 0.13 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table F1.3: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage OLS) 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) 
age 0.01* 0.03** 0.01** 0.01 0.02* -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar 0.18 -0.65 0.14 -0.20 0.50 1.14** 
 (0.40) (0.52) (0.21) (0.48) (0.95) (0.48) 
other urban areas 0.09 -1.00** -0.30** -0.27 0.79 1.01*** 
 (0.33) (0.42) (0.14) (0.47) (0.68) (0.35) 
no. of children -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
wealth -0.30*** -0.21 -0.31*** 0.23** -0.17 -0.15 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.06) (0.09) (0.23) (0.12) 
inverse Mill's ratio -0.13 0.05 -0.49*** -0.32 0.23 -0.05 
 (0.32) (0.52) (0.18) (0.30) (0.66) (0.45) 
constant -0.92** -0.41 -0.56** -0.96 -2.74*** -2.55*** 
 (0.44) (0.66) (0.22) (0.59) (0.84) (0.68) 
       
observations 1,219 550 2,875 1,219 550 2,875 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.90 0.74 0.95 0.88 0.00 0.18 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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Table F1.4: Simultaneous equation model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.00 -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Dakar -0.44** -0.83*** -0.19* 0.46** 0.93** 0.82*** 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.11) (0.21) (0.39) (0.23) 
other urban areas -0.07 -0.70*** -0.17*** 0.19 0.56* 0.39** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.06) (0.19) (0.30) (0.17) 
no. of children -0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.04** -0.03 -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
wealth -0.10** -0.06 -0.15*** 0.19*** 0.00 0.15*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) 
inverse Mill's ratio -0.17 0.32 -0.35*** -0.10 0.13 0.02 
 (0.15) (0.22) (0.09) (0.15) (0.34) (0.20) 
constant -0.81*** -0.76*** -0.84*** -1.30*** -2.02*** -1.47*** 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.11) (0.23) (0.45) (0.25) 
       
observations 1,219 550 2,875 1,219 550 2,875 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table F1.5: 2SLS model accounting for selection & endogeneity 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
age 0.00* 0.01** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dakar 0.03 -0.24 0.05 -0.07 0.04 0.06** 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03) 
other urban areas 0.01 -0.37*** -0.10** -0.09 0.06 0.05*** 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.02) 
no. of children -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
wealth -0.08*** -0.07 -0.11*** 0.07*** -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
inverse Mill's ratio -0.04 -0.00 -0.18*** -0.08 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.09) (0.15) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) 
constant 0.20 0.41** 0.30*** 0.19 -0.03 0.00 
 (0.13) (0.19) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.02) 
       
observations 1,219 550 2,875 1,219 550 2,875 
R-squared 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.02 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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F2 Migration instead of remittances 
 
 
Table F2: Probit model accounting for selection & endogeneity (first-stage OLS) 
 Self-employment Wage employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High education Low education No education High education Low education No education 
       
remittances p.c. -0.28 -0.94 1.16*** -0.47 -0.48 -0.20 
 (0.58) (0.75) (0.26) (0.55) (1.11) (1.55) 
age 0.01** 0.02* 0.01** 0.01* 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dakar -0.02 -0.98** 0.13 -0.44 0.04 1.18 
 (0.42) (0.43) (0.20) (0.50) (0.62) (0.89) 
other urban areas -0.04 -1.09*** -0.30** -0.36 0.37 1.06** 
 (0.35) (0.33) (0.14) (0.49) (0.65) (0.47) 
no. of children -0.01 -0.02 -0.02* -0.01 -0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
wealth -0.24** -0.09 -0.28*** 0.30*** 0.05 -0.19 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.05) (0.09) (0.19) (0.22) 
constant -0.83 0.31 -1.30*** -0.93 -1.94 -2.65 
 (0.53) (0.73) (0.20) (0.70) (1.45) (1.91) 
       
observations 1,288 576 3,019 1,288 576 3,019 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.75 0.14 0.00 0.24 0.26 0.82 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations take into account sample weights. 
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4 Remittances, Migration and Child Education 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 3, I found that the relationship between remittances and labor market 
outcomes of non-migrant household members is moderated by the level of education the 
recipients attained. This chapter focuses on the direct impact of remittances on child 
education in households receiving remittances. If remittances increase child human capital 
then they may contribute to a virtuous circle: Remittances would increase the educational 
level of non-migrant household members and better educated household members may also 
use them for productive investment (see chapter 3). Higher income from productive 
investment may then increase education levels even more. If remittances do not exhibit a 
positive effect on child education, then it appears that alleviating credit constraints is more 
important for labor market decisions than for educational ones and education levels may be 
better explained by other factors. 
Most studies on the impact of migration and remittances on child human capital 
investments have focused on Mexico and countries further to the south due to their high 
migration flows into the United States. This relationship is little researched in the context of 
Sub-Saharan Africa even though emigration flows from some of these countries are 
considerable and remittances constitute a notable share of GDP (see section 3.1). There are 
several noteworthy points to motivate the study of these countries separately. Almost all 
African countries do not have land borders with high-income countries making illegal 
migration and frequent moves between home and these destination countries more 
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burdensome. Moreover, since GDP is generally very low in Sub-Saharan African countries, 
liquidity constraints of households may be a major concern and child labor more frequent to 
sustain household consumption levels. In addition, school enrolment and educational 
attainment remain relatively low, which may have implications for the expected returns of 
additional years of education and general preferences towards education. Concerning the 
methodological analyses, none of the existing studies has included both migration and 
remittances simultaneously as separate variables rendering the interpretation of their results 
unclear. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first analysis that disentangles the effects of 
migration and remittances and seeks to establish the sign and the quantity of each effect. This 
is important since migration could have positive and negative effects on child education (for 
example due to the absence of a parent) and the net effect has to be identified empirically. On 
the other hand, remittances are likely to have positive effects (as they can reduce household 
liquidity constraints). The interpretation of, for instance, a positive effect of remittances 
would be unclear if only the latter is included without controlling for migration since 
counteracting negative effects of migration are not considered in this set-up. This analysis 
points out the different channels, through which migration and remittances may affect 
investment in child human capital and illustrates in detail why both variables need to be 
included for appropriate identification of the respective effects. 
Moreover, this study embeds these dynamics in a general theoretical model that 
includes the education level of parents who are likely to be the ultimate decision makers with 
respect to child education. The subsequent empirical model operationalizes the unified 
framework. My results show that neither migration nor remittances exhibit a significant effect 
on child educational attainment for the data set on Senegalese households used in this chapter. 
Remittances, Migration and Child Education 
190 
 
To investigate the reasons for the lack of an effect, the main transmission channel, through 
which migration and remittances were expected to affect child education, is examined: The 
effect of both of these variables on education expenditures that are supposed to ultimately 
influence child education. Migration and remittances are insignificant in these estimations as 
well suggesting that they do not affect educational attainment of children (partly) because 
they do not change household spending behavior with respect to education expenditure. 
However, we find a highly significant effect of average adult schooling on child education 
that persists even if education expenditure is controlled for. This therefore suggests that adult 
schooling is important for child education beyond education spending. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 gives a brief 
overview over the results in the recent literature on the impact of migration and remittances 
on child human capital in origin households. Section 4.3 explains how migration and 
remittances may affect child education and establishes the framework to deal with both effects 
simultaneously. The data used for this analysis are described in section 4.4 followed by the 
econometric set-up and results in section 4.5. Finally, section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 The impact of migration and remittances on child education 
 
 Most studies on the relationship between migration, remittances and child education 
focus on the effect of remittances. Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow (2009) show that remittances 
have a positive effect on school enrolment in Ecuador, specifically for girls and in rural areas. 
Moreover, they find evidence that remittances might increase the quality of education 
investments as children are more likely to be enrolled in private schools substituting for 
public schools. Acosta (2011) does not find a significant effect of remittances on school 
enrolment of boys in El Salvador. In contrast, girls were more likely to be enrolled in 
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response to remittances. However, older students aged 15 to 18 years were more likely to drop 
out of school. Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that higher amounts of remittances in El 
Salvador are associated with a lower hazard of leaving school. Moreover, the presence of 
remittances lowers the hazard of leaving school only in rural areas. 
Yang (2008) examines exchange rate shocks during the Asian financial crisis that 
increased the value of migrant earnings abroad if these shocks were favorable and decreased 
them if they were unfavorable. He shows that positive exchange rate shocks lead to increased 
child schooling in the Philippines. 
Hanson and Woodruff (2003) show that girls in migration households in Mexico 
accumulate more years of schooling if their mothers have little education whereas results for 
boys are inconclusive. In addition, they find that the presence of remittances increases child 
schooling. They argue that both results suggest that migration (and subsequent receipt of 
remittances) relax credit constraints and help increase child education (Hanson and Woodruff, 
2003, p.24). In line with these results, Mansuri (2006) finds that children in migration 
households in Pakistan are less likely to drop out and accumulate more years of schooling. 
However, in female-headed migrant households, girls are more likely to drop out than in 
male-headed migrant households. Moreover, girls in such households do not differ in their 
years of schooling from girls in non-migrant households. McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) find 
that migration in Mexico lowers school attendance and attainment for boys aged 12 to 18 and 
girls aged 16 to 18. They suggest that these results confirm the notion that migration increases 
opportunity costs and lowers the expected returns to education (McKenzie and Rapoport, 
2011, p.1355). Antman (2012) finds that paternal international migration increases girls’ 
schooling but does not impact on education of boys in Mexico. Domestic migration of fathers 
does not show any effect, which suggests that absence of fathers is not the main transmission 
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channel. Finally, Gyimah-Brempong and Asiedu (2014) show that international remittances to 
households in Ghana increase the probability of child enrolment in primary and secondary 
school and that this effect is stronger if remittances are sent to female-headed households. 
This brief overview of the literature shows that there is little evidence on this subject 
in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the results are ambiguous. Most of the 
studies using data from Latin America suggest that remittances and migration have positive 
effects on education outcomes for girls only. Some studies, however, find insignificant or 
negative effects of migration. A disadvantage of these studies is that the respective effects of 
migration and remittances are not distinguishable from one another as they have been used 
synonymously in the empirical analyses. The next section discusses the different channels by 
which migration and remittances may affect child education and how both can be included in 
a unified framework. 
 
4.3 Theory 
 
Migration and remittances are interconnected in the sense that rarely a household 
receives remittances if it does not have a migrant family member. As both migration and 
remittances may impact on educational outcomes in a number of ways and as their effects are 
ambiguous it is essential to consider their effects in an encompassing unified framework. 
 
 
4.3.1 Impact of migration on child education 
 
Migration of a parent may disrupt family life with ambiguous effects on child 
schooling. For example, a child in a migration household lacks supervision by the adult 
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migrant (Gyimah-Brempong and Asiedu, 2014; Mansuri, 2006) who may act as a role model 
(Hanson and Woodruff, 2003) and give educational inputs such as help with homework 
(Gyimah-Brempong and Asiedu, 2014; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011). Children may have to 
replace the adult migrant by doing household work such as taking care of siblings (Hanson 
and Woodruff, 2003; Mansuri, 2006; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011) or may even become 
wage-earners to compensate for the possible losses in income due to migration (McKenzie 
and Rapoport, 2011). Absence of a parent may also impose psychological costs such as 
emotional stress on the child (Antman, 2012; Mansuri, 2006) leading to poorer educational 
outcomes such as early dropout from school or low achievement and grade retention. 
Moreover, if migrants do not legally enter destination countries, then they are likely to 
be employed in jobs requiring low levels of education. Prospect of future migration would 
therefore lead to lower educational attainment of children in migration households (see 
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011, p.1333).  
The arguments above suggest that migration should have a negative effect on 
educational outcomes of children. There are, however, some arguments that point to an 
opposite, positive connection between migration and child education. 
For instance, household investment in child education may rise if the expected returns 
from education are believed to be high in case of migration (Gyimah-Brempong and Asiedu, 
2014; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011). This would naturally be the case if the domestic labor 
market does not highly reward additional years of schooling and if migration is legal and 
therefore job opportunities requiring higher levels of education are attainable in the 
destination country. 
Another line of argument emphasizes the role of the family structure. Parents transmit 
their values to their children and mothers and fathers may attach varying importance to child 
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education. If fathers migrate, mothers may have increased decision power regarding the 
education of the children. These differential preferences may result in higher schooling 
outcomes if mothers decide upon child education (Mansuri, 2006; see also Hanson and 
Woodruff, 2003). Similarly, the migration experience may change educational preferences 
towards children if education is valued more in destination countries and if migrants (at least) 
partially adopt these values and transmit them to their origin households. An example would 
be a migration from a developing country with low educational attainment to an OECD 
country with typically very high levels of schooling in general. For instance, Böhme (2012) 
finds a positive link between migration and educational aspirations of parents in Moldova. 
 
4.3.2 Impact of remittances on child education 
 
Regarding remittances, most studies argue that transfers from migrants to their origin 
households could reduce liquidity constraints, increase human capital investments and 
therefore have positive effects on child education (Mansuri, 2006; Calero et al., 2009; Acosta, 
2011; Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Yang, 2008; McKenzie and Rapoport 2011; Hanson and 
Woodruff, 2003). Remittances may increase the reservation wage of a child and therefore 
decrease labor force participation leading to better educational outcomes (Calero et al., 2009, 
p.1143). They may also be part of a household strategy to diversify income and smooth 
consumption in response to economic shocks (Calero et al., 2009, p.1143). 
Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003, p.438) argue that parents decide upon schooling 
investments regarding their children based on cost-benefit considerations. Their expectations 
of future labor market returns on formal schooling are weighed against education costs such 
as those related to school attendance or opportunity costs of schooling (see also Hanson and 
Remittances, Migration and Child Education 
195 
 
Woodruff, 2003). In this framework, parents choose more schooling for their children if they 
receive remittances since they are less dependent on their children’s labor. 
 
4.3.3 Migration and remittances in a single framework 
 
While many of the above studies emphasize that both migration and remittances have 
important effects on educational outcomes of children in origin households, none of the 
studies simultaneously introduces both in the econometric analyses. 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) acknowledge that migration and remittances have 
very distinct transmission channels in their impact on child schooling. However, they only 
include a binary variable indicating whether a child lives in a migration household and 
interpret the result as the net effect of migration and remittances. This is a very broad and 
encompassing interpretation of the effect. Assuming that there are no households that receive 
remittances if they do not have a migrant household member there is still variation among 
migration households. A considerable number of migrants do not send back any remittances 
to their families at all.45 Therefore, a variable capturing migration may capture a migrant 
household that does not receive remittances or migrant households receiving very distinct 
amounts of remittances. The explanatory power of a migration variable is therefore unclear. 
 In contrast, other studies (e.g. Acosta, 2011; Calero et al., 2009) have included the 
amount or presence of remittances as predictors without controlling for the presence of 
migration. The problems are analogous. Positive amounts of remittances denote migration and 
remittances combined. But variation is still present for the households that do not receive 
                         
45
 For example, in the data used in this chapter about 22 per cent of migration households with children in the 
relevant age range do not receive remittances. 
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remittances. They may be migration or non-migration households making it unclear what 
effect the variable for remittances actually captures. 
 Methodologically, the most convincing approach is chosen by those studies that 
confine their data set to migration households only and estimate the impact of remittances on 
child education outcomes (e.g. Acosta, 201146; Yang, 2008). The effect of remittances can 
therefore be interpreted as the effect of alleviating credit constraints for the subset of 
households that have sent a migrant abroad. It has even been argued that the determinants to 
migrate and to remit may be the same and, if so, selection to migration is not a problem if 
migration households only are considered (Acosta, 2011, p.926).47 Two interconnected 
problems arise from the latter approach. First, the question to what extent migration affects 
schooling outcomes is of fundamental theoretical interest in this literature and should be 
contrasted to (possibly counteracting) effects of the receipt of remittances. Second, if migrant 
households differ systematically from non-migrant households, then the effect of remittances 
(or additional financial means) for the subset of migration households is not representative of 
the whole population. For example, assume that migration households are less risk averse than 
non-migration households as they chose to send a migrant abroad, which may require 
considerable up-front costs and involves subsequent uncertainties about the success of 
migration. A lower level of risk aversion may cause these households to allocate additional 
financial resources in a different manner than non-migration households. This variation in the 
use of financial means is likely to also lead to variation in its impact on schooling outcomes of 
                         
46
 Acosta (2011) does both: Analyses with the whole sample and the subset of migration households. 
47
 It is, however, unlikely that the determinants to migrate are entirely the same as the determinants to remit since 
typically a considerable number of migrants do not remit. 
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children.48 Less risk-averse households may for instance channel more resources into a new 
risky business, leaving less for education investments or even causing children to neglect 
school for work in this business. Many different ways in which differential use of resources 
impacts on human capital investments are conceivable. We may conclude that migration and 
remittances need to be accounted for in one unified framework that tackles endogeneities in 
both variables to disentangle the respective effects. 
 
4.3.4 A simple model 
 
The following formal theoretical model adapted from McKenzie and Rapoport (2011, 
pp.1342-1345) serves to illustrate the arguments regarding migration and remittances made so 
far. The number of years of schooling * of a child ; is decided upon by the household, which 
will weigh the benefits against the costs of an additional year of schooling. The benefits of an 
additional year in school are denoted ,® depicting the present discounted value of the 
additional returns. The costs of an additional year at school may be financial,	/,®, including 
schooling fees, costs for school material or foregone earnings. In the model of McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2011), non-financial costs in terms of disutility of school effort are distinguished 
from the financial costs. However, it is not necessary to consider these costs separately for the 
purposes of this study. For simplicity, I therefore subsume costs in the parameter	/,®. The 
costs of schooling may not exceed the available resources of the household, ¯.The schooling 
decision of the household for child ; therefore is: 
                         
48
 Migration can also be considered to be a risk diversification strategy (see Azam and Gubert, 2005) and 
therefore a symptom of greater risk aversion among migration households. Analogously, the argument of 
differential usage of additional financial resources between migration and non-migration households persists. 
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*∗ = arg	max	®	∈{,",D,I…,z} 		¶(,w − /,w)	
®
w·" 							*. 0.¶/,w ≤ ¯	
®
w·" 			(4.1) 
 
If the household does not face liquidity constraints the optimal level of schooling 
is	*¸ . Schooling of children is expected to be positively related to parents’ education as more 
educated parents may help with homework or simply care more for the education of their 
children than less educated parents (see McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011, p.1342). The higher 
the level of schooling the more independent children may become with respect to their 
educational decisions and the less parents may be able to use their knowledge to directly 
support their children. Therefore, the relationship between parents’ education and child 
schooling is depicted as a concave function in Figure 4. Moreover, financial resources of the 
household are expected to be positively related to parents’ education since well-educated 
parents are likely to have better-paid jobs and a higher income than low-educated parents. The 
straight positive line in Figure 4 shows this positive relationship. The number of schooling 
years is constrained,	*H, if the liquidity constraint of the household is binding. However, it is 
possible that schooling preferences result in lower than possible educational attainment given 
the financial constraint. This would be the case if the household was financially endowed to 
finance more years in school for the household’s children but the value attached to more 
schooling years is too low. This scenario is depicted in areas A and C in Figure 4. For 
example in point P, the preferred schooling level for children is below the affordable one. 
Higher education of parents, however, would increase child schooling as we would move 
upwards along the concave function. 
Let us now consider what happens if the household receives remittances indicated by 
the upward shift of the straight line depicting the financial constraint. At point P, this has no 
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implications since there was no financial constraint in the first place and child schooling 
therefore does not change. What about point Q in the area B, which is subject to a binding 
financial constraint? Here, the receipt of remittances at the indicated level alleviates the 
constraint and allows to reach Q’, the preferred level of child schooling. Formally in point ¹′ 
we have	∑ /,w  ¯®w·" . This also shows that it is crucial to include the amount of remittances 
(not just their presence) received by the household in any such analysis to find out if financial 
constraints are responsible for lower than otherwise preferred schooling levels. Note that a 
higher level of parents’ schooling still implies higher levels of child education in area B. 
However, in this area, we do not move along the unconstrained schooling level but along the 
budget constraint.  
 
Figure 4: Educational attainment, migration and remittances 
 
So far we have only looked at the implications of a change in parent’s education or 
remittances. As discussed above, migration may change preferences towards schooling in one 
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or the other direction. Consider the case where paternal migration leaves the mother with 
decision making power over schooling of the children and her preferences towards child 
schooling are more favorable (see Antman, 2012). In this case, the concave function depicting 
the optimal unconstrained schooling level would shift upwards. In contrast, if schooling 
preferences decreased because of a lack of a role model or emotional stress for the child (see 
Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Antman, 2012), the function would shift downwards. Looking 
at point P, an upward shift would increase child schooling to P’, a downward shift would 
decrease it to P’’ and if positive and negative effects cancel out, the schooling level would 
remain at P. In all three scenarios remittances do not play a role because the financial 
constraint is not binding. 
In contrast, in point Q, a potentially positive effect of migration may not materialize as 
households are constrained financially. Even a negative effect of migration may not show if it 
does not shift downwards the concave function far enough, that is below Q. 
This figure and the concepts of financial constraints and changing educational 
preferences that it contains serve to illustrate why it is highly important to disentangle the 
respective effects remittances and migration may have on schooling decisions. Let us combine 
the insights of the arguments to see how the results in the current literature may come about. 
Starting in point Q, consider that we observe that a variable denoting migration and 
remittances combined increases schooling to point	¹′. This is therefore the net effect of the 
migration and the remittances effect. In fact, there are three scenarios possible leading to this 
result. First, unconstrained schooling preferences,	*¸, may have decreased or increased to 
point Q’ or remained at this point and remittances may have alleviated credit constraints to 
reach point Q’ as well. Second, unconstrained schooling levels have remained at a point 
higher than point Q’ or increased or decreased to this higher point and remittance increased 
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the budget to reach point Q’ only, constituting a credit constraint at this schooling level. Third 
and very importantly, unconstrained schooling preference may have moved to or stayed at 
point Q’ and remittances may have increased *H more than to this point. The last case shows 
that if remittances increased sufficiently, then it was household preferences that prevented 
higher levels of educational attainment than that of point Q’. Moreover, studies that consider 
migration households only may overlook the differences in financially unconstrained 
schooling preferences between migration and non-migration households. Those studies only 
allow remittances to change and therefore focus on financial constraints leaving out the 
possibility of restrictive preferences. In addition, parents’ schooling always impacts positively 
on child schooling. The degree to which better educated parents positively affect child 
schooling depends on whether the household has a binding budget constraint and on the 
specific slopes of the respective functions. Table 4.1 summarizes the respective marginal 
effects that we may expect in the areas A, B and C of Figure 4. 
 
Table 4.1: Expected marginal effects on child education 
 
 
 
¼	½¾¿À¼	Á¼ÂÃÄÅ¿ÆÇ¼	È¿ÉÊÄÅ¿ÆÇ  ¼	½¾¿À¼	Á¼ÂÃÄÅ¿ÆÇ¼	ËÁÌ¿ÅÅÄÇÃÁÍ  ¼	½¾¿À¼	Á¼ÂÃÄÅ¿ÆÇ¼	ÎÄÊÁÇÅÍÏÁ¼ÂÃÄÅ¿ÆÇ 
A + / - 0 + 
B 0 + + 
C + / - 0 + 
 
The expectations regarding the effects of migration and remittances clearly vary 
between the areas A, B and C. Whether we expect an effect of migration and remittances and 
its direction for the case of Senegal therefore depends on what area we expect the country to 
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be located in. Table 4.2 shows mean schooling years for a number of developing countries 
including those mentioned in the literature review and countries in the same region in order to 
get some insight about which area may be relevant for which countries. It also shows the 
stock of migrants abroad originating from these countries and the average amount of 
remittances per migrant sent back to these countries. The last column contains remittances as 
the share of GDP to inform about the importance of remittances for the relevant countries. 
In the second column of Table 4.2, we can see that mean schooling of adults is very 
low for most of the selected Sub-Saharan African countries. The value for Senegal is only 
2.42 years while it reaches 6.72 years for Ghana. In the Asian countries and in the Latin 
American countries shown, this value is generally much higher, up to 10.49 years in Belize. 
With respect to the areas in Figure 4, this means that countries in Latin America and Asia are 
further to the right than Sub-Saharan African countries. We could therefore conjecture that 
while Senegal may be in area A, other countries researched so far may rather be in area B. If 
this is the case, then the results for Senegal may differ from those found in the existing 
literature. According to the theory, remittances would be unlikely to affect child schooling in 
Senegal as the preferred schooling level is below the financial constraint. While parents’ 
education should have a positive effect in area A according to the theory, the effect of 
migration is ambiguous as it depends on whether its positive or negative effects are stronger. 
However, we cannot theoretically explain where one area ends and the other starts and the 
sign of the net effect of migration. Therefore, the next sections set out to find empirical 
evidence for the effects of migration and remittances as well as the impact of adult schooling. 
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Table 4.2: Adult schooling, migration & remittances for selected countries 
 
 
 
 
Mean years of 
schooling in 
20111) 
Stock of 
migrants abroad 
in 2013 
Average 
remittances per 
migrant in 20134) 
Remittances 
(share of GDP in 
2013) 
 
   
Sub-Saharan Africa    
Senegal 2.42 533,085 3,027 10.65% 
Mali 2.04 869,894 901 7.17% 
Ghana2) 6.72 719,236 192 0.29% 
Ethiopia 2.41 585,853 1,066 1.33% 
 
   
Latin America    
Belize2) 10.49 62,570 1,189 4.64% 
Colombia2) 7.07 2,448,385 1,683 1.09% 
Costa Rica 8.31 130,364 4,575 1.20% 
Ecuador2) 7.50 1,144,408 2,131 2.71% 
El Salvador 6.35 1,526,093 2,602 16.37% 
Honduras 5.53 659,606 4,754 16.91% 
Mexico2) 8.34 13,212,419 1,742 1.83% 
Uruguay 8.38 336,741 365 0.22% 
 
   
South (East) Asia    
Pakistan 4.73 5,682,673 2,574 6.18% 
Philippines3) 7.56 5,481,683 4,871 9.82% 
Indonesia 7.51 2,992,338 2,545 0.88% 
Malaysia3) 8.61 1,673,671 834 0.45% 
1)
 Mean years of schooling of population aged 25 and above. 2) Mean years of schooling in 2010. 3) Mean years of schooling in 2000. 4) In 
current US Dollars. 
Source: UNESCO (2014b), United Nations (2013), World Bank (2014) and own calculations. 
 
 
 
4.4 The Data 
 
The data for this analysis come from the Migration and Remittances Household 
Survey 2009, which was carried out by the Consortium Pour La Recherche Économique et 
Sociale (CRES) and funded by the World Bank (World Bank, 2009). This data set is the same 
as the one used in the labor market analysis in chapter 3 (see its description in section 3.3). 
Table 4.3 shows unweighted summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis for all children aged between 7 and 19, which is during the time they would be at 
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primary or secondary school. The main dependent variable is educational attainment. This 
variable denotes the gap between the years of schooling a child should have accumulated 
according to their age if they had entered school at the age of seven (and have not dropped out 
or repeated a grade) and the actual years of schooling attained. For example, a nine-year old 
child should be in grade three (UNESCO-IBE, 2010). If she did not enter school by this age 
she would attain the value -3 for educational attainment. In some cases this number is 
positive, presumably because these children have entered school early or passed through 
school more quickly. The advantage of this measurement is that it captures several 
dimensions of educational attainment: If students do not enter school at all or drop out early 
their value will be very low. Similarly, if students have low achievements (for example due to 
absenteeism, work outside school or a lack of schooling equipment) and have to repeat a 
grade they will also attain lower values for this variable. On the other hand, students who 
enter school early, move quickly to subsequent grades and do not drop out are attributed 
higher values of educational attainment. 
To measure more directly the channels through which the effect on schooling should 
work, further dependent variables are household expenditure on education as well as its share 
in total expenditure. The mean age of the children is about 13 years and there are roughly as 
many girls (49 percent) as boys in the sample. Most of the children live in Dakar or in other 
urban areas (56 percent). Mean schooling of the adults above 20 years is only about 3 years. 
The number of migrant households in the region is at least 10 percent and regarding the length 
of the duration of migration I consider the migrant with the longest duration as another very 
recent migrant in the household may not yet be sending remittances. As Table 4.3 shows 
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unweighted sample statistics the number of migration households appears to be very high at 
71 percent.49 The empirical analyses below take into account sample weights. 
 
Table 4.3: Summary statistics 
 Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum N 
Dependent Variables      
educational attainment -3.04 4.11 -13.0 5 5458 
expenditure on education 5776 9273.70 0.0 133333 5458 
expenditure on education (share of 
total expenditure in %) 
2.70 3.64 0.0 38 5458 
      
Household Characteristics      
remittances (in 100.000 XOF) 6.06 13.03 0.0 125 5458 
migration 0.71 0.46 0.0 1 5458 
average adult schooling (above 20) 2.92 3.79 0.0 18 5458 
age 12.69 3.81 7.0 19 5458 
female 0.49 0.50 0.0 1 5458 
Dakar 0.17 0.37 0.0 1 5458 
other urban areas 0.39 0.49 0.0 1 5458 
wealth -0.20 1.56 -2.4 5 5458 
no. of children 5.87 4.32 0.0 29 5458 
migration network 0.62 0.19 0.1 1 5458 
household size 13.30 7.50 2.0 57 5458 
average adult age (above 20) 38.96 6.39 22.0 66 5458 
average adult employment (above 
20) 
0.53 0.30 0.0 1 5458 
duration of migration (max) 6.95 9.02 0.0 69 5458 
Note: The table shows values for the unweighted data sample (estimations below include weights). Educational attainment is the main dependent 
variable and consists of the difference between the grade children should be attending according to their age and the highest grade they actually attained. 
Remittances are all monetary and in-kind transfers the migrants sent back to the household in the twelve months preceding the survey date. Migration is 
a dummy variable denoting one for migration households and zero otherwise. The wealth index is calculated from a principal component analysis 
carried out using long-term household characteristics that indicate wealth (such as whether the household has electricity or not, etc., see caption of Table 
3.1). In this way I try to avoid capturing wealth that is induced by the receipt of remittances. The migration network is the share of migration households 
in the region multiplied with the square of the age of the household head to obtain variation across households within a region. The number of children 
contains all household children below the age of 20. 
 
4.5 Methodology and results 
 
 In line with the unified theoretical framework that disentangled migration and 
remittances effects the empirical analysis will need to include both variables separately and 
                         
49
 Since many households have both domestic and international migration the latter are not easily separable and 
are used combined in this chapter. 
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identify the respective effects. There are some concerns, however, that migration as well as 
remittances may be endogenous. Migration households may differ from non-migration 
households in unobserved ways that may also affect the educational attainment of the 
household’s children. For example, an economic shock may trigger the migration decision of 
a household member and at the same time it could induce a child to drop out from school in 
order to work and add to the household income (see Acosta, 2011). Similarly, unobserved 
household preferences may increase the amount of remittances and educational attainment or 
higher educational attainment of children may cause higher amounts of remittances sent by 
the migrants. 
 I attempt to mitigate these problems using an instrumental variable technique. In a first 
step I regress a dummy denoting migration on a number of household characteristics. In this 
regression I use a proxy for migration networks, the share of migration households in the 
region, as excluded instrument (see Hanson and Woodruff, 2003). The intuition behind this 
instrument is that migration is enhanced and facilitated if there exists a migration network that 
could help a prospective migrant to emigrate. The identifying assumption is that having a 
migration network per se does not change the educational attainment of the children of the 
respective household apart from its effect through the migration decision. Formally, we have 
 
vw = xw 	yz + {wy| + }w      (4.2) 
 
where v is a binary variable indicating if a household - has sent a migrant abroad or not and 
x is the proxy of migration networks, that is a variable that indicates the number of migrant 
households in a district in Senegal. This variable is multiplied with the square of the age of 
the household head to attain variation on the household level (see Hanson and Woodruff, 
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2003; Acosta, 2011). As Hanson and Woodruff (2003, p.21-22) point out, household 
characteristics may be relevant for the migration decision and therefore are a suitable term for 
interaction with regional migration rates (as noted in section 3.4). While this achieves 
variation in the household level, a potential limitation may be that the square of the age of the 
household head used here may be directly linked with child schooling. Furthermore, H is a 
vector of other household characteristics that may influence the migration decision including 
average schooling of adults above 20 years. The latter proxies parents’ education as it is not 
possible to disentangle the exact family relationships among the individuals of a household 
with the data used in this analysis. 
 In the next step, I regress remittances on household characteristics for migration 
households. Once migrated, the duration of migration may influence the amount of 
remittances as migrants who have stayed at their destination for a longer time period may 
have adapted to the new environment. They have had more time to find employment and to be 
promoted. They may also have acquired knowledge necessary in their job market. All these 
aspects may lead to higher remuneration and therefore to higher amounts of remittances sent 
back home. As remittances are left-censored at zero, I specify the following tobit model:  
 
 =		 		 			;	∗ = w 	yÐ + {wy| +  > 0		0					;	∗ = w 	yÐ + {wy| +  ≤ 0	,																																								 (4.3) 
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 I estimate these first-stage regressions manually in separate steps as the equation for 
remittances is only possible for migration households.50 The predicted values of migration and 
remittances obtained from these two steps are plugged into the outcome equation of interest: 
 
 h = Ñw 	y]Ñ +vwyÒ + {wy| + n     (4.4) 
 
where h denotes educational attainment of child ; and Ñw 	and	vw are the predicted 
values for migration and remittances for household -. Since this method involves three 
distinct estimations the whole procedure is bootstrapped using 300 repetitions to obtain valid 
standard errors. I follow the literature (see section 4.2) in separating the estimations between 
girls and boys. We may expect different effects if, for example, parents believe that returns to 
education on the labor market are higher for men than for women51. To assess the validity of 
the instruments, table 4.4 shows results of estimations demonstrating the strength of the 
relationship between the instruments and the endogenous variables. Columns (1) and (2) show 
that migration networks are a highly significant predictor of household migration status for 
boys and girls. The reason is likely that migration networks facilitate migration as friends and 
relatives who have migrated may inform and help prospective migrants. Once migrated, the 
duration of migration has a strong positive and significant impact on the amount of 
remittances sent home by the migrants. 
                         
50
 Since the equation for remittances can only be estimated for migration households the values for remittances 
used in case of non-migration are zero. This also means that only remittances of former household members are 
considered. 
51
 See the discussion on labor market choices for men and women in subsection 3.5.4. 
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Table 4.4: Relevance of instruments for migration & remittances 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Migration Remittances 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls 
     
migration network 0.11*** 0.11***   
(0.03) (0.03)   
duration of 
migration 
  0.36*** 0.34*** 
  (0.10) (0.11) 
average adult 
schooling (above 20 
years) 
0.00 -0.00 -0.26 -0.06 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.28) (0.41) 
dakar -0.30*** -0.17 -13.88*** -15.64*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (4.64) (5.20) 
other urban areas -0.10 -0.07 -7.47*** -11.54*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (2.83) (3.53) 
wealth 0.06** 0.07** 5.10*** 4.93*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (1.06) (1.27) 
household size 0.01 0.00 0.56** 0.24 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.23) (0.32) 
average adult age 
(above 20 years) 
0.00 -0.00 -0.13 -0.06 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.13) 
average adult 
employment (above 
20 years) 
0.07 -0.02 -6.36** -8.62*** 
(0.08) (0.08) (2.53) (2.42) 
no. of children -0.00 0.01 -0.28 0.13 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.34) (0.46) 
constant 0.41** 0.47* 11.04 11.86 
 (0.19) (0.24) (6.94) (8.08) 
     
observations  2,793 2,730 1,970 1,916 
(pseudo) R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.07 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters (districts) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The R-squared refers to columns (1) 
and (2). The Pseudo R-squared refers to columns (3) and (4). 
 
Assessing the exogeneity of the instruments is more difficult as there are no tests that 
can clearly identify exogeneity. Moreover, the equations are exactly identified making it 
impossible to use standard exogeneity tests that rely on the assumption that at least one of the 
instruments is exogenous to assess the exogeneity of the others. In addition, it would not be 
clear how to implement such a test in the multi-step setting used in this analysis. Instead, we 
need to state clearly that the results shown below rest upon the assumption that migration 
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networks do not impact on educational attainment of children except through their effect on 
migration. However, if migrants provide educational goods such as schools in their home 
communities (see Chauvet et al., 2013), migration networks would not be truly exogenous and 
the effect of migration on child education may be overestimated. Similarly, the duration of 
migration of a migrant, once migrated, must not affect child education except through its 
impact on the size of remittances sent back home. Theoretically, migration rates may be 
higher where educational infrastructure is well-established and schooling levels are high as it 
may be easier for educated individuals to find migration opportunities. As the association 
between migration networks and household migration are also positive, the resulting estimate 
for migration may be overestimated. Similarly, the duration of migration may be positively 
related, in theory, if more schooling induces the migrant not to return for a longer period of 
time and to send home remittances for the schooling of the child. Therefore, the results below 
should be seen as initial empirical evidence for the relationships between migration, 
remittances and child schooling in Senegal. 
Table 4.5 shows estimation results of the impact of migration, remittances and adult 
schooling on educational attainment of children aged 7 to 19. Columns (1) to (3) contain the 
results for boys. The first column includes migration and remittances as predictors for child 
education. Migration has a negative coefficient while remittances have a positive one. This is 
in line with the theoretical arguments if the negative effects of migration outweigh the 
positive ones leading to an overall negative coefficient. Remittances were expected to show a 
positive effect since they are supposed to alleviate credit constraints. However, both migration 
and remittances are not significant meaning that we cannot infer any negative or positive 
effect of these variables. In the second and the third column I estimate educational attainment 
using either migration only or remittances only. In this way the differences between the full 
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model and the models often used in the literature can be evaluated. It is notable that the 
coefficient of remittances, when included without controlling for migration, shows a negative 
sign while it shows a positive sign in the full model. Although this would confirm the 
theoretically expected result that the effect of remittances is overestimated if migration has a 
predominantly negative effect and is omitted from the regression, we cannot clearly infer this 
result from these estimations as the standard errors are very large and the effects are 
insignificant. Similarly, in the estimations of educational attainment of girls, the absolute size 
of the coefficient for remittances in the restricted model in column (6) is greater than that of 
the full model in column (4) since migration is likely to be responsible for parts of the effect. 
As the coefficient of remittances is negative, the results of the estimation including migration 
only (column 5) shows a greater negative coefficient. It is remarkable that the signs are 
negative for both migration and remittances in all estimations for girls. However, they do not 
exhibit a significant effect on educational attainment in any of the estimations. 
Moreover, according to the theory, we would expect a positive impact of adult 
education on child schooling. This is strongly confirmed by the results of these estimations for 
both boys and girls. Specifically, an increase of average adult schooling in the household 
decreases the gap between the grade a child should be in according to her age and the grade 
she is actually in by about 0.33 in all estimations.  
Going back to Figure 4 and revisiting the underlying theoretical relationships, we may 
conclude that Senegal indeed is located in area A, where preferred educational levels for 
children are lower than financial constraints. This means that remittances may not play a role 
for child schooling because the credit constraint is not binding. In contrast, there are many 
arguments that point to a positive or negative effect of migration, which should be visible in 
the absence of binding credit constraints. Therefore, it is likely that positive and negative 
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migration effects have cancelled out on average leading to a non-significant result in the 
estimation. Moreover, adult schooling appears to have a positive effect on child education as 
expected. These results are therefore in line with the theory if we perceive Senegal to be 
located in area A of Figure 4, which is likely to be the case given the low mean years of adult 
schooling as shown in Table 4.2. This result may therefore also hold for many other Sub-
Saharan African countries with similarly low levels of adult schooling, such as Mali and 
Ethiopia. 
 
Table 4.5: Impact of migration & remittances on child educational attainment – age 7-19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Boys Girls 
       
migration -1.09 -1.08  -3.30 -3.49  
 (1.38) (1.36)  (2.53) (2.45)  
remittances 0.00  -0.01 -0.02  -0.04 
 (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) 
average adult 
schooling (above 20 
years) 
0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) 
Dakar 1.12 1.12 1.48** -0.55 -0.39 0.09 
 (0.74) (0.69) (0.62) (0.95) (0.91) (0.85) 
other urban area 1.20 1.19* 1.30* 0.69 0.84 0.82 
 (0.75) (0.72) (0.67) (0.89) (0.82) (0.84) 
wealth -0.11 -0.11 -0.17 0.23 0.16 0.01 
 (0.23) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.20) 
household size -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.14 0.14 0.09 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.08) 
average adult age 
(above 20 years) 
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
average adult 
employment (above 
20 years) 
-0.09 -0.09 -0.18 -0.39 -0.35 -0.42 
(0.52) (0.48) (0.40) (0.63) (0.72) (0.65) 
no. of children -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.20 -0.20 -0.17 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.20) (0.20) (0.14) 
       
observations 2,765 2,765 2,765 2,693 2,693 2,693 
Bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clusters (districts) using 300 repetitions in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In the next step, in line with the literature reviewed in section 4.2, I repeat the analysis 
for two age subgroups of children to see if these results differ depending on the age range of 
children. The first group contains children aged 7 to 12, that is the period in which they 
should be in primary school if they do not enroll late or retain a grade. Children in the second 
group are between 13 and 19 years old, the period they should be in secondary school 
(UNESCO-IBE, 2010). Tables G1 and G2 in the appendix show the results of these refined 
estimations. Similar to the results shown in Table 4.5, migration and remittances are 
insignificant predictors of educational attainment. Again, adult schooling is a highly 
significant predictor confirming the results obtained when all children were included. 
 To further investigate the reasons why both migration and remittances do not exhibit 
any significant effect for the data at hand, I will examine the impact of these variables on the 
household expenditure on education. The literature has argued that household investments in 
education are the main transmission channel through which migration and remittances may 
affect child education (e.g. Acosta, 2011, Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003). The correlation 
between remittances and expenditure for education is positive at about 13 percent. The 
correlation between remittances and the share of education expenditure in total expenditure is 
only around 1 percent. This may suggest that while the absolute value of the expenditure 
increases with remittances, its share of total expenditures remains roughly the same. However, 
these correlations do not account for other covariates. Table 4.6 shows instrumental variable 
estimations analogous to the ones in Table 4.5 using education expenditures as dependent 
variables.52 The results for absolute and relative expenditures (columns 1 and 2) show positive 
coefficients for remittances and negative ones for migration. However, both coefficients are 
                         
52
 These estimations are on the household level. To allow appropriate comparisons to the previous estimations 
only households with children aged 7 to 19 are considered. 
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insignificant and therefore we cannot attribute a negative effect to migration or a positive one 
to remittances.  
 These results are in line with the expectations given the results for educational 
attainment: As neither migration nor remittances seem to influence the investment behavior of 
receiving households regarding education these variables also do not impact on child 
education. In contrast, adult schooling is a highly significant predictor of education 
investments (columns 1 and 2 in table 4.6) and therefore could be the main driving force of 
child educational outcomes through increased educational investments. 
 
Table 4.6: Impact of migration & remittances on education expenditure 
 (1) (2) 
 Absolute education 
expenditure 
Share of education 
expenditure 
   
migration -2,267.74 -1.60 
 (2,199.31) (1.42) 
remittances 11.05 0.02 
 (135.35) (0.05) 
average adult schooling (above 20 
years) 
303.61** 0.20*** 
(128.28) (0.06) 
Dakar 321.03 -0.09 
 (1,452.13) (0.81) 
other urban area 713.65 0.55 
 (1,307.78) (0.77) 
wealth 1,551.24** 0.01 
 (718.83) (0.31) 
household size 428.89** 0.04 
 (177.44) (0.12) 
average adult age (above 20 years) 27.87 0.02 
(33.65) (0.02) 
average adult employment (above 
20 years) 
530.72 -0.51 
(664.95) (0.47) 
no. of children -168.79 0.07 
(232.29) (0.15) 
   
observations 1,510 1,465 
Bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clusters (districts) using 300 repetitions in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.7: Education expenditures & child educational attainment – age 7-19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Boys Girls 
migration -0.92 -0.73 -3.11 -3.08* 
 (1.36) (1.24) (2.36) (1.84) 
remittances 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
average adult schooling (above 20 years) 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
education expenditure 0.00*** 0.15*** 0.00*** 0.28*** 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.07) 
Dakar 1.13 1.20* -0.72 -0.68 
 (0.70) (0.68) (0.90) (0.85) 
other urban areas 1.14 1.29* 0.45 0.58 
 (0.70) (0.69) (0.88) (0.90) 
no. of children 0.01 -0.03 -0.20 -0.25 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.17) 
wealth -0.26 -0.20 0.16 0.27 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) 
household size -0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.17 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.14) (0.12) 
average adult age (above 20 years) 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
average adult employment (above 20 years) -0.08 0.05 -0.49 -0.23 
 (0.49) (0.53) (0.72) (0.74) 
     
observations 2,765 2,678 2,693 2,644 
Bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clusters (districts) using 300 repetitions in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Absolute 
education expenditure is used in columns (1) and (3). The share of education expenditure in total expenditure is used in columns (2) and (4). 
 
 
To find out, if education expenditures are indeed the relevant transmission channel, 
table 4.7 shows estimations including absolute and relative education expenditures besides 
migration, remittances and adult schooling to explain educational attainment for boys and 
girls. The education of adult household members still has a strong positive impact on child 
education. For boys the respective coefficients are similar in size and for girls the coefficients 
are smaller but nevertheless highly significant. Moreover, absolute and relative education 
expenditures have very significant positive effects on child educational attainment. This 
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suggests that adult schooling does not or only to a small extent have an impact on child 
education through education expenditures. These results suggest that more educated adult 
household members directly care for higher education of the household’s children even when 
holding the expenditures for education constant. This may also be an indication that financial 
constraints are not binding and schooling levels of children can be increased if adults have 
favorable preferences towards education. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Migration and remittances flows in Sub-Saharan Africa are considerable and are likely to 
influence educational outcomes of children in migration households. The literature analyzing 
impacts on child education has produced ambiguous results and the dynamics in Sub-Saharan 
Africa have scarcely been researched. In this chapter, I contrast the various transmission 
channels both migration of household members and remittances migrants send back home 
may have on child education in sending households. I set up a model and illustrate that 
migration and remittances may have counteracting effects that need to be tackled in a unified 
framework including both variables. The model shows that the level of child schooling 
depends on their parents’ preferences and financial constraints. Both are positively associated 
with the education level of parents. Remittances can further reduce liquidity constraints but 
the direction of the migration effect is unclear as there are a number of transmission 
mechanisms between migration and child schooling that can be positive or negative. Since 
existing studies have focused either on migration or on remittances but not on both 
simultaneously the interpretation of the resulting effects remained unclear. 
 Using survey data from Senegal, I operationalize the model including both migration 
and remittances as well as schooling of adult household members and estimate their impact on 
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child education. I address concerns of endogeneity using migration networks as instrument for 
the migration decision and the duration of migration of a migrant, once migrated, as an 
instrument for remittances. 
 The results of these estimations do not show any significant effects of migration or 
remittances on educational attainment of children aged 7 to 19. There is, however, suggestive 
evidence that the effect of remittances may be underestimated if migration is not controlled 
for and the effect of migration may be overestimated if included alone. This may serve to 
reinterpret the results of the existing literature. To investigate the reason for the lack of an 
effect I analyze the impact of both variables on the main transmission channel, education 
spending. As neither migration nor remittances appear to influence household spending 
behavior concerning education, the insignificant results with respect to child education are not 
surprising. Finally, in line with the theory, I find that average adult schooling is a highly 
significant predictor of education spending and educational attainment of children. It seems 
that educational preferences of adults essentially influence educational outcomes of children 
in Senegal. In contrast, preferred child education appears to be below the financially 
attainable level and positive migration effects cancel out negative ones leading to an 
insignificant overall effect of migration on child schooling. 
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Table G1: Impact of migration & remittances on child educational attainment – age 7-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Boys Girls 
       
migration -0.48 -0.45  -0.97 -1.12  
 (1.29) (1.34)  (6.38) (6.35)  
remittances 0.00  0.00 -0.02  -0.02 
 (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
average adult schooling 
(above 20 years) 
0.20*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.19** 0.20** 0.19*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) 
Dakar 1.86** 1.84** 1.99*** 1.18 1.35* 1.33*** 
 (0.80) (0.75) (0.58) (0.84) (0.80) (0.41) 
other urban area 1.69*** 1.67*** 1.72*** 1.00* 1.14** 1.03*** 
 (0.49) (0.45) (0.42) (0.58) (0.55) (0.30) 
wealth -0.13 -0.12 -0.16 -0.08 -0.15 -0.14 
 (0.30) (0.27) (0.26) (0.19) (0.17) (0.10) 
household size -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.41) (0.41) (0.05) 
average adult age (above 
20 years) 
0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) 
average adult 
employment (above 20 
years) 
0.01 -0.00 -0.06 -0.87 -0.76 -0.93** 
(0.34) (0.33) (0.36) (0.61) (0.60) (0.42) 
no. of children 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.41) (0.41) (0.08) 
       
observations 1,395 1,395 1,395 1,284 1,284 1,284 
Bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clusters (districts) using 300 repetitions in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table G2: Impact of migration & remittances on child educational attainment – age 13-19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Boys Girls 
       
migration -2.84 -2.92  -2.95 -2.65  
 (3.67) (3.51)  (3.79) (3.64)  
remittances -0.01  -0.03 0.03  0.02 
 (0.07)  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) 
average adult schooling 
(above 20 years) 
0.51*** 0.51*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.54*** 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11) 
Dakar 1.29 1.34 2.35*** 0.13 -0.15 0.80 
 (1.76) (1.69) (0.89) (1.49) (1.43) (1.11) 
other urban area 1.86 1.90 2.20** 1.47 1.17 1.64 
 (1.28) (1.23) (0.86) (1.32) (1.22) (1.15) 
wealth -0.06 -0.09 -0.19 0.03 0.11 -0.17 
 (0.37) (0.33) (0.26) (0.43) (0.44) (0.29) 
household size 0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.14 0.14 0.07 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) 
average adult age (above 
20 years) 
0.07 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.05 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
average adult 
employment (above 20 
years) 
-0.80 -0.76 -0.86 0.39 0.04 0.38 
(0.79) (0.74) (0.58) (0.79) (0.89) (0.80) 
no. of children -0.14 -0.14 -0.03 -0.29 -0.29* -0.25* 
(0.23) (0.22) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.14) 
       
observations 1,370 1,370 1,370 1,409 1,409 1,409 
Bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clusters (districts) using 300 repetitions in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
 
 This chapter concludes the dissertation, embedding the analyses in the development 
context regarding human capital, labor markets and remittances in Francophone Sub-Saharan 
Africa, highlighting the contributions of my analyses to research in these fields and 
suggesting future research that may benefit from the theories, empirical applications and 
results in this work. 
In chapter 1, I introduced this dissertation remarking that the development of 
educational indicators (such as adult literacy rates) in Sub-Saharan Africa has been positive in 
the past years, nevertheless, still leaving considerable scope for improvement. However, since 
education is relevant for the labor market, the latter should be able to absorb higher numbers 
of students who graduate from primary or higher school. This does not seem to be the case: 
The labor markets in Sub-Saharan African countries appear to struggle with improved 
educational outcomes as the increase in wage employment cannot keep in step with increasing 
school enrolment numbers (see Bennell, 1996, p.188, Table 5). We would certainly not want 
to lower educational attainment to accommodate the specificities of the labor market but 
much rather improve the capacity of the labor market to offer decent employment options for 
an increasingly educated population. That is, there are two aims: First, further increasing the 
formation of human capital in schools and second, improving labor market options. This 
dissertation shows opportunities to improve both education and labor market outcomes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa by analysing the relevant dynamics which are summarized below. 
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As there are severe budget constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa, we could think of many 
educational improvements that may increase educational outcomes (such as the provision of 
text books or electrification of schools). I have chosen to study the consequences of grade 
retention as repetition rates are very high in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa in comparison 
to other world regions and it appears to be a particularly expensive policy. Therefore, I have 
started my analysis of human capital on the level of students noting that grade retention can 
be costly to households who may need the labor of their children to sustain themselves and 
that high rates of grade retention is costly for governments as well. 
I have used a unique panel data set from Senegalese primary schools (see PASEC, 
2004) where comparable test scores across grades allowed a detailed analysis of the impact of 
grade repetition on student achievement. The methodological analyses include an innovative 
matching methodology that incorporates the development path of students, robustness checks 
and simulation estimates that give confidence in the results. 
Greater achievement in response to grade retention could have justified wide-spread 
grade repetition practices in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. However, this analysis 
suggests that there is no evidence that grade retention positively affects subsequent student 
achievement and therefore that the costly practice of high repetition rates may be changed 
without a drop in student achievement measured by the test scores that students attain. To the 
contrary, the results indicate that grade retention may in fact worsen their achievement, 
potentially for de-motivational reasons. 
 Future research in the context of repetition and student achievement is highly 
dependent on high-quality data that are scarcely available in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of 
particular interest in this field is the high number of school dropouts. The discussion on 
selection in chapter 2 shows that research on dropouts is important if we want to learn more 
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about the consequences of repetition, the costs for governments and households and the 
potential of policies that try to minimize the number of students who leave school early. 
 If lowering grade retention rates indeed leads to better achievement and higher 
educational attainment of children, this will have consequences on the labor market. To 
understand what the consequences may be, I have introduced human capital considerations 
into the literature on remittances and labor market outcomes (chapter 3). Research on the 
relationship between the receipt of remittances of non-migrant household members and their 
labor market outcomes is ambiguous. The argument that remittances raise reservation wages 
and reduce labor supply is contrasted with research on return migrants who appear to use the 
capital they earn abroad to start a business in their origin countries. I construct a formal 
theoretical model that shows that both credit constraints and knowledge constraints need to be 
overcome to choose self-employment over wage employment. Remittances received would 
therefore not necessarily be used for consumption purposes but are used for potentially 
productive business start-ups if the educational minimum requirements are met by the 
respective individuals. Combining the remittances and return migration literature with human 
capital considerations seems a promising way of explaining the ambiguity of existing studies 
on remittances and labor supply. 
 In the empirical analysis, I used a detailed World Bank survey of Senegalese 
households from 2009 that was specifically designed to shed light on the issue of remittances 
(World Bank, 2009). The statistical analysis indeed provides evidence that remittances 
increase the likelihood of self-employment if individuals have spent at least one or more years 
in primary school enabling them to make simple calculations and to read. However, this result 
was only found for Senegalese men. Women did not seem to respond to remittances, which 
may partly be due to their traditional role in Senegalese society. 
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 This has direct implications for future research: Empowerment of women in society 
may make the rationale of their labor market participation resemble that of men and therefore 
further research is needed to understand these dynamics for women. Moreover, these analyses 
are carried out in a setting of a low income country. With low literacy rates and low average 
years of schooling they are an example of the dynamics that are likely to be found in other 
Sub-Saharan African countries. To fully understand the importance of education in this 
context, studies on these relationships in higher income countries with more schooling is 
needed. Moreover, a data set that tracks households over many years and notes phases of 
unemployment, self-employment and wage employment as well as their financial constraints 
including the receipt of remittances would be highly useful to increase the precision of the 
results. 
Combining the results of chapter 3 with the fact that an ever increasing number of 
children are enrolled in school and enter the labor market with higher levels of education, we 
may not be able to rely on increases in wage employment opportunities but may have to think 
about policies that support self-employment endeavors of individuals in order to take pressure 
from the labor market. As starting businesses often requires up-front costs and since 
remittances are not available to the entire population, the respective policies would have to 
target an improvement in access to credit markets. At the same time, this research also leads 
to the conclusion that individuals who face lower credit constraints may need to have at least 
a few years of education in a setting with scarce wage employment opportunities. Starting a 
self-employment project may be the only option for them to make a living. 
 Finally, chapter 4 contributes to the literature by specifically looking at the importance 
of credit constraints for the schooling decisions of households with respect to their children. 
In combination with the results of chapter 3, there is the possibility of a virtuous circle: 
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Remittances may potentially increase child education and higher educational attainment may 
lead to positive labor market outcomes later in life. Higher income from improved labor 
market choices could then increase the education of a new generation of children. 
Specifically, the research aimed at showing that existing studies that analyze the 
relationship between remittances and child schooling are not only ambiguous but also do not 
offer clear interpretations of the identified effects. Remittances and migration are closely 
interlinked and net effects of one factor without the explicit consideration of the other factor 
are difficult to interpret. This research set out to disentangle the respective effects in order to 
understand how important the alleviation of liquidity constraints can be considered to be for 
educational outcomes of children. This research shows that neither migration nor remittances 
appear to be relevant for child schooling. Rather, child education may be best explained by 
the educational attainment of adults in the household. The estimations suggest that a higher 
average of adult schooling in the household increases educational attainment of children in 
that household beside its positive effect on education expenditure. This implies that for a low-
income Sub-Saharan African country, it may not be binding credit constraints but rather the 
preferences of the adult population that prevent higher educational attainment of children. 
Therefore, a virtuous circle of increasing education induced by remittances could not be 
found. It is probably difficult to target parental preferences directly by means of policies. 
However, the reason why parents with lower education have a negative impact on their 
children’s education may be that they do not believe the returns to education to be sufficiently 
high. This means that a policy that improves labor market conditions, such as increasing the 
number of wage employment opportunities or facilitating self-employment, may signal higher 
educational returns and may therefore indirectly lead parents to support their children’s 
educational progress. 
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 In further research, it would be useful to know, how much disentangling the effects of 
migration and remittances changes the results of existing studies, which would give us more 
information on the severity of liquidity constraints and the actual impact of the latter on the 
schooling decision of children. Much as in chapter 3, the results of these estimations can 
readily be transferred to other Sub-Saharan African countries with similar education levels 
and liquidity constraints. Further research, on countries with higher income and greater 
schooling levels, would help to understand the underlying dynamics of child schooling even 
better. 
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